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ABSTRACT 
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE POLICY: POWER SHIFT, 
DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS, AND SOVEREIGNTY ASSERTIVENESS (1988-2010) 
                                                                   Dalei Jie 
                                                               Avery Goldstein 
How to explain the rise and fall of the Taiwan independence policy? As the Taiwan Strait 
is still the only conceivable scenario where a major power war can break out and 
Taiwan’s words and deeds can significantly affect the prospect of a cross-strait military 
conflict, to answer this question is not just a scholarly inquiry. I define the Taiwan 
independence policy as internal political moves by the Taiwanese government to 
establish Taiwan as a separate and sovereign political entity on the world stage. Although 
two existing prevailing explanations—electoral politics and shifting identity—have some 
merits, they are inadequate to explain policy change over the past twenty years. Instead, I 
argue that there is strategic rationale for Taiwan to assert a separate sovereignty. 
Sovereignty assertions are attempts to substitute normative power—the international 
consensus on the sanctity of sovereignty—for a shortfall in military-economic-diplomatic 
assets. So when Taiwan’s security environment becomes more perilous as a result of 
adverse power shift and domestic constraints hinder internal balancing efforts, Taiwan is 
more likely to resort to sovereignty assertions, while favorable power shift and enhanced 
domestic mobilizational capacity reduce the incentive to assert sovereignty. Using 
congruence procedure and process tracing and drawing a large amount of historical and 
qualitative data, I test my argument in five periods: the early Lee Teng-hui years (1988-
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1994), the late Lee Teng-hui years (1995-1999), Chen Shui-bian’s early moderation 
(2000-2001), the Chen Shui-bian era (2002-2007), and the Ma Ying-jeou era (2008-
2010). I find that my theory focusing on external and internal constraints offer a better 
explanation of the Taiwan independence policy. My findings suggest that balancing, as a 
survival and security strategy, can take a political face under certain circumstances, and 
international norms do matter in political leaders’ strategic calculations. An important 
policy implication is that in contrast to the conventional understanding that Taiwan 
independence grows out of the Taiwanese soil, it actually has an overlooked external 
origin.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Taiwan and the mainland are indivisible parts of China’s territory, and all 
Chinese are compatriots of the same flesh and blood. At this time when all 
of humanity longs for peace and is pursing conciliation, all Chinese should 
work together to seek peaceful and democratic means to achieve our 
common goal of national reunification.                                                                                                                    
Lee Teng-hui, May 20, 1990, inaugural address, the Eighth President of 
the Republic of China 
The 1991 constitutional amendments have designated cross-strait relations 
as a state-to-state relationship or at least a special state-to-state 
relationship, rather than an internal relationship between a legitimate 
government and a renegade group, or between a central government and a 
local government.                                                                                           
Lee Teng-hui, July 9, 1999, interview with Deutche Welle 
The people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait came from the same family… 
The integration of our economies, trade, and culture can be a starting point 
for gradually building faith and confidence in each other. This, in turn, can 
be the basis for a new framework of permanent peace and political 
integration.                                                                                                
Chen Shui-bian, December 31, 2000, New Year’s Eve Address 
Taiwan is our country, and our country cannot be bullied, diminished, 
marginalized, or downgraded as a local entity… Taiwan is a sovereign 
independence country. Simply put, it must be clear that Taiwan and China 
are each one country on each side of the strait.                                                                                                                
Chen Shui-bian, August 3, 2002, Opening Address to the 29th Annual 
Meeting of the World Federation of Taiwanese Associations (in Tokyo, 
Japan) via Live Video Link 
Under the principle of “no unification, no independence, and no use of 
force”… and under the framework of the ROC Constitution, we will 
maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait… based on the “1992 
Consensus,” negotiations should resume at the earliest time possible.                                                                                                           
Ma Ying-jeou, May 20, 2008, inaugural address, the Twelfth President 
of the Republic of China 
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1.1. The puzzle 
Taiwan and mainland China have been governed separately for more than six decades 
after the Kuomintang (KMT/the Nationalist Party) lost the Chinese civil war and fled to 
the island in 1949.1 During the first four decades when Taiwan was ruled by the two 
Chiangs, tensions were high but neither side attempted to redefine the political nature of 
cross-strait relations. Both sides claimed to be the sole legal government to represent 
China and were determined to reunify China under its rule. In the context of the Cold 
War and East-West divide, each side managed to find a niche for itself and survived. 
However, in the past twenty years or so the Taiwanese government from time to time 
deviated from the decades-old policy of one China, wavered over the goal of unification, 
and redefined the nature of Beijing-Taipei relations. In another word, the Taiwan 
independence policy, once a political taboo, has made its way to the Taiwanese 
government’s political agenda. But the Taiwan independence policy is not always on the 
rise. As the above five political speeches illustrate, it waxes and wanes.  
One quick reaction to the question might point to Taiwan’s democratic transition that 
gradually took shape in the late 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s. There is no doubt 
that democratization constitutes one basic background since before the fundamental 
political change ideas of Taiwan independence were strictly prohibited, let alone 
becoming politically viable. Nevertheless, democratization is merely a “permissive 
cause” of the Taiwan independence policy and cannot explain its rise and fall, just as 
                                                          
1 Throughout the dissertation, the ROC (Republic of China) and Taiwan will be used interchangeably for convenience, 
and so will be the PRC (People’s Republic of China) and China. Moreover, terms such as “state” and “country” will be 
applied to Taiwan solely for analytical purpose. None of these suggest that the author takes a substantive view on 
Taiwan’s sovereign status.   
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anarchy is also a “permissive cause” of wars but cannot explain why in certain 
international system the outbreak of wars is more frequent than others.2 The dissertation 
focuses exclusively on the post-democratization era, thus making democratization more 
or less a constant and ruling it out as an explanatory variable.  
Another reaction to the question sees the Taiwan independence policy purely as 
electioneering, i.e., it is electorally beneficial for politicians to outbid each other in 
promoting Taiwan independence policies. However, it is not entirely clear that being 
assertive on Taiwan independence is often a winning strategy for elections. In fact, the 
only time that the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won a majority 
in presidential, legislative, or local elections was in 2004, when the election result was 
swayed by an alleged assassination attempt at the DPP candidates, Chen Shui-bian and 
Annette Lu. Moreover, numerous polls have consistently shown that the majority of 
voters have no strong preference for Taiwan independence.  
Still another possible reaction to the question points to the impact of individual political 
leaders. Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian are widely believed to harbor independence 
ambitions so that they have pushed for their cause whenever possible. Although there are 
evidences that they may have some ideological affinity for Taiwan independence, there 
are also ample evidences to suggest that they are pragmatic politicians who are willing to 
bend personal predilections to political realities. In fact, both of them have pursued quite 
different policies on Taiwan independence throughout their presidencies. So how do we 
make sense of the rise and fall of the Taiwan independence policy? 
                                                          
2 For anarchy as a permissive cause of war, see Waltz, 1959, pp. 232-238; Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 334-335. 
4 
 
1.2. Definition of the Taiwan independence policy 
The “Taiwan independence policy” is defined as internal political moves by the 
Taiwanese government to establish Taiwan as a separate and sovereign political entity on 
the world stage, either in the form of sovereignty assertions, redefinition of the nature 
cross-strait relations, or institutional reform. Further elaboration is in order. First, the 
“Taiwan independent policy” has two essential components: sovereignty and 
separateness. The highlight and pursuit of sovereignty is not by itself sufficient, since 
during the authoritarian era the two Chiang’s routinely claimed that the ROC was a 
sovereign country, and no one would accuse them of Taiwan independence. The second 
component is also crucial: a separate sovereignty, whether separate from the PRC, or a 
vaguely defined “China”. Second, no matter whether the goal of a move is ultimate 
Taiwan independence or not, as long as it contributes to a separate and sovereign Taiwan, 
it is encapsulated under the umbrella of “Taiwan independence policy”. Since sometimes 
whether a move constitutes one toward Taiwan independence is contested,3 the non-
purposive definition avoids the often futile efforts at dissecting the real intent behind a 
move. Third, this is not a study of the social movements of Taiwan independence. 
Although the Taiwan independence movement is not unimportant and has certainly left 
                                                          
3 The most expansive interpretation of Taiwan independence is that of the Beijing’s. In the white paper on the Taiwan 
issue released in February 2000 by the Taiwan Affairs Office, political reform, seeking more international space, 
weaponry purchase from the United States, fostering a Taiwanese identity are all indices of the Taiwan independence 
policy. (The Taiwan Affairs Office, the PRC 2000) The definition adopted here is relatively narrower, as it focuses on 
the political dimension and excludes the military and cultural ones. Richard Bush argued that what Lee Teng-hui had 
said and done during his presidency did not fully justify the claim that he was a “separatist”. Even President Chen Shui-
bian exhibited considerable flexibility and open-mindedness on the cross-strait relations, which was not given credit for 
by Beijing. (Bush, 2005, pp. 35-80) My interviews with former national security officials in Lee Teng-hui 
administration denied that Lee was intent on Taiwan independence in the 1990s. For a radical account that denied that 
existence of a “Taiwan independence plot”, see Friedman, 2006. Friedman maintained that the so-called “Taiwan 
independence plot” was a constructed narrative by the CCP due to its regime interests and quest for regional 
domination but nevertheless falsely adopted by many independent observers and analysts.   
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heavy footprints on Taiwan’s domestic politics after its democratic transition,4 this study 
is one of Taiwan’s security policy and strategy, and the “Taiwan independence policy” 
refers to the Taiwanese government’s endeavors to define, modify and manipulate 
Taiwan’s sovereign status and its relations with China.  
To gauge and measure the rise and fall of Taiwan independence policy, I use the term 
sovereignty assertiveness, i.e. the extent to which the Taiwanese government seeks and 
claims a separate sovereignty. More specifically I look at three aspects: self-claim and -
definition of Taiwan’s sovereignty status and cross-strait relations, long-term 
commitment to unification, and sovereignty-implicated institutional changes. It is worth 
noting that Taiwan’s pursuit of international space is left out of the measurement of 
sovereignty assertiveness. The issue of international space does have implications for 
Taiwan’s sovereignty, but I leave it aside for three reasons.  
First, ever since Taiwan switched to pragmatic diplomacy in the late 1980s, its pursuit of 
international space has been more or less consistent. The degree of success varied over 
time, but the fundamental goal of securing as much as international recognition and 
attention remained unchanged. In contrast, the Taiwanese government’s self-definition of 
cross-strait relations, declaratory commitment to unification and certain institutional 
features changed considerably over time. Second, the success or failure of Taiwan’s 
pursuit of international space is more an immediate result of external pressures and 
support and less the fruit of its own endeavors. Again in contrast, the self-claim of 
sovereignty, commitment to unification and institutional changes are more manipulative 
                                                          
4 For recent works on the Taiwanese independence movement, see Wang, 1999; Phillips, 2005. An earlier well-known 
work is Kerr, 1965.  
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at its own discretion. Third, Taiwan’s international space and diplomatic standing will be 
included as one dimension of the independent variable—power shift, as will be discussed 
later. In a nutshell, Taipei’s pursuit of international space is more about its external 
efforts at highlighting sovereignty, but what the dissertation tries to explain focuses more 
on its internal efforts at elevating its sovereign status, and there are significant differences 
between the internal and external dimensions. I treat them separately for the sake of 
analytical clarity. Below is a brief account of the rise and fall of the Taiwan independence 
policy, i.e. the degree of sovereignty assertiveness.     
1.3. A historical overview of the Taiwan independence policy  
1.3.1. From one China to one China with adjectives (1988-1994) 
When Lee Teng-hui assumed the presidency upon Chiang Ching-kuo’s death in 1988, the 
official line of the ROC was that reunification has to occur under the Three Principles of 
the People, the KMT’s founding ideology.5 On the matter of cross-strait exchange, it was 
the Three No’s policy: no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise. Lee Teng-hui 
vowed to carry on these policies and fulfill the mission of unification for the Chinese 
nation. (Academia Historica, 2000) He emphasized that both Taiwan and the mainland 
are “indivisible part of China,” and all Chinese were “compatriots of the same flesh and 
blood” and should therefore work together to achieve the common goal of national 
unification through peaceful and democratic means. (Academia Historica, 2000) What 
parts Lee from his predecessors were his attitudes toward Beijing: he terminated the 
                                                          
5 The Three Principles of the People refers to nationalism, democracy and people’s livelihood. Taipei’s policy was a 
counter-offer to Beijing’s peace overtures during the late 1970s and early 1980s.  For origins of Beijing’s strategy of 
“peaceful reunification” and Taipei’s response, see Hsiao and Sullivan 1980; Chiu, 1983. 
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“period of national mobilization for the suppression of communist rebellion” and 
abolished the “temporary provisions” of the Constitution in 1991, thus shifting the ROC’s 
long-standing position that Beijing was a “rebel regime” to one that regarded Beijing as a 
(legitimate) “political entity” ruing the mainland area.  
Meanwhile, institutional structures were also established to direct, supervise, and 
implement mainland policies. In particular the National Unification Council (NUC) was 
established and passed the National Unification Guidelines (NUG) in February 1991. The 
NUG envisioned a three-phased unification process: exchanges and reciprocity (short 
term), mutual trust and cooperation (medium term), and consultation and unification 
(long term). Negotiations across the Strait were held since the end of 1991 between the 
Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF), a semi-official body, and its mainland counterpart, the 
ARATS (Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait). Under the auspices of the 
so-called “1992 consensus”—one China, different interpretations, the cross-strait 
interaction culminated in a historic meeting between the two heads of the SEF and 
ARATS in Singapore in April 1993 and its four agreements. 
After 1993 there was a perceptible change of Taipei’s characterization of cross-strait 
relations. “One China policy with adjectives” is perhaps the best term for it, i.e., Lee and 
other political leaders tended to add certain qualifications to the “one China policy” so as 
to highlight the ROC’s sovereignty and equality with the PRC. For example, Chiang 
Ping-kun, the ROC’s Economic Minister, told the press at APEC in Seattle in 1993 that 
the government policy was a “one-China-oriented two-China policy over a certain period 
of time”. In another word, one China is the future, two Chinas are the present. In April 
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1994, Lee stated that “the current stage is that ‘the ROC is on Taiwan’ and ‘the PRC is on 
the mainland’. We should forget words like one China, two Chinas…” (Academia 
Historica 2000) Despite the rhetoric change, Taipei’s policy was still firmly confined to 
the one China framework, its commitment to ultimate unification remained strong and the 
institutionalized cross-strait interaction was moving forward.  
1.3.2. From one divided China to special state-to-state theory (1995-1999)   
The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis was a turning point. Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the U.S., 
China’s two rounds of military exercises and the Clinton administration’s decision to 
send two aircraft carrier battle groups to the vicinity of the strait not only brought the 
greatest crisis since 1958 to the strait, but also effectively ended the conciliatory 
interaction across the strait. In the aftermath of the crisis, although Taipei did not 
abandon the one China policy, it grew more skeptical of it, and frequently referred to 
“one China” as a “political trap” for Taiwan. In February 1997 the Government 
Information Office even warned that if the PRC’s “one China principle” were accepted, it 
amounted to a “verbal annexation” of the ROC, and it was thus better to talk about “one 
divided China” than simply “one China”. In 1998 the SEF and ARATS resumed talks and 
during the meeting between the two heads, Koo Chen-fu, the SEF president, stressed 
once again that “one divided China” was not only a historical fact, but also political 
reality. 
It was Lee Teng-hui himself who redefined the nature of cross-strait relations in a 
revolutionary way. On July 9, 1999, Lee proclaimed that since the ROC’s constitutional 
reform in 1991, cross-strait relations are “nation-to-nation (guojia yu guojia), or at least 
9 
 
as special state-to-state ties (te shu de guoyuguo de guanxi), rather than internal ties 
within ‘one China’ between a legitimate government and a rebellion group, or between 
central and local governments.” The new formulation was seen by many as formally 
scrapping the one China policy and it effectively dashed any hope of cross-strait dialogue 
during Lee’s presidency. In short, the 1995-1999 years witnessed medium rise of 
sovereignty assertiveness, as Taiwanese leaders were more skeptical and critical of one 
China, commitment to unification turned shaky, and institutionalized cross-strait 
interaction stalled.    
1.3.3. Chen’s initial moderation (2000-2001) 
The 2000 presidential election brought Chen Shui-bian, the candidate of the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP), to the presidency, marking the first transfer of power to the 
opposition after five-decade of the KMT rule. Notwithstanding long-term advocate of 
Taiwan independence, initially Chen and the DPP approached cross-strait relations with 
considerable moderation and conciliation. Chen’s inaugural address on May 20 2000 not 
only emphasized the same “ancestral, cultural, and historical background” across the 
strait and did not rule out the possibility of future unification, but also pledged the “Five 
Noes”: no declaration of independence, no change of the national title, no inclusion of the 
‘state-to-state-theory’ into the constitution, no referendum on independence, and no 
abolition of the NUC and NUG.  
Chen’s subsequent statements and policies in the first two years of his reign by and large 
kept the moderate tone and in 2001 his New Year messages went far beyond the DPP’s 
traditional radicalism on Taiwan independence by suggesting the possibility of “political 
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integration” across the strait. Meanwhile, the Chen administration authorized the so-
called “three mini-links”6 between the two offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu and the 
Chinese mainland in January 2001. Taken together, although Chen’s 2000-2001 approach 
was still not comparable to that of the early 1990s in terms of commitment to unification 
or acceptance of the “1992 consensus”, etc., it was a significant retreat from the late Lee 
Teng-hui years and given the initial pessimistic expectations of Chen’s handling of cross-
strait relations, could be reasonably coded as a period of low sovereignty assertiveness. 
1.3.4. From one-country-on-each-side on (2002-2007) 
Chen initial moderate approach proved to be transient and the “one-country-one-each-
side theory” was clearly a watershed. When addressing a group of overseas Taiwanese 
supporters on August 3, 2002 Chen claimed that “Taiwan and China are standing on 
opposite sides of the strait, there is one country on each side.” The new formulation was 
arguably more assertive in terms of self-claim of sovereignty than Lee’s “special-state-to-
state-theory”, and it was followed by a series of moves that were deemed by Beijing as 
“creeping independence”, salami tactics to achieve formal independence. In September 
2003 Chen proposed a new constitution to be completed by 2006 to make Taiwan “a 
normal, complete and great country.” Later that year Chen announced that a “defensive 
referendum” would be held alongside the presidential election in March 2004, which did 
not raise the alarm for Beijing, but also drew strong opposition from Washington.  
                                                          
6 The “three links” are direct postal, trade and transportation linkages between mainland China and Taiwan, which were 
severed ever since 1949. To establish the “three links” has long been the PRC’s goal since the late 1970s. The “three 
mini-links” are “mini-” because they only apply to the two offshore islands. 
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Chen won his second term by a razor-thin margin and made a fairly conciliatory 
inaugural speech on May 20 2004, but he soon resorted back to tactics with high 
sovereignty assertiveness. He continued to press on the “constitutional reengineering 
project” and called for a “bottom-up, outside-in” process, which was prone to radical 
independence-oriented drafts. In February 2006 one significant institutional change took 
place when Chen announced that the NUC would “cease to function” and the NUG 
would “cease to apply”, thus further weakening Taipei’s already tenuous commitment to 
unification. Furthermore, Chen indicated that Taiwan should apply for the U.N. 
membership under the name of “Taiwan”, instead of its official title, the ROC, and later 
on he announced to hold another referendum on this issue in tandem with the presidential 
election in early 2008. In short, on all three fronts—definition of Taiwan’s status, 
commitment to unification, and institutional change, the 2002~2007 years were the most 
sovereignty-assertive.  
1.3.5. Enter Ma Ying-jeou (2008-2009) 
The KMT won a landslide victory during the presidential election in May 2008 and the 
coming into power of Ma Ying-jeou, the KMT candidate, abruptly ended the high 
sovereignty-assertive era of his predecessor. During his inaugural address Ma reiterated 
the “no unification, no independence, and no use of force” and promised to maintain the 
status quo in the Taiwan Strait “under the framework of the ROC Constitution.” He also 
called for the resumption of cross-strait negotiations based on the “1992 consensus”, and 
proposed a “truce” in both cross-strait and international arenas. Ma also distanced himself 
from his predecessors by defining the cross-strait relationship as a special one and denied 
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that it was one between two countries. Meanwhile, the SEF and ARATS quickly resumed 
dialogue after a hiatus of nine years. Agreements have been signed on a wide range of 
issues such as trade, transportation, tourism, travel, finance and investment, crime control, 
food safety, etc., and the “three links” were finally realized between the mainland and 
Taiwan. Moreover, a cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) 
was signed in 2010 and there were calls to sign a “peace agreement” between the two 
sides. The Ma Ying-jeou era is thus characterized by distinctively low sovereignty 
assertiveness, the extent to which had never been seen since the Taiwan Strait crisis of 
the mid-1990s.   
Table 1.1 A Summary of the Degree of Sovereignty Assertiveness 
 Sovereignty 
assertion 
Long-term 
commitment to 
unification 
Sovereignty-
implicated 
institutional changes 
SOVEREIGNTY 
ASSERTIVENESS 
1988~1994 Low  Strong Low  LOW 
1995~1999 Medium  Medium Medium MEDIUM 
2000~2001 Low  Medium  Low  LOW 
2002~2007 High  Low  High  HIGH 
2008~2009 Low  Medium Low  LOW 
 
1.3. The argument in brief  
In contrast to the conventional wisdom which locates explanations at domestic and 
individual level, I argue that there is strategic rationale for Taiwan to assert a separate 
sovereignty. Sovereignty assertions are attempts to substitute normative power—the 
international consensus on the sanctity of sovereignty—for a shortfall in military-
economic-diplomatic assets when the security environment becomes perilous for Taiwan 
as a result of adverse power shift.  
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Many see Taiwan’s sovereignty assertions as unnecessarily provocative to Beijing and 
undermine rather than bolster Taiwan’s security. This line of reasoning has a great deal of 
truth, but it neglects the security-plus aspect of sovereignty assertions. A well-founded 
and solid sovereign status contributes to Taiwan’s security for two major reasons. First, 
sovereignty is an instrument for survival. The universalization and canonization of 
sovereignty and its associated norms and principles after the Second World War and the 
decolonization movement means that any forcible action against a sovereign would be 
seen as fundamentally illegitimate. Studies of survival strategies of small states point to 
sovereignty as “the greatest nominal protection for the weak.” Second, sovereignty is 
bargaining chips with respect to political negotiations across the strait. If Taipei ever 
comes to the negotiation table with Beijing, its sovereign status ex ante is critical in 
determining its political status ex post. In short, sovereign status is consequential for 
Taipei to withstand both military coercion and political offensive from Beijing. Although 
it is a double-edged sword, this is the case for every other means of security seeking—
military buildup, alliance building, and pragmatic diplomacy. 
Moreover, I do acknowledge that sovereignty assertions are not necessarily the most 
effective weapon to redress an adverse power shift, but it is the least resource-consuming 
compared with other military, economic or diplomatic means. So I further argue that 
Taipei would have the highest incentive to push on the sovereignty issue when there are 
strong resource and political constraints on its ability to mobilize sufficient resources and 
respond to power shifts in other ways. In other words, i.e., political response becomes 
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more likely when these other means—military, diplomatic, and economic—are less 
available due to domestic constraints. 
With power shift and domestic constraints as the independent variables, we arrive at four 
scenarios. Taiwan’s stances on sovereignty would be the most assertive when an adverse 
power shift threatens its security and survival and strong domestic constraints hinder 
domestic resource mobilization to deal with the changed security environment with more 
orthodox approaches. On the other hand, when external or internal constraints are 
relatively loose, namely, when either power shift is favorable or sufficient domestic 
resources are mobilizable, the push on sovereignty will be less assertive. Under the most 
auspicious circumstances—favorable power shift plus resource abundance, sovereignty 
assertiveness is the lowest and Taipei might choose opening up to mainland China. 
1.4. The significance of the Taiwan independence policy  
The issue of Taiwan independence is a matter of war and peace. Most international 
relations scholars, analysts and Asian specialists have agreed that in today’s world if 
there is any chance for two major powers to plunge into war, it must be between the U.S. 
and China, and the only conceivable trigger would be over the issue of Taiwan. 
(Campbell and Mitchell 2001; Romberg 2003; Carpenter 2005; Tucker 2005; Copper 
2006; Bush and O'Hanlon 2007)7 If one steps further to ask what would lead the two 
major powers armed with nuclear warheads to fight a war that neither wants, one 
possibility is due to unification: the PRC is eager to achieve unification through the use 
                                                          
7 U.S. policy planners tend to take a similar view. For example, the U.S. 2002 Nuclear Posture Review explicitly singed 
out the Taiwan Strait as one of the few contingencies in which nuclear weapons might be brought into use. (Graham 
and Pincus, 2002) 
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of force and the U.S. intervenes in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA); the 
other possibility points to independence: China comes to believe that Taiwan crosses the 
red line toward de jure independence and responds by the use of force, and the U.S. again 
comes to Taiwan’s rescue by confronting the Chinese military force.  
With a closer look the first scenario is less likely given the People’s Liberation Army’s 
(PLA) still limited amphibious capability,8 China’s grand strategy of peaceful 
development (Goldstein, 2005) and the enormous damage to China’s ambition of great 
renaissance that a reckless use of force against Taiwan could bring about,9 and Beijing’s 
optimism that time is on its side.10 The second scenario of war, which results from the 
Taiwanese government’s independence policy, is deemed more realistic and troublesome. 
Indeed Taiwan’s actions were increasingly seen as “the most crucial variable” 
influencing the U.S.-China-Taiwan triangular dynamic and the prospect of military 
conflict.11 (Swaine and Mulvenon, 2001, p. 1) Although after Ma Ying-jeou took office 
in May 2008 there has been significant reduction of tensions across the Taiwan Strait and 
the Taiwan independence policy seems much less of a destabilizing factor, the 
rapprochement is by no means irreversible and it is still crucial to understand how the 
past independence-oriented policies came about and evolved over time.  
                                                          
8 Even the usually alarmist US DoD report to the Congress concluded that “the PLA is capable of accomplishing 
various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan,” and “an attempt to invade Taiwan would strain 
China’s untested armed forces and invite international intervention.” Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2010. 
9 The grand strategy of “peaceful development” has been put to a big test after 2008 in light of Beijing’s more assertive 
stances in a variety of issues areas. See Swaine, 2010; Christensen, 2011; Wang, 2011. Nevertheless, Beijing’s Taiwan 
policy seems rather like an exception to the assertiveness embodied in China’s recent foreign policies. 
10  See Wang, 1999, p.21; Shi, 2000, p. 31. On how Beijing’s optimism and pessimism about future trends affected its 
choice of security strategies and use of force, see Christensen, 2006. Occasional pessimism regarding future cross-strait 
relations did arise from time to time; but on balance optimism was the rule and has been rising with China’s growing 
economic, political and military clout.  
11 To use Su Chi’s [secretary-general of the ROC’s National Security Council (05/20/2008-02/23/2010); chairman of 
the Mainland Affairs Council (02/01/1999-05/19/2000)] metaphor, Taiwan could be the “tail that wags two dogs”. (Su, 
2009) 
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There is no dearth of studies of Taiwan’s policies vis-à-vis mainland China, but there are 
very few systematic and theoretically informed ones. Most existing studies are 
journalistic, policy-oriented and have short time span. A prominent Taiwanese political 
scientist Wu Yu-shan lamented, “… the high attention cast on cross-strait relations has 
not translated into fertile theorization. Detailed description of events and preoccupation 
with current policies preclude detached observation and comparative understanding. We 
are short of theoretical frameworks with which to approach Taipei-Beijing relations.” 
(Wu, 2000, p. 408) Another problem with existing studies is that many of them are 
emotionally charged or ideologically driven since Taiwan independence is such a 
sensitive issue to most people across the Taiwan Strait that even arguments made by 
scholars and analysts are sometimes tinted by the unification-independence controversy. I 
seek to offer a more detached and systematic study by analyzing the Taiwan 
independence phenomenon from a security perspective.  
As a “theory-building” exercise, my theory goes beyond the usual domestic story of the 
Taiwan independence policy and offers a structural explanation focusing on external and 
internal constraints facing Taiwanese leaders. No matter whether it is due to 
democratization, electoral politics, identity change, or individual leaders’ preferences, the 
predominant view holds that the Taiwan independence policy “grows” out of the 
Taiwanese soil. In contrast, my theory suggests that there may be an external origin of the 
Taiwan independence policy, which rises and falls as a result of its changing security 
environment. Though internal dynamics are certainly an integral part of any 
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understanding of the Taiwan independence policy, an exclusive focus on its domestic 
roots is incomplete and will very likely generate misguided policy prescriptions. 
1.5. Methodology and Organization  
The study’s focus on the single case of Taiwan may raise eyebrows among those who 
regard case study as a weak tool of scientific inquiry in political science. In particular 
there are two major criticisms leveled against case study: inability to control for variables 
and generalizability. (Van Evera, 1997, pp. 50-55) First of all, it is worth noting that a 
single case usually has multiple observable implications, i.e. there can still be substantial 
within-case variations of the independent and dependent variables so as to allowing 
vigorous theory testing. Moreover, within-case studies have the advantage of having 
uniform background conditions, the equivalent of actually having many variables 
controlled by keeping them constant. Generalizability is more of a problem for case 
studies, because the validity of a theory for a given case does not say much about its 
applicability to other cases. But this weakness can be offset by case study’s strengths at 
identifying causal processes and providing historical richness.  
On the other hand, this study’s generalizability is hampered by Taiwan’s distinctiveness. 
To be sure, in comparative politics literature there have been many studies comparing 
Taiwan’s political economy with other developmental states and its democratization with 
other countries riding the third wave.12 But Taiwan’s security policy is more in its own 
category. The subject of this dissertation—the Taiwan independence policy/sovereignty 
assertiveness—and one major challenge for Taiwan’s survival and security—the nexus of 
                                                          
12 For examples, see Wade (1990), Lin (1998). 
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security and sovereignty—is to a great extent unique to Taiwan itself. Although there are 
certainly other independence movements across the world, the Taiwan case is 
fundamentally different in that Taiwan has already enjoyed de facto autonomy, which 
remains a long shot for many independent-aspiring groups. Some attempted to group 
Taiwan and other “unrecognized states” in the international system, (Caspersen & 
Stansfield, 2011) but Taiwan still immediately stands out as other impoverished 
unrecognized states with little geopolitical weight bear few resemblances to Taiwan 
beyond not being “recognized”. This is not to suggest that generalizability is a nonissue 
for the study of Taiwan’s security policy, but as a first step it is justifiable to study it on 
its own merits. 
As for specific methods, I employ congruence procedure and process tracing. I draw 
upon a large amount of historical and qualitative data from press reports, government 
documents, memoirs, secondary literature in Chinese and English and in-depth interviews 
I conducted with former officials, security analysts and scholars during my fieldwork in 
Taiwan in 2008 and 2009. Whenever possible and necessary, I try to triangulate data 
from sources in Taiwan, the U.S. and mainland China. The rest of the dissertation is 
organized as follows. Chapter 2 is the theory chapter. It briefly traces the rise and fall of 
the Taiwan independence policy, reviews existing literature and proposes my own theory 
focusing on power shift and domestic constraints; Chapter 3, 4, and 5 test the theory by 
examining the early Lee Teng-hui years (1988-1994) when the Taiwanese government 
adhered to one China and opened up to mainland China, the late Lee Teng-hui Years 
(1995-1999) when there was a medium rise of sovereignty assertiveness, and the Chen 
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Shui-bian era (2002-2007) when the Taiwan independence policy was at its height. 
Chapter 6 addresses two seemingly counter-examples: Chen Shui-bian’s early 
moderation (2000-2001) and the grand cross-strait rapprochement under Ma Ying-jeou 
(2008-2010). Chapter 7 concludes by drawing some theoretical and policy implications.  
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Chapter 2 Explaining the Taiwan Independence Policy: Power Shift, 
Domestic Constraints, and Sovereignty Assertiveness 
 
This is the theory chapter of the dissertation. I first review existing explanations on the 
Taiwan independence policy, most notably the theses on electoral politics and shifting 
identity. Then I propose my own theory focusing on power shift and domestic constraints, 
which is followed by a brief preview of the cases.  
2.1. Prevailing theses: electoral politics and shifting identity  
2.1.1. Electoral politics 
International relations scholars have devoted a significant amount of efforts to study the 
domestic politics-foreign policy nexus and in recent years gone beyond simply arguing 
that “domestic politics matters” to the more interesting questions of how, why and when 
it matters. (Fearon, 1998, p.290; Schultz, 2001, p. 2) In particular regime type and 
electoral politics have often been invoked to explain the different conduct of foreign 
policy between democracies and autocracies and suboptimal foreign policy outcomes. 
However, opinions differ on whether democratic elections incentivize political leaders to 
initiate conciliatory policies and thus make interstate conflicts less likely or just the 
opposite happens, namely, political elites pursue belligerent, adventurous, or expansionist 
policies for electoral benefits. Democratic peace theorists maintain that electoral 
contestation, whether being one important manifestation of the “live and let live” 
democratic norms (Maoz and Russett, 1993), or rendering leaders accountable to largely 
21 
 
anti-war electorate (Doyle, 1986), or helping democratic countries to send more credible 
signals (Schultz, 2001), or magnifying the voice of ever-present anti-war factions 
(Gaubatz, 1999), should in general reduce the likelihood of interstate conflicts. On the 
other hand, however, both formal modeling research (Smith, 1996) and empirical study 
of the U.S. Soviet policy (Nincic, 1990) revealed that electoral considerations tend to bias 
political leaders toward violent, adventurous and overreacting foreign policies. Moreover, 
countries undergoing incomplete democratization with elections but weak political 
institutions are especially war-prone. (Mansfield and Snyder, 2005)  
Domestic politics have also attracted much scholarly attention in the study of Taiwan’s 
mainland and security policy, as Taiwan was gradually democratized and became a 
vibrant democracy by the mid-1990s. Taiwanese as well as American scholars and 
analysts focused on “median voter position” (Hsieh, 1995), domestic political changes 
and cross-strait negotiations (Goldstein, 1999), the converging effects of elections on the 
mainland policy (Wu, 1999), the domestic political economy of Taiwan’s mainland 
economic policies (Leng, 1996; Tung, 2003; Kuo, 1995). Indeed on scholar claimed that 
“the most important factors that determine whether there is war or peace between the 
PRC and Taiwan are the domestic politics of the two sides.” (Tsang, 2002, p. 66) 
However, on the important question of whether electoral politics is a moderating or 
radicalizing factor on the issue of Taiwan independence, i.e., whether electoral politics 
contributed to more or less sovereignty assertiveness, opinions are divided.  
Deriving from Anthony Downs’ economic theory of democracy, Wu’s “vote-maximizing 
model” argued that since the popular preference in Taiwan on issues related to the 
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mainland policy—unification vs. independence and economic interest vs. security interest 
is a normal distribution and the mainstream public opinion is maintaining the status quo, 
major political parties, despite their prior opposing stances, tended to converge toward 
the center for the purpose of vote-maximization. (Wu, 1999) On the other hand, other 
studies show that the approaching of presidential and legislative elections increased the 
probability of more hostile and provocative words and deeds against mainland China. 
(Lin, 2004; Kuan, 2007) Wu’s arguments seem to be supported by the 2000 presidential 
election, while Lin and Kuan’s findings find evidence in the 2004 election, when political 
parties, instead of converging toward “maintaining the status quo”, became much more 
sovereignty-assertive on the issues of national referendum and new constitution.  
The electoral politics theory of Taiwan’s independence policy is thus indeterminate: 
electoral politics could moderate as well as radicalize the Taiwan independence policy.13 
This is actually in line with Gaubatz’ finding (Gaubatz, 1999) that domestic elections do 
not have a consistent effect on a country’s foreign policy conciliation or belligerence.  
Hypothetically if electoral politics has sufficient explanatory power, we would observe a 
cyclic change of Taiwan’s mainland policy, coinciding with the electoral cycles, but as 
the previous historical overview reveals, the rise and fall of the Taiwan independence 
policy cut across rather than changed cyclically with the presidential and legislative 
elections. 
                                                          
13 Advocates of the electoral politics approach could argue that the inconsistency resulted from the rise of Taiwanese 
identity and change of policy preferences of the electorate. For example, Wu argued that during the 2004 presidential 
campaign different political parties still converged toward the middle, but it was just that the “middle” shifted in the 
direction of Taiwan independence. (Wu, 2005) The next section will address the shifting identity thesis. 
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Secondly, the high frequency of Taiwan’s elections makes the argument that “elections 
matter for Taiwan’s mainland policy” largely unfalsifiable. Elections “occur not once a 
year in Taiwan but often twice a year because local and national, legislative, and 
executive terms of office are not conterminous and each kind of office has its own 
election day.” (Chu and Nathan, 2008, p. 85) Even if one considers local elections to be 
less concerned with national policies such as the mainland policy and leaves them out,14 
still “the density of elections with national scope or significance is striking.” (deLisle, 
2005) For example, during the ten years from 1991 to 2000, there were eight island-wide 
lections, with two presidential elections (1996, 2000), three Legislative Yuan elections 
(1992, 1995, 1998), two National Assembly elections (1991, 1996)15, and one Taiwan 
Governor election (1994). In one sense, the high frequency makes elections in Taiwan a 
“constant” and gives birth to “perpetual campaign” (deLisle, 2005), thus ill-suited to 
explain the sometimes drastic change of the Taiwan independence policy.  
There is no pretense that electoral politics or domestic politics writ large are irrelevant or 
unimportant to Taiwan’s mainland policy. Indeed, they are undoubtedly integral to an 
understanding of Taiwan’s mainland policy and security strategy, but the divisive nature 
of the national identity issue, highly visible domestic wrangling of the direction of 
mainland policy, and frequent electoral campaigns made it look like that domestic 
politics is the whole picture and all we need to explain the Taiwan independence policy. 
This is a false impression. The indeterminacy and unfalsifiability of the electoral politics 
approach made it hard to answer how and when it matters. To some extent this is a level 
                                                          
14 In fact even Taiwan’s local elections were laden with national policy debates, especially the mainland policies. 
(deLisle, 2005) 
15 The 1996 National Assembly election was held concurrently with the 1996 presidential election. 
24 
 
of generality question: domestic politics is better at generating situation-specific 
arguments but less useful to offer generalizable explanations to the broader, long-time-
span question set out in the beginning: the rise and fall of the Taiwan independence 
policy over the last twenty years.   
Table 2.1 Electoral Density in Taiwan during 1991-2010 
 National-level Direct-controlled 
municipalities 
Counties, provincial cities 
1991 2nd National Assembly   
1992 2nd Legislative Yuan   
1993   12th county magistrate/city mayor 
1994 1st Taiwan governor, 10th 
provincial assembly 
1st municipal mayoral, 
7/4 city council 
13th county council/city council 
1995 3rd Legislative Yuan   
1996 9th Presidential & 3rd 
National Assembly 
  
1997   13th county magistrate/city mayor 
1998 4th Legislative Yuan 2nd municipal mayoral, 
8/5 city council 
14th county council/city council 
1999    
2000 10th Presidential   
2001 5th Legislative Yuan  14th county magistrate/city mayor 
2002  3rd municipal mayor, 
9/6 city council 
15th county council/city council 
2003     
2004 11th Presidential, 6th 
Legislative Yuan  
  
2005 Ad hoc National 
Assembly 
 15th county magistrate/city mayor; 
16th county council/city council 
2006  4th municipal mayor, 
10/7 city council 
 
2007    
2008 7th Legislative Yuan; 12th 
Presidential 
  
2009   16th county magistrate/city mayor; 
17th county council/city council  
2010  5/1 municipal mayor, 
11/1 city council 
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2.1.2. Shifting identity 
Constructivist international relations theories gained increasing prominence since the 
1990s (Wendt, 1992; Johnston, 1995; Katzenstein, 1996; Finnemore, 1996; Checkel, 
1998; Hopf, 1998; Hopf 2002) Identity is one of the core concepts of constructivism, 
since it “strongly imply a particular set of interests or preferences with respect to choices 
of action in particular domain, and with respect to particular actors.” (Hopf, 1998, p. 175) 
Applying this logic to the context of cross-strait relations,16 the shifting identity thesis 
would postulate that if more and more Taiwanese self-identify themselves only as 
Taiwanese rather than Chinese and believe Taiwan to be a nascent nation-state distinct 
from China, popular support for Taiwan’s legal independence of Taiwan would rise and 
consequently Taiwan’s mainland policy would become more sovereignty-assertive; 
conversely, if the rise of Taiwanese identity is reversed and Chinese identity makes its 
way back, popular demands for Taiwan independence would fall and its mainland policy 
would be more conciliatory. Many believed that the issue of national identity and identity 
politics in Taiwan is “the dominant factor affecting Taiwan’s mainland China policy” 
(Hsieh, 2004) and carries serious implications of the peace and stability in East Asia. 
(Chu, 2007; Wu, 2004) Some analysts are rather pessimistic given the “inexorable” rise 
of the Taiwanese identity and nationalism. (Carpenter, 2005; Wang, 2001a)    
While it is indisputable that a “Taiwanese consciousness/identity” has emerged after the 
two sides of the strait experienced vastly different political, economic, cultural and social 
                                                          
16 There are different variants of constructivism, using different levels of analysis. For example, Johnston’ s work 
(1995) on China’s cultural realism focuses on the domestic level, while Wendt (1999) attempts to construct an 
international-level systemic theory. The study of shifting identity in Taiwan falls into the former category.  
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development since the end of the 19th, the identity thesis suffers from a number of 
insufficiencies to explain the rise and fall of Taiwan’s independence policy. First of all, 
the identity structure is more complex than impressionistic and journalistic descriptions. 
Although Taiwanese consciousness has risen at the expense of Chinese consciousness, it 
almost never acquires a majority status and there always exist a stable and significant 
percentage of people who consider themselves both Chinese and Taiwanese, the so-called 
“dual identity” group. More importantly, the political attitudes on the independence-
unification issue do not reflect a strong preference for the former. For most of the time 
pragmatism is the rule: “status quo and decide later” accounts for the plurality. The 
independence-leaning attitudes comprising of “independence as soon as possible” and 
“status quo, move toward independence” peaked at little more than 20%! Albeit with 
different operationalization and measurement, numerous surveys and research have 
reached the same conclusion of the non-dominant status of an exclusive Taiwanese 
identity or support for independence.17 As one leading Taiwanese political scientist 
stated, “neither the principled believers in Taiwan’s independence, nor principled 
believers in reunification, are sizable enough to impose their favored resolution on 
national identity in the near future.” (Chu, 2007, p. 227) These results contradict the 
popular impression and discourse, which to a large extent results from the conflation of 
                                                          
17 The literature on Taiwanese national identity is abundant. The bulk of the literature asks two major questions: self-
identification as Chinese, Taiwanese or both; and position on the unification-independence issue. The former measures 
ethnic identity/consciousness (zuqun rentong/yishi), and the latter is a proxy for national identity (guojia rentong). For 
an overview, see (Rigger, 1999b). See also (Chu, 2007; Wu, 2001a; Chu, 1992; Wachman, 1994; Chu and Lin 1996; 
Wang and Liu, 2004). Niu and others pointed out that conditional preference is a better way to capture respondents’ 
national identity since many “status-quo” Taiwanese would move away from status quo to either unification or 
independence if the conditions regarding China’s military attack and the political, economic and social disparity across 
the strait are clearly specified. See (Niou, 2004) 
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Taiwanese ethnic consciousness, its national identity and public policy preferences, that 
Taiwanese support for independence is rising and increasingly dominant.   
Secondly, the identity thesis also lacks a specified and substantiated causal mechanism 
suggesting how the shifting Taiwanese identity has led to the Taiwanese government’s 
changing positions on its sovereign status. Rather it essentially adopts a simplistic 
“bottom-up” approach and assumes the public opinion’s impact on foreign policy: 
democratically elected leaders follow masses; since more and more Taiwanese people 
want independence, so do Taiwanese leaders. To some extent this is a reflection of the 
state of the larger public opinion and foreign policy literature. In recent years the post-
World War II “Almond-Lippmann consensus” that public opinion is highly volatile and 
incoherent and lacks any significant impact on foreign policy has been challenged from 
various quarters by a growing body of public opinion literature, but much is on the state 
of public opinion itself than on how public opinion affects the conduct of foreign affairs. 
(Lippmann, 1943; Almond, 1950; Page and Shapiro, 1983; Russett, 1990; Holsti, 1992) 
Even if strong correlation is found to exist between the change of public opinion and 
evolution of actual policies, (Page and Shapiro, 1983; Monroe, 1979; Kusnitz, 1984)there 
still exists too wide an analytic gulf to jump over and conclude that public opinion indeed 
has played the decisive role in the minds of decision-makers, as Holsti noted, 
“It is not wholly sufficient to describe the state of or trends in public opinion 
on an issue immediately preceding or during foreign policy decisions. A 
finding that major decisions seemed to be correlated with public preferences 
does not, by itself, establish a causal link; for example, policy-makers might 
be responding to pressures and constraints from the international 
system…without any significant attention to public sentiments on the issue, 
even if those attitudes are highly congruent with those of the decision-
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makers. Alternatively, the actual direction of causality might run from 
policy-makers to the public rather than vice versa…”(Holsti, 1992, p. 453) 
The same caution has to be taken when it comes to the argument that a rising Taiwanese 
identity determines the direction of Taiwan’s mainland policy. Indeed the link between 
the rise of Taiwanese consciousness/identity and Taiwan’s mainland policy is not as 
direct and clear-cut as is commonly assumed. As Taiwanese political scientist Wu Yu-
shan observed, “the rapid nativization of ethnic consciousness is only partially reflected 
in positions on national identity and the independence/unification question, and its 
influence on concrete policy positions [related to cross-strait economic relations] is even 
more limited … Put simply, the trend toward Taiwanization in basic ethnic consciousness 
has not evolved into a political demand for Taiwan independence.”(Wu, 2001a, p. 84)  
Moreover, Risse-Kappen pointed out that the policy impact of public opinion is indirect 
and to a large measure depends on domestic structures and coalition-building processes. 
Specifically, “in countries with centralized political institutions but polarized societies 
and rather weak social organizations, the policy network is likely to be state-dominated.” 
(Risse-Kappen, 1991, p. 486) Taiwan has a strong presidential system and quite polarized 
society highly divided on the national unity issue, so drawing on Risse-Kappen’s insights 
we should expect to see state-dominated policies in Taipei. Lastly, the identity thesis has 
a difficult time in accounting for policy change. Although the rise of Taiwan’s 
sovereignty assertiveness after the mid-1990s seemed to coincide with the rise of the 
Taiwanese identity, the exclusive Taiwanese identity remained fairly stable afterwards 
and thus was unable to explain the change of sovereignty assertiveness from then on. In 
particular, after the Ma Ying-jeou’s administration came into power, the Taiwanese 
29 
 
identity actually went up and for the first time surpassed 50%. Yet Ma was able to adopt 
a low-profile strategy on sovereignty, further indicating that there is no necessary 
correlation between identity and policy.   
2.1.3. Other approaches  
In addition to the two prevailing theses, there are also other attempts at explaining 
Taiwan’s independence policy and its mainland policy in general. Although they may 
look plausible in view of a short time period, they can hardly pass the empirical testing 
by the last twenty years’ historical vicissitudes. Wu’s power asymmetry model applied 
what was observed in the relationship between Russia and non-Russian former Soviet 
states to cross-strait relations, and argued that the bigger the economic gap between the 
two sides, the more the U.S. support is available, the more likely that Taiwan opts for 
balancing. (Wu 1997) However, Taiwan’s balancing and bandwagoning strategies do not 
seem to follow lockstep with the closing economic gap across the Strait. Likewise, the 
“U.S. support hypothesis” is also contradicted by the fact that Lee’s “special-state-to-
state-theory” followed the announcement of the “three-nos” and Washington’s seemingly 
tilt toward Beijing and the fact that Taiwan’s most assertive 2002~2008 period coincided 
with arguably the most strained U.S.-Taiwan relationship after the Cold War. 
On the individual level, Robert Ross argued that neither the deterrence failure of China or 
alliance politics with the U.S., nor Taiwan’s domestic politics can explain Taiwan’s 
revisionist diplomacy to challenge “a vital status-quo interest” of mainland China’s 
insistence on the “One-China” principle and opposition to de jure independence of 
Taiwan. The answer lies in the individual level, i.e. President Chen Shui-bian’s personal 
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commitment to Taiwan independence and his risk-acceptant personality. (Ross, 2006) 
However, Taiwan’s “revisionist” diplomacy did not start with Chen Shui-bian’s 
inauguration. The self-claim of sovereignty, redefinition of the nature of cross-strait 
relations, and the pursuit of more international space resurfaced from time to time during 
Chen’s predecessor, Lee Teng-hui’s tenure as well. Moreover, at times Chen did not 
behave as described by Ross as one so bent on his ideology as to seek it consistently, 
recklessly and wrong-headedly. As the above account of the rise and fall of the Taiwan 
independence policy revealed, Chen’s initial approach to mainland China demonstrated 
considerable flexibility and pragmatism.   
2.2. Security, sovereignty, and the Taiwan independence policy 
In contrast to the existing approaches which locate explanations in the domestic and 
individual level, I propose that there is strategic rationale for asserting separate 
sovereignty for Taiwan. Assertions of separate sovereignty are attempts to substitute 
normative power—the international consensus on the sanctity of sovereignty—for a 
shortfall in military-economic-diplomatic assets. Specifically, sovereignty assertiveness 
is a response to adverse power shift across the Taiwan Strait and strong domestic political 
constraints, with the former threatening its security and survival and the latter hindering 
domestic resource mobilization to deal with the changed security environment with more 
orthodox internal and external balancing approaches other than the political one on its 
sovereign status. On the other hand, when external or internal constraints are relatively 
loose, namely, when either power shift is favorable or sufficient domestic resources are 
mobilizable, the push on sovereignty will be less assertive. Under the most auspicious 
31 
 
circumstances—favorable power shift plus resource abundance, sovereignty assertiveness 
is the lowest and Taipei might even open up to mainland China.   
Many see “the Taiwan independence policy” or the rise of sovereignty assertiveness as 
unnecessarily provocative to Beijing and counterproductive in terms of bolstering 
Taiwan’s security, so the best strategy for Taipei is to keep a low profile on its sovereign 
status. This logic certainly has a great deal of truth, but the sovereignty-security nexus is 
much beyond what this line of reasoning implies. Sovereignty could undermine security, 
but it could also enhance it. Like other forms of statecraft, it is a double-edged sword. 
Since the provocative and security-minus aspect of Taiwan’s sovereignty assertiveness is 
well-known and next to conventional wisdom, below I will spell out the logic of its oft-
neglected security-plus aspect. I will first set up the background by briefly tracing the 
evolution of the norm of sovereignty and examining Taiwan’s sovereign status and its 
implications, and then propose my own theory.  
2.2.1. International and domestic setting 
2.2.1.1. The changing face of international norms: sovereignty and self-determination 
The notion of sovereignty can be traced back to classic theorists such as Bodin and 
Hobbes and its initial adoption and practice was closely associated with the end of the 
Thirty Years War (1618~1648) in Europe and the subsequent Peace of Westphalia.18 
Over the next three hundred years the sovereignty-based Westphalia system gradually 
went beyond Christian Europe and was extended to Latin America, Eastern Europe and 
                                                          
18 For a classic study of the intellectual history of sovereignty, see (Hinsley, 1986) For dissenting views that the Peace 
of Westphalia had little to do with our conventional understanding of sovereignty, see (Krasner, 1993; Osiander, 2001) 
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the vast colonies in Asia and Africa. With the completion of decolonization after WWII 
and establishment of many sovereign states out of former colonies, a system of sovereign 
states has become “the constitution” of international society on a global scale.19 (Philpott, 
2001) Sovereignty can be simply defined as “supreme authority within a territory” 
(Philpott, 2001)20, and its two corollaries are formal equality among all sovereigns and 
non-intervention into each other’s domestic affairs. Furthermore, conquest, initially 
regarded as a legitimate “right” of sovereigns that could be carried out outside as well as 
within Europe, had gradually been effectively de-legitimized through the Congress of 
Vienna, the League of Nations Covenant, the Stimson Doctrine (1931), and the United 
Nations Charter. As a consequence of the universalization of the notion of sovereignty 
and de-legitimization of conquest, in today’s world “any forcible action that extinguishes 
sovereignty is the most fundamental ‘crime’ of contemporary international politics.” 
(Holsti, 2004, p. 134)  
Thus sovereignty and all its associated principles, such as equality, non-intervention and 
non-conquest, all seem to work to the advantage of small and weak states. But 
sovereignty is no panacea, and the principle of non-intervention and domestic autonomy 
has been routinely violated in history. Alternative norms, such as minority rights, human 
rights, and international stability, had been invoked to trump sovereignty and justify 
foreign interventions. Stephen Krasner famously characterized the norms of sovereignty 
                                                          
19 Likewise, Bull maintained that state sovereignty is the basis of an international order. (Bull, 1977) Ruggie also 
regarded the shift from the medieval system to the modern international system as “the most important contextual 
change in international politics in this millennium.” (Ruggie 1983, p. 273) 
20 Krasner aptly elucidated the four dimensions of sovereignty—international legal sovereignty (mutual recognition 
among states), Westphalian sovereignty (exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures), domestic 
sovereignty (political authority and effective control within a given territory), and interdependence sovereignty (ability 
to regulate cross-border flow of information, ideas, goods, people, capital, etc.). The four dimensions do not necessarily 
go hand in hand. (Krasner, 1999, pp. 3-4) 
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as an “organized hypocrisy”, enduring but violable. (Krasner 1999) Nevertheless, the 
basic rules associated with sovereignty remained in place for more than three hundred 
years and survived unprecedented material and ideational change in human society, 
despite being frequently violated. Even greater challenges for sovereignty loomed large 
after the Cold War came to a close, calling into question the “enduring” part of 
sovereignty. These challenges included: globalization,21 humanitarian intervention, 
(Lyons and Mastanduno, 1995) failed states, (Krasner, 2004; Clunan and Trinkunas, 
2010) emergence of quasi-supranational organizations such as the EU, etc. (Philpott, 
2001)22 State sovereignty is thus characterized as “diffusing”, “shifting”, “diminishing”, 
“maturing”, “pooling”, “leaking”, “evaporating”, etc. (Hashmi, 1997, p. 3)  
However, despite the multiple old and new challenges and the historical violations of 
sovereignty principles, sovereignty is still the most significant and highly 
institutionalized international norm that protects small and weak states from attack and 
coercion from the strong ones and it will likely remain so for the foreseeable future. First 
of all, sovereignty is about both control and authority. Much of the oft-cited evidences of 
the eclipse of sovereignty are on states’ increasingly inability to control cross-border 
flows of goods, capital, people, ideas, diseases, etc., but losing control does not 
                                                          
21 Strictly speaking, the challenge of economic interdependence and globalization to state sovereignty is not new, as 
Vernon and Keohane and Nye noted the phenomenon back in the 1970s. (Vernon, 1971; Keohane and Nye, 1977) But 
the end of the Cold War revived the attention on the seemingly accelerated wheel of economic interdependence and 
globalization. For a few sample works of the voluminous globalization literature, see (Rosenau, 1990; Ohmae, 1993; 
Strange, 1996)   
22 Aside from these practical challenges to sovereignty, alternative theoretical perspectives, especially the constructivist 
school and David Lake’s emphasis on hierarchy in international relations—also questioned the dominant realist view 
on sovereignty, i.e., that sovereignty is a fixed and exogenous attribute of state and it is absolute. (Biersteker and Weber, 
1996; Reus-Smit, 1999; Lake, 2003) 
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necessarily bring about authority crisis.23 (Holsti, 2004, pp. 135-141) Moreover, in 
history sovereignty rules have successfully been through enormous material and 
ideational challenges by accommodating alternative institutional arrangements and 
making self-adjustments. (Krasner, 2001, pp. 239-245) In short, sovereignty and its 
associated institutional arrangements are strikingly resilient, and various strands of 
discussion about its evaporation or death prove to be overblown.  
Secondly, it is true that sovereignty rules are not ironclad, which is arguably the case for 
all international norms, but they are not readily violable either. The violators usually had 
to invoke alternative norms such as minority rights, human rights, international stability, 
etc. to justify their trampling on sovereignty. Given its fundamental nature and 
“constitutional” status for international society, any defiance of sovereignty and its 
associated principles are at best controversial. Lastly, the value of sovereignty for a 
political entity’s security has to be appraised not based on whether it can provide 100% 
warranty,24 but against its lack thereof. As one scholar pointed out, had it not been for the 
principles of sovereignty and independence and territorial integrity of a sovereign state, it 
is difficult to conceive of the massive international response to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
in 1990. (Holsti, 2004, p. 116) In fact the unfolding of the story perfectly illustrated the 
usefulness of sovereignty as well as its limits: there is no guarantee that sovereigns will 
not be attacked, but the international community will view an outright violation of 
sovereignty as illegitimate and intolerable and try to restore the ex ante.      
                                                          
23 In fact there is no conclusive evidence to argue that globalization has systematically undermined state control. In 
some aspects states do have retrenched their activities, but in some others they have expanded interventionist policies. 
(Garrett, 1998) 
24 One scholar noted that since 1945 only there has been only one case of the death of a sovereign state—North 
Vietnam’s conquest of South Vietnam in 1975. (Holsti, 2004, p. 137) 
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An alternative international norm that the Taiwanese government might appeal to is self-
determination. Self-determination protagonists maintain that every people should freely 
determine its own political status and freely pursue its economic, social, and cultural 
development, and in this vein Taiwan could conceivably claim that if the Taiwanese 
people are determined to have separate sovereign statehood, it is entitled to do so in 
accordance with the spirit of self-determination.25 However, the appeal to self-
determination has serious limitations in the case of Taiwan. First of all, the principle/right 
of self-determination has an ambivalent status in international law.(Buchheit, 1978) Even 
in the context of decolonization during the 1960s and 1970s, during which self-
determination was nearly universally adopted, the U.N. human rights covenants and 
resolutions were quick to add that the affirmation of self-determination should not be 
construed as undermining the territorial integration and political independence of its 
member states.26 Beyond the context of decolonization, the applicability of self-
determination is highly problematic at best. If international lawyers and jurists are still 
debating the legality and legitimacy of self-determination, state practices almost 
unequivocally speak against it.27  In the rare cases where states chose to support 
secessionist claims, they did so mostly for political expediency instead of principled 
                                                          
25 The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) officially adopted self-determination as regards Taiwan’s future from 1986 
to 1991 before embracing Taiwan independence at the 1991 National Party Congress. For an overview of evolution of 
the DPP’s positions on independence, see Rigger, 2001, pp. 120-136. For an earlier work espousing self-determination 
for Taiwan, see Chen and Lasswell, 1967. 
26 The U.N. documents containing the principle/right of self-determination include: the U.N. Charter (1945), the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960), the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1966), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966), and the 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970).   
27 This does not mean that states have never embraced a pro-self-determination stance. In history there are some 
instances of voluntary and amicable secession based on self-determination (most notably Norway’s secession from 
Sweden in 1905 and Singapore’s from the Malaysian Federation in 1965); some states even used to include a right of 
secessionist self-determination in their constitutional framework. See (Buchheit, 1978, pp. 97-107)  
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judgment. The reluctance, if not adamant opposition, manifested in states practice as 
regards secessionist self-determination is perfectly understandable, since many states face 
similar secessionist challenges from disgruntled groups in their own territory and the 
Pandora’s Box of self-determination, if opened, could well endanger the state-centered 
international system.28  
Leaving aside the status of self-determination in international law, there is still the 
question of whether the 23 million residents in Taiwan constitute a “people” distinctive 
from the Chinese people on the mainland. Taiwanese people share substantial ethnic, 
linguistic, cultural and historical similarities with mainland Chinese,29 a fact all but a 
small number of radical pro-independence Taiwanese have acknowledged. If one 
dismisses these objective factors as superfluous and takes self-identity as the more 
genuine manifestation of the existence of a “people”, still the evidence is mixed. Polls in 
Taiwan show that more and more residents see themselves exclusively as Taiwanese, but 
dual identity—those claiming to be both Taiwanese and Chinese—always accounts for 
1/3~1/2 of the population. Although Lee Teng-hui started to tout the idea of the “New 
Taiwanese” people in the late 1990s, trying to forge a distinct “Gemeinschaft or 
community” encompassing all residents in totality,30 (deLisle, 2000, p. 56) the fact that 
identity politics is still quite salient seems to suggest that a clear, single and non-divisive 
                                                          
28 Secession’s lack of legitimacy could to some extent explain China’s careful framing of the title of the “Anti-
Secession Law” passed in March 2005.  
29 Over 95 percent of Taiwan’s population is of Han Chinese ancestry. Different ethnicity can only be found in 14 
aboriginal groups and an increasing number of new immigrants from Southeast Asia.   
30 Lee Teng-hui’s speech on October 24, 1998 epitomized the idea of “New Taiwanese”: “All of us who grow and live 
on this soil today are Taiwanese people, whether we be aborigines or descendants of the aborigines or descendants of 
the immigrants from the mainland who came over centuries or decades ago. We all have made equal contributions to 
Taiwan’s development in the past, and share a common responsibility of Taiwan’s future. It is a non-transferrable duty 
for each of us, the ‘New Taiwanese people’, to convert our love and affection for Taiwan into concrete actions in order 
to open up a grander horizon for its development. It is also our responsibility to establish a magnificent vista for our 
descendants.” (Lee, 1999, p. 193) 
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identity has yet emerged on the island. In a nutshell, given the uncertainty revolving 
around both the legal status of self-determination and the existence of a Taiwanese 
“people”, appealing to the norm of self-determination is less than an attractive weapon 
for Taiwan to utilize.  
2.2.1.2. Taiwan’s ambiguous sovereign status and its political development  
To say that Taiwan has an ambiguous sovereign status is to say that both the defenders of 
its sovereignty and the critics can make a case for themselves. If the claim for Taiwan’s 
sovereignty is either completely groundless or unquestionable, few people would care 
about the issue at all, since it would be like discussing California’s sovereignty (no 
feasibility) or Canada’s (no necessity). Taiwan’s case is rather that ambiguity creates 
controversy, and controversy reinforces ambiguity. On the one hand, in functional terms 
Taiwan’s claim for its sovereignty sounds quite credible. If we use Krasner’s 
disaggregation of the concept of sovereignty—domestic sovereignty, Westphalian 
sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, and international legal sovereignty—as a 
measurement,31 then Taiwan scores high on the first three. Since the ROC fled to and 
settled on Taiwan in 1949, its government has ruled the island effectively consistently; it 
dictated its own domestic and foreign policies by and large without substantial outside 
interference; and the flow of goods, capital, people, information etc. across the Taiwan 
Strait and beyond are heavily regulated by relevant governmental agencies in Taiwan. To 
be sure, none of these dimensions of sovereignty are unchangeable or absolute: Taiwan 
experienced and completed successful democratic transition when the old way of 
                                                          
31 For a different conceptualization of different dimensions of sovereignty and its application to China, see (Carlson, 
2005) 
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organizing and exercising domestic authority was subject to mounting pressures from the 
society in the late 1980s and early 1990s; its national security policy, economic policy 
and even political development were heavily influenced by the United States throughout 
the Cold War period and beyond and more recently Beijing had at times attempted to 
penetrate the domestic politics in Taiwan via cooptation of opposition parties as well as 
economic leverage; and its interdependence sovereignty was imperiled by growing 
economic interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and globalization.32 But as Krasner 
noted, sovereignty and its associated principles have never been absolute and one can 
doubt if there has ever been or will ever be a sovereign entity if absoluteness is the 
criterion. In fact Taiwan could confidently claim that its domestic, Westphalian and 
interdependence sovereignty far exceed many of the widely recognized sovereign states 
in the world.  
Another route to examine Taiwan’s sovereign status is through the concept of 
statehood.33 According to the classic definition of statehood in the Montevideo 
Convention of 1933, the qualifications for a state include permanent population, a defined 
territory, government, and capacity to enter into relations with other states. (Crawford, 
1979, pp. 36-48) Again Taiwan is highly qualified with regard to population, territory and 
government. The Achilles’ heel, however, of Taiwan’s claim for sovereignty and 
statehood lies in the juridical dimension: international legal sovereignty and capacity to 
enter into formal relations with other states. In other words, Taiwan lacks formal 
                                                          
32 For a couple of samples among the voluminous works on Taiwan’s democratization, see (Tien, 1989; Chao and 
Myers, 1998); for the U.S.-Taiwan security relationship, see (Bush, 2004; Tucker, 2009).  
33 Sovereignty and statehood are conceptually distinct, but in today’s world it can be said that all and only states have 
sovereignty, so statehood does imply sovereignty.  
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recognition from other sovereignty states. The extensive and substantive relations that 
Taiwan has established and maintained with most states are not substitutes for formal 
relations or membership in inter-governmental organizations that many international law 
jurists and governments believe are essential for complete sovereignty and statehood, and 
the two dozen tiny diplomatic allies that Taipei has made so much effort to amass are not 
sufficient evidences for recognition in a world of nearly 200 states. Taipei’s “recognition 
deficit” is further aggravated by a dilemma: if it asserts to be and is recognized as the 
historical ROC—the government of a state called China, it fails to pass the functional 
criteria of sovereignty and statehood—domestic, Westphalian and interdependence 
sovereignty and population, territory and government—simply because it does not have 
any control over mainland China and Outer Mongolia;34 if it claims to be and be 
recognized as a separate state ruling only Taiwan and its associated islands for the sake of 
meeting the functional criteria, then its recognition test fares more poorly as even its 
diplomatic allies have not recognized it as the government of a state called Taiwan. 
(deLisle, 2000, p. 50 and p. 88) 
There are two ways to resolve this dilemma: either to recover mainland China and Outer 
Mongolia or to claim to be the government of a state called Taiwan and be recognized as 
such. The former is out of the question, while the latter is also next to impossible under 
current circumstances: the stiff barriers to constitutional changes and guaranteed 
vehement opposition from the PRC as well as no-support attitude of most states.35 Since 
                                                          
34 Outer Mongolia is officially part of the ROC.  
35 Amendment of the ROC constitution requires it be initiated by one-fourth of the Legislative Yuan members, passed 
by at least three-fourths of the members present at a meeting attended by at least three-fourths of the total members of 
the Legislative Yuan, and sanctioned by at least half of eligible voters.  
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the late 1980s and early 1990s Taipei has tried to reconcile the functional and juridical 
requirements of sovereignty and statehood,36 but barring the two extreme scenarios—
“recovering” mainland China or de jure Taiwan independence, the dilemma will be ever-
present and the ambiguity revolving around the ROC/Taiwan’s sovereign status is 
something that it (and the international community) has to live with. 
Lastly, it is worth noting that Taiwan’s democratic transition has helped its government 
to better substantiate the sovereignty claim. As the claim that the ROC on Taiwan is a 
successor government to the Qing dynasty and it has existed since 1912 despite the 
relocation of the central government in Taipei in 1949 becomes less tenable, Taiwan’s 
democratization enabled it to find an alternative source of sovereignty—popular 
sovereignty.37 The most elaborate official formulation of popular sovereignty in the 
context of Taiwan’s political development was seen in Lee Teng-hui’s 1999 “Special-
State-to-State-theory”. The successor theory of sovereignty is not totally abandoned, but 
Taipei at times selectively brings up the concept of popular sovereignty to give 
countenance to its sovereignty assertion.      
So what do all these add up to? The sanctity of sovereignty and its associated rules, the 
unappealingness of the principle/right of self-determination, plus Taiwan’s ambiguous 
sovereign status and its political democratization mean that Taiwan has a strong 
                                                          
36 The most dramatic moves in this regard include the recognition of the PRC’s jurisdiction over mainland China, 
retiring senior Legislative Yuan and National Assembly members elected before 1949 and holding new legislative and 
presidential elections only in Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen, and Mazu, “freezing” the Taiwan Province, etc. For a more 
detailed account, see Chao, 2005.  
37 Taiwan independence protagonists would couple popular sovereignty with the argument that Taiwan’s status is 
“undetermined” to make a case for Taiwan’s entitlement to establish a separate sovereign state. For an appraisal of 
“Taiwan’s status undetermined” argument by a ROC international law expert, see (Chiu, 1973); for a PRC perspective, 
see (Wang, 1989)  
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motivation to assert its sovereignty. This constitutes the basic background when we think 
about the rise and fall of the Taiwan independence policy.  
2.2.2. Power shift, domestic constraints and sovereignty assertiveness 
Next I will offer an alternative theory focusing on Taiwan’s external and internal 
constraints. I will start with one assumption and two propositions and proceed from there 
to distill my hypotheses.  
Assumption: the fundamental goal of the Taiwanese government’s national security 
strategy is survival and security.  
Proposition 1: sovereignty assertion is one of the instruments for Taiwan to bolster its 
survival and security. 
Proposition 2: sovereignty assertion is more likely to be utilized when other means for 
survival and security, be them military, economic, or diplomatic, are not readily 
available. 
As the assumption states, the fundamental goal of the Taiwanese government’s national 
security strategy should be no different from any other political entities on the world 
stage, i.e. preservation of its survival and security.38 For Taiwan survival and security 
means both physical integrity and political autonomy. Note that the goal is non-partisan 
and consistent with any future political arrangements between Taipei and Beijing. For 
Taiwan independence advocates, survival and security is certainly a prerequisite to 
realize their political ambitions; for unification supporters, survival and security is also 
                                                          
38 For one view that challenges the utility of the survival assumption, see Howes, 2003. 
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indispensable to negotiate an acceptable political deal with Beijing. In another word, if 
there is one least common denominator between different political camps on the island, 
that is Taiwan’s survival and security.39 
Proposition 1 states that sovereignty assertion is one of the instruments for Taiwan to 
bolster its survival and security. This may sound counterintuitive or even fallacious since 
many believe that sovereignty assertion is unnecessarily provocative to Beijing and 
undermine rather than enhance Taiwan’s security. This logic has a great deal of truth, but 
the sovereignty-security nexus is much beyond what this line of reasoning implies. 
Sovereignty could undermine security, but it could also enhance it. Similar to other forms 
of statecraft, it is a double-edged sword. Specifically, sovereignty assertion contributes to 
Taiwan’s survival and security for two major reasons.  
First of all, sovereignty is an instrument for survival. As Kalevi Holsti forcibly pointed 
out, sovereignty “is the critical component of the birth, maintenance, and death of states. 
Sovereignty helps create states; it helps maintain their integrity when under threat from 
within or without; and it helps guarantee their continuation and prevents their death.” In 
short, sovereignty “provides an essential ingredient for the security of any political 
community.” (Holsti, 2004, p. 113 and p. 116, italics original) For small and weak states 
with much less military, political and economic clout sovereignty rules are more 
                                                          
39 In fact, there are more commonalities among different political parties in regard to Taiwan’s political status and 
external relations than are usually recognized. For example, Taiwan specialist Shelly Rigger listed five common 
principles of Taiwan’s external relations that most political parties adhere to: avoid entrapment by or provoking the 
PRC, maintain good relations with the United States, and maintain and strengthen the ROC’s formal diplomatic 
relations as well as substantive relations with other countries. (Rigger, 2005). See also Swaine (2001) and Schubert 
(2004) for discussion of some overarching consensus regarding Taiwan’s political status, external relations and defense 
policies. That these commonalities are often neglected is partially attributed to political rhetoric that stresses or 
exaggerates differences and accuses one another of selling out Taiwan or dragging Taiwan into disastrous wars. Also it 
is undeniable that there are genuine differences as to tactically how best to achieve those commonly held goals.   
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instrumental and could be a matter of life and death. As the norm of sovereignty 
presupposes equality of all sovereigns, it to some extent neutralizes power asymmetries 
and is thus “far more constraining for powerful states and far more liberating for weak 
states.” (Jackson, 1990, p. 6) In the same vein, studies of survival strategies of small 
states concluded that the principle of sovereignty constitutes “the greatest nominal 
protection for the weak”, and that the failure of attracting international attention by a 
small state would put it into peril (Indorf, 1985, p. 23) 
The sovereignty-security connection is felt keenly in Taiwan. In fact given the 
universalization and canonization of sovereignty and its associated norms and principles 
after the Second World War, an internationally recognized independent sovereign status 
for Taiwan (no matter what the formal title is) may serve as the best guarantor of its 
survival and security.40 To be sure, being a sovereign in no way precludes possibilities of 
falling victim to attack or coercion, but these forcible actions against a sovereign would 
be perceived as fundamentally illegitimate and prompt strong international reactions.  As 
one scholar put it, “although sovereignty cannot guarantee that a state will remain in 
being, it can guard against the possibility of the state’s extinction: it can create problems 
for greater states when they try to impose their will on smaller ones…” (Miller, 1986, p. 
82) So sovereignty is no magic bullet, but it does make a difference. For Taipei the 
difference lies in whether the international community perceives Beijing’s coercion as 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait or as Beijing’s repression of secessionists in Xinjiang or Tibet. 
(deLisle, 2002, p. 750) 
                                                          
40 Interviews with former ROC’s Foreign Ministry officials and former members of the National Security Council, June 
2008, May 2009, Taipei. 
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Second, sovereignty is bargaining chips with respect to political negotiations. So far all 
negotiations that have been conducted and completed across the strait are so-called 
“functional” or “apolitical” ones regarding tourism, transportation, trade, investment, 
crime control, food safety etc., and political negotiations on the political status of Taipei 
and future political arrangements between Taipei and Beijing seem to be beyond reach 
for the time being. Still Taipei has to get ready for discussing political issues with 
Beijing. Just as states have to prepare for war during peacetime, they also have to come to 
the negotiation table with enough bargaining chips to avoid disastrous consequences. For 
Taipei the consequences could be as grave as its very existence, since it is believed that 
Beijing’s goal is to “undermine” or even “destroy” Taiwan’s sovereign status. (Lin, 
2008a, pp. 100-101) Although many factors such as power asymmetry, domestic politics, 
external actors, and negotiation tactics would influence the trajectory and outcome of 
such negotiations,41 Taipei’s sovereign status ex ante is obviously crucial in determining 
its political status ex post. (deLisle, 2002, p. 749) 
For now there is a great gulf between the two sides’ proposals regarding the forms of a 
future political union: Beijing’s “one country, two systems” proposal which grants some 
sort of home rule for Taipei but denies it sovereignty has no popular attraction in Taipei, 
while Taipei’s sporadic indicated preference for an EU-like confederation with both 
Beijing and Taipei being equal, sovereign and constituent parts of a larger China has been 
rejected by Beijing.42 If we put “one country, two systems” and confederation at two 
extremes along a continuum, the more established Taiwan’s sovereign status ex ante is, 
                                                          
41 For analyses of Beijing’s negotiation tactics, see (Solomon, 1999; Chang, 2008) 
42 For more discussion in this regard, see (Bush, 2005; deLisle, 2002 ) 
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the more likely it is able to obtain favorable terms and move the final resolution toward 
its desired outcome.43 Moreover, Taipei could take advantage of its alleged sovereign 
status to fend off Beijing’s political offensive by accusing the latter’s proposal of 
downgrading its sovereignty.  
In short, sovereign status is consequential for Taipei to withstand both military coercion 
and political offensive from Beijing. Skeptics would quickly point out that Taipei’s 
reckless pursuit of sovereignty is very provocative to Beijing and thus damaging to its 
most important goal of survival and security. This is certainly true. But we have to bear in 
mind that this is also the case with respect to other means of security seeking. To take one 
of the most classic type of security seeking—military buildup as an example, it could also 
be potentially provocative and counterproductive. First of all, the ubiquity of security 
dilemma means that oftentimes a state’s military buildup for defensive purpose is 
interpreted as threatening in other capitals, triggering countermeasures and the action-
reaction chain and arriving at a sub-optimal outcome for everyone.44 (Jervis, 1978) The 
security dilemma presents itself in a particularly acute way in East Asia and across the 
Taiwan Strait, because even defensive capabilities acquired by Taiwan appear to be 
“protection umbrella” for Taiwan’s separatist agenda and thus provocative to the PRC. 
(Christensen, 1999, 2002a) Secondly, in the context of the Taiwan Strait, certain military 
options for Taiwan are highly provocative and even suicidal. This is why the U.S. refuses 
                                                          
43 Interview with former ROC official at the President Office, October, 2008. 
44 Security dilemma is absent only under two extreme circumstances: relations with one’s unprovokable friends and 
one’s undeterrable enemies. (Christensen, 2002, p. 9) 
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to sell offensive weapons to Taiwan and why the nuclear option is self-defeating for 
Taiwan as it almost ensures a preventive attack from the mainland.45  
In addition, other means of security seeking for Taiwan such as alliance building and 
pragmatic diplomacy are potentially explosive as well. In terms of alliance building, 
Beijing has made it clear that foreign military presence on the island is one of the 
conditions to prompt the use of force, while the climax of Taipei’s pragmatic 
diplomacy—Lee Teng-hui’s 1995 visit to the U.S.—precipitated the third Taiwan Strait 
crisis.46 So provocativeness does not differentiate various means of security seeking. 
Neither does effectiveness. All can be potentially effective to enhance Taiwan’s security, 
but none are failure-proof.47 As the table shows, differences among security-seeking 
means come more out of form than substance: whether they are internal or external 
efforts, and whether they rely on material (hard) or normative (soft) power. So the 
fundamental and thorny question for Taiwan’s decision-makers is to balance the 
effectiveness and provocativeness of each different security-seeking means, i.e., to push 
it to the great extent possible without being unduly provocative.48 This is no easy matter 
and it suggests that the inherent difficulty in walking a fine line in a security dilemma 
                                                          
45 Taiwan tried twice in the 1970s and 1980s to develop nuclear weapons but eventually gave up under strong U.S. 
pressure.(Wang, 2008, p. 412) 
46 The 2000 “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue” stated that “if Taiwan is invaded and occupied by foreign 
countries…”, “the Chinese government will only be forced to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use of 
force…” see (The Taiwan Affairs Office, the PRC, 2000)  
47 This is not to deny that different means may be more or less effective under certain specific circumstances.  
48 In economic terms, the push for each means should ideally stop when the marginal returns (of effectiveness) equal 
the marginal costs (of provocativeness).   
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situation is also existent in alliance building, pragmatic diplomacy, sovereignty assertion, 
etc.49  
Table 2.2 Comparison of Different Means of Security Seeking for Taiwan 
 Effectiveness? Provocative? Internal/External Hard/Soft 
Military buildup  Yes, to some extent Yes Internal  Hard 
Alliance building Yes, to some extent Yes  External  Hard  
Pragmatic diplomacy50 Yes, to some extent Yes  External  Soft  
Sovereignty assertion Yes, to some extent Yes  Internal  Soft  
       
The bottom line of the above discussion is not that sovereignty assertion is the most 
effective way of defending Taipei against Beijing’s military attack or political offensive 
but that given Taiwan’s political status, endeavors to acquire as many as possible 
trappings of a normal sovereign state are one of the many means of security seeking, just 
like military buildup, seeking alliances, economic diplomacy and any other kinds of 
statecraft. It has its drawbacks, but so do other means. When its fundamental goal of 
survival and security is imperiled, Taiwan’s leaders simply have more incentive to resort 
to sovereignty assertion as one of its responses.  
Proposition 2 states that sovereignty assertion becomes more likely when other means for 
survival and security are not readily available. This is because there are a variety of 
military, economic and diplomatic instruments that are utilizable for security-seeking 
                                                          
49 During my interview in Taipei in June 2009, one former senior official from the Mainland Affairs Council used 
“political security dilemma” to describe the vicious cycle across the Taiwan Strait during the Chen Shui-bian era. 
Likewise, Richard Bush’s characterization of the pre-Ma Ying-jeou era is close to a “security dilemma” in political 
sense, although he did not use the term. In Richard Bush’s words, “each side feared that the other was going to 
challenge its fundamental interests. Beijing worried that Taipei would close the door on its goal of unification. Taipei 
feared that Beijing would constrain it to the point that negotiations on China’s terms would become inevitable. Each 
side took measures to protect its interests…” (Bush, 2011, p. 274) 
50 Economic diplomacy is subsumed under pragmatic diplomacy, as the former is one instrument of the latter. For a 
discussion of Taiwan’s economic diplomacy, see (Wu, 1996) 
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purpose and sovereignty assertion is not necessarily the best choice due to its “soft” 
nature and Beijing’s hypersensitiveness in that regard. However, sovereignty assertion 
does have one unique advantage, i.e., it is the least resource-consuming of all means as 
under many circumstances it entails no more than a few top officials’ policy 
pronouncements. In comparison, military modernization, alliance building and pragmatic 
diplomacy all require substantial devotion and consumption of financial and human 
resources. Consequently when domestic constraints make it difficult to mobilize 
sufficient resources, chances increase for sovereignty assertion.  
There are two kinds of domestic constraints: resource constraints and political constraints. 
Resources constraints refer to the societal resources that a state has available to advance 
its strategic goals by building military forces and conducting diplomacy. But those 
resources are only “latent power”, (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 60) and whether they can be 
expended and effectively turned into “actual power” also hinges upon domestic political 
context. Various domestic political configurations, such as elite fragmentation, regime 
vulnerability, administrative deficiency, prevailing ideology etc., can all affect whether 
and distort how political leaders can tap domestic resources for the purpose of national 
security.51 (Zakaria, 1998; Friedberg, 2000; Schweller, 2006) As Taiwan’s democratic 
transition gained momentum since the late 1980s and a series of constitutional 
amendments and institutional reform have been made, the security and foreign policy 
                                                          
51 The two-dimensional domestic constraints conform to the distinction made between “material power” and 
“administrative power”, and “security hardware” and “security software”. (Ferris, 1991; Azar and Moon, 1988) The 
attention paid to domestic political constraints, especially mobilizational capability as another variable between 
distribution of power and foreign policy outcome is in line with the new wave of neoclassical realist research that 
emerged in the early 1990s. In addition to Zakaria, Friedberg, and Schweller, see also (Christensen, 1996; Taliaferro, 
2006) Earlier exploration of domestic mobilization and extraction and foreign policy includes (Lamborn, 1983; 
Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, 1989) For discussion of neoclassical realism as a theoretical approach, see (Sterling-
Folker, 1997; Rose, 1998; Schweller, 2003; Rathbun, 2008; Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro, 2009) 
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decision-making no longer resides solely in the hands of a few top civilian and military 
leaders and various political constraints have exerted increasing pressures on the 
government’s ability to initiate and implement preferred policies.   
To summarize, sovereignty assertion is one instrument for survival and security, so it 
becomes more likely when Taiwan’s survival and security is imperiled due to adverse 
power shift; sovereignty assertion also becomes more likely when domestic constraints 
make other means of security-seeking less available. While power shift affects what 
political leaders in Taipei want to do, resource and political constraints affect what they 
can do. With these two explanatory variables—power shift and domestic, we arrive at the 
following hypotheses.   
Hypothesis 1: sovereignty assertion is most likely, i.e., sovereignty assertiveness is the 
highest when power shift is adverse and domestic constraints are strong; 
Hypothesis 2: sovereignty assertion is least likely, i.e., sovereignty assertiveness is the 
lowest when power shift is favorable and domestic constraints are weak; 
Hypothesis 3: sovereignty assertion is medium, i.e., sovereignty assertiveness is medium 
when power shift is favorable and domestic constraints are strong or power shift is 
adverse and domestic constraints are weak.  
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Table 2.3 A summary of the hypotheses 
 
 
2.3. A preview of the cases 
The vicissitudes of cross-strait relations and rise and fall of Taiwan’s sovereignty 
assertiveness over the past two decades offer an excellent opportunity to test the above 
hypotheses. Next I will briefly examine if the independent variables—power shift and 
domestic constraints—covary as the hypotheses predict with sovereignty assertiveness, 
the dependent variable. Power shift includes military balance, alliance strength,52 and 
diplomatic standing since all three dimensions have a strong bearing on Taiwan’s 
survival and security, while domestic constraints refer to both resource and political 
constraints.  
The period of 1988-1994 is arguably the honeymoon of cross-strait relations and 
Taiwan’s sovereignty assertiveness was distinctively low during this time. First of all, 
perceptible favorable power shift took place at the end of the 1980s: the end of the Cold 
War and dissolution of the Soviet Union deprived the U.S.-China quasi-alliance of its 
raison d'être and the U.S. subsequently became less accommodating on the Taiwan issue. 
Moreover, the 1989 Tiananmen crisis tarnished Beijing’s image internationally and 
                                                          
52 Taiwan, of course, has no formal alliances after 1979, and the term “alliance strength” simply refers to U.S.-Taiwan 
relations (security commitment, arms sales, and political relations).  
 Power shift: adverse Power shift: favorable 
Domestic constraints: 
strong 
High sovereignty assertiveness Medium sovereignty 
assertiveness 
Domestic constraints: 
weak 
Medium sovereignty 
assertiveness 
Low sovereignty assertiveness
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pushed it to a temporary pariah status. In terms of military balance across the Taiwan 
Strait, Taiwan possessed qualitative advantage in some realms despite its being 
outmanned, and China had only a few credible military options by then. The U.S. support 
of Taiwan suddenly seemed to rebound from the hardest years following the termination 
of formal diplomatic relations between Washington and Taipei in 1979, manifested both 
by weapon sales and visits of higher-level officials. Taiwan’s pragmatic diplomacy also 
bore fruits in other parts of the world, establishing numerous substantive economic, 
cultural and political relations and extending the footprints of its top leaders widespread 
in the world. In short, this was a brief sanguine period for Taipei and the incentive for 
sovereignty assertiveness remained low.  
In addition, domestic constraints were weak during this period. Taiwan’s rapid economic 
growth showed no sign of slowdown in the early 1990s and its financial clout was 
enormous, which enabled it to consistently increase military spending from 1988 to 1994 
and to utilize economic diplomacy to establish and expand substantive relations with 
other countries. In terms of political constraints, President Lee Teng-hui did face a 
formidable power struggle against his own party’s old guard in the initial years of his 
reign, but he successfully consolidated his power due to his extraordinary knack of 
political struggle and high popularity among electorate. So both in terms of power shift 
and domestic constraints, the theory predicts a period of low sovereignty assertiveness 
and it was indeed the case.  
The period of 2002-2008 is the mirror contrast of the early 1990s. Military balance 
decisively shifted to China’s favor and the gap was widened with China’s sustained 
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contingency-driven military modernization program. As a result both China’s ability of 
coercion through limited use of force and anti-access/area denial capacity was 
substantially enhanced. During this period the U.S.-Taiwan relations encountered a series 
of setbacks and undergone disconcerting change for the latter. Furthermore, the golden 
years of pragmatic diplomacy came to an end and Taipei lost ground on all diplomatic 
fronts, from formal diplomatic recognition to substantive relations, from membership in 
IGOs to participation in NGOs. Clearly adverse power shift for Taiwan took place and 
thus the incentive for sovereignty assertiveness was enormous. To add on to this was 
strong resource and political constraints on what political leaders in Taipei can do about 
it. Its economy fell into recession in 2001 for the first time in decades and never returned 
to high growth rate ever since. The increased spending on social welfare further took up a 
chunk of the budget. Under these circumstances defense spending started to decline, not 
only as a portion of the budget and GDP, but also in real terms; the erstwhile effective 
economic diplomacy was also outdone by the mainland. Lastly, political constraints—the 
opposition party’s fierce obstructionist tactics in the legislature and President Chen Shui-
bian’s dwindled popularity due to a series of scandales—further impeded the 
mobilization of limited resources. As the theory predicts, this is the most sovereignty-
assertive period of all.  
The years from 1995-1999 witnessed noticeable rise of sovereignty assertiveness relative 
to that of the early 1990s but the assertiveness was not as high as the later Chen Shui-bian 
era. On the one hand, after the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis, China’ startup of 
contingency-driven military modernization specifically targeting the Taiwan scenario, the 
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Clinton administration’s  China policy adjustments seemingly tilting toward Beijing, and 
Taiwan’s continual loss of diplomatic allies portended less favorable security 
environment.  On the other hand, however, many of the goals of China’s military buildup 
have yet to be realized, the U.S.-Taiwan military relationship was actually expanded and 
went beyond arms sales to include more “software initiatives”, and Taiwan could still 
secure some diplomatic successes  despite its losing tug-of-war with China. In fairness, 
the adverse power shift during this period was medium. In terms of domestic constraints, 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis took a toll on Taiwan’s economy but the shock was 
limited, and Taiwan could still maintain a decent amount of defense budget; also 
President Lee Teng-hui’s stature reached the acme after paying a visit to the United 
States in 1995 and becoming the first democratically elected president in 1996. In short, 
during this 1995~1999 period Taiwan was confronted with a medium adverse power shift 
but domestic constraints were relatively weak, and sovereignty assertiveness rose to a 
limited extent. 
At first sight the brief 2001-2002 conciliatory policy in the beginning of the Chen Shui-
bian administration may prove to be a counter-example to the theory. Neither favorable 
power shift nor domestic constraints loosened, yet the Chen administration retreated from 
the fairly high degree of sovereignty assertiveness in the previous years and took a 
conciliatory stance. This appears to be incongruence between variations of the dependent 
variable and those of the independent variables. It is conceded that since the theory 
offered here is largely a structural one, it inevitably excludes variables at the individual 
level, such as political leadership. However, although political leadership could be critical 
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in initiating policy, it is structural factors that determine the sustainability of the policy. 
Indeed, as early as in August 2002, Chen reversed course and resorted to a policy infused 
with high sovereignty assertiveness. In another word, political leadership was finally 
overwhelmed by structural factors.  
During the 2008 presidential election the KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou achieved a 
landslide victory against the DPP. Ma vowed to improve cross-strait relations and is 
fulfilling his campaign promises. Although any observation about Ma’s mainland policy 
is still tentative, I contend that the sustainability of Ma’s policy, especially his low 
sovereignty-assertiveness approach, hinges upon whether there is perceived favorable 
power shift and whether domestic constraints would hinder effective resource 
mobilization to prepare for a possible adverse shift. As of now, the military balance has 
not changed much to the benefit of Taiwan, but along the other two dimensions of power 
shift—U.S.-Taiwan relations and diplomatic standing, recent developments do suggest a 
dose of positiveness: U.S.-Taiwan relations was restored and mutual trust is being built; 
“diplomatic truce” is tacitly observed by both sides of the strait and Taiwan made it to 
WHA for the first time to a U.N.-affiliated organization in 2009. Again political 
leadership was not absent from Ma’s policy, but the long-term prospect of his policy 
cannot be fully understood without taking into account structural constraints. Politicians 
can certainly choose to go against the tide, but they cannot do so for a sustained period of 
time. The short-lived conciliatory policy in the beginning of Chen’s presidency (2000-
2001) serves as both a case in point and a reminder for decision-makers in Beijing, Taipei, 
as well as Washington.  
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2.4. Summary  
This chapter sets out to establish the theoretical framework to explain the rise and fall of 
the so-called Taiwan independence policy during the period of 1988-2010. It defines the 
Taiwan independence policy as internal political move by the Taiwanese government to 
establish Taiwan as a separate and sovereign political entity on the world stage. It 
reviews two existing prevailing theses—electoral politics and shifting identity and 
pointed out their weaknesses, the former’s being its indeterminacy and unfalsifiability, 
and the latter’s being lack of causal mechanism and inadequacy to explain policy change. 
A new explanation focusing on relative power shift and domestic constraints is then 
proposed to explain the rise and fall of the Taiwan independence policy. A preview of the 
cases lends some support to the theory, and subsequent chapters will provide more 
rigorous testing. 
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Chapter Three: One China and Opening Up: Lee Teng-hui’s Early 
Years 
This third chapter tests the theory proposed in the previous chapter by examining the 
history from 1988 to 1994, starting with Lee Teng-hui’s assumption of presidency in 
1988 and ending before the 1995~1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. The theory states that the 
rise and fall of the Taiwan independence policy is primarily affected by the nature of 
power shift across the Taiwan Strait and conditioned by domestic constraints. I will first 
identify the nature of the power shift, which is further disaggregated into military 
balance, alliance strength, and diplomatic standing, to shed light on the change of 
Taiwan’s security environment during this period. Then I will turn to the domestic side to 
examine if resource constraints and political constraints undermine or strengthen the 
government’s capacity to respond to power shift. The last section traces the degree of 
Taiwan’s sovereignty assertiveness to see if what the theory predicts in fact matches what 
history unfolds itself during this period. 
3.1. Military balance: Taiwan’s qualitative edge 
The military balance across the Taiwan Strait is arguably the most important dimension 
in determining Taiwan’s security environment. Although the military tensions declined 
noticeably and the possibility of military conflicts was greatly reduced after the late 
1970s, when the PRC ceased the artillery bombardment of Kinmen and put forward a 
“peaceful reunification” plan, Beijing never rules out the option of the use of force to 
resolve the Taiwan issue and hence the Sword of Damocles hovering over Taiwan, the 
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constant military threat from the other side of the strait, has been nothing but real.53 On 
the other hand, the military balance before the mid-1990s is not reassuring to Beijing if it 
decided to take military actions against Taiwan, and if anything, Beijing did not 
possesses sufficient military capability to take Taiwan or even conduct effective coercive 
diplomacy, despite its overwhelming numerical advantage in terms of military personnel 
and weaponry.  
3.1.1. Military balance54 
The first hint of PLA’s military modernization could be probably traced back to an 
expanded meeting of the Military Commission of the CCP’s Central Committee in July 
1975, when Deng Xiaoping noted that the PLA was overstaffed, lazy, arrogant, ill-
equipped and unprepared to conduct a modern war. (Godwin, 1988, p. 142) Moreover, 
China’s poor performance during the “punitive” war with Vietnam in 1979 brought into 
sharp relief the PLA’s weaknesses and added further urgency to modernize the military.55 
If the war with Vietnam revealed the PLA’s backwardness and ineffectiveness, the 1991 
Persian Gulf War demonstrated the U.S. huge military advantages through air power, 
long-range precision-guided weaponry and information-based warfare. It “was a rude 
awakening for the CMC and the military-industrial complex.” (Stokes, 1999, p. 12) The 
series of catalysts only reinforced the shared consensus among Chinese civilian and 
                                                          
53 Beijing has officially set the threshold for the use of force against Taiwan twice: one in the white paper “The One-
China Principle and the Taiwan Issue” (2000) and the other in the “Anti-Secession Law” (2005). 
54 The discussion will focus mostly on the “hardware” dimension of the military balance. The author is fully aware of 
that many other “software” factors such as quality of training and military exercise, joint operations, C4ISR, and 
doctrines and battlefield tactics all affect the ultimate outcome of a cross-strait military conflict. But I am not aiming at 
a comprehensive military analysis here; the goal is to examine how the evolution of military balance influenced 
Taipei’s assessment of its security environment, as the big-ticket weapons are the most visible and high-profile and are 
more easily factored into political leaders and the public’s threat perceptions. For example, the hundreds of SRBMs are 
the most oft-mentioned threat in the island. Nevertheless, software issues will be touched upon wherever necessary. 
55 For early discussions of China’s military modernization, see Godwin, 1988; Wortzel, 1988.  
58 
 
military leaders that China’s military needed extensive modernization and reform, but up 
until the mid-1990s, Chinese efforts had achieved only limited results benefiting a few 
military units in terms of modern weapons, better training, command and control and 
logistics. (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1995, pp. 16-27) In the PLA expert David 
Shambaugh’s words,  the PLA was still “a military undergoing transformation from top 
to bottom, with ‘pockets of excellence’ and some qualitative advances emerging within 
an overall force structure that is changing relatively slowly and remains substantially 
antiquated.” (Shambaugh, 1997, p. 2) 
In terms of the military balance across the Taiwan Strait in the early 1990s, the simplest 
answer is that Beijing had a substantial quantitative advantage while Taipei gained the 
qualitative upper hand. But the total balance of forces and order-of-battle between the 
PLA and Taiwan’s armed forces may not be a very useful measure of Taiwan’s 
security/or lack thereof. There are three major reasons why a straightforward “bean-
counting” is not too meaningful. First, oftentimes sheer mass, whether in terms of 
weapons or personnel, is no substitute for military professionalism, clever battle 
management, superior technology, effective organization, good command and control and 
defense engineering. (Cordesman, 1990, pp. 592-593) So simple force ratio comparisons 
could be more misleading than informative when we do military balance assessment.  
Secondly, the narrow waters of the 100-mile-long Taiwan Strait and the air space over it 
could potentially neutralize the PLA’s numerical advantages. For example, the “air space 
accommodation” over the strait only permits manoeuvrability for a total of 300 fighters 
engaged in combat at one time (or 150 on each side). (Shambaugh, 1996, p. 1304) 
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Likewise, Taiwanese defense analysts believed that 36 sufficiently-armed surface 
combatants would be adequate to command dominance in the strait, provided air 
superiority were maintained. (Shambaugh, 1996, p. 1315) The limited air space and sea 
area of the Taiwan Strait meant that the PLA could not conceivably bring 100 percent of 
armed forces to bear on the battlefield and the Taiwanese military could hold out much 
longer whiling expecting the U.S. intervention than a simple force ratio comparisons 
would suggest. Thirdly and most importantly, although quantitative superiority could be 
decisive under conditions of a protracted total war, it is highly unlikely that China would 
opt for it. (Lin, 1997) Beijing’s ultimate objective toward Taipei is political reunification 
and full-scale conflict, if failed, would fatally damage the CCP’s nationalistic credentials 
and possibly mean the loss of sovereignty over Taiwan forever, and if succeeded, would 
face a devastated Taiwanese economy and alienated and rebellious population to rule. On 
top of that, immediate diplomatic isolation and wide-ranging economic sanctions would 
certainly ensue from a total attack on Taiwan. 
While the limited utility of the PLA’s numerical advantages seemed to be only cold 
comfort for Taiwan’s security, the Taiwanese military’s qualitative superiority 
constituted a much more reassuring asset. Taiwan’s own military modernization program 
was focused on air defense, sea-control, and anti-landing capability, and in all three areas 
Taiwan had made significant progress through overseas acquisition and indigenous 
production. In terms of air defense, Taiwan not only secured purchases of 150 U.S. F-16 
fighters and 60 French Mirage 2000-5 and started to roll out its own Indigenous Defense 
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Fighter (IDF),56 but also improved early warning capability, surface to air missile (SAM) 
systems, electronic counter measure (ECM) and counter-counter measure (ECCM), 
deployed long-range surveillance and mobile 3-D radars and constructed hardened 
aircraft hangars and underground air bases. (Yang, 1998, p. 148) In contrast, China’s air 
force (PLAAF)’s inventory was still “primarily of 1950s-1960s Soviet vintage”, and most 
of the fighters were “so antiquated as to be a meaningless deterrent against the F-15s, and 
16s, Su-27s, and Mirage 2000s in the region”. (Shambaugh, 1997, p. 29) The PLAAF’s 
air-to-air missile capabilities were also inferior to that of Taiwan’s. (Klintworth, 1998, p. 
157) Although the acquisition of two dozes of Su-27s was a substantial step forward and 
the development of indigenous Jian-10 was underway, there remained an awfully long 
way to go before China built a relative modern air force or even compete for air 
superiority over the Taiwan Strait. A 1995 RAND report concurred that China’s air force 
did not constitute a credible offensive threat against either the U.S. or its Asian allies.  
In terms of sea-control, Taiwan launched the WUGIN (weapon improvement) programs 
I, II, III to modernize most of the World War II vintage ex-U.S. Navy destroyers in order 
to enhance anti-submarine, anti-aircraft, and anti-ship capabilities. Moreover, Kwang 
Hwa-1, Kwang Hwa-2, and Kwang Hwa-3 ship replacement programs aimed at 
rebuilding the navy’s entire surface fleet since the 1980s. (Yang, 1998, p. 148-149) The 
modernization of old destroyers under WUGIN, ship replacement under Kwang Hwa, the 
U.S. lease of six Knox-class frigates in 1992, and the prospect of acquiring several new 
conventionally powered submarines led one respected Taiwanese analysts to conclude 
                                                          
56 But the complete delivery of those advanced fighters was expected to be around 1998. 
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that “the ROC is in the process of building one of the strongest regional navies in East 
Asia.” (Yang, 1998, p. 149) On the other hand, the Chinese navy (PLAN) had also 
undergone some generational changes of destroyers, guided missile frigates and 
submarines. However, by the mid-1990s the PLAN only had three destroyers (Luhu) and 
four frigates (Jiangwei) that approached modern standards. (Shambaugh, 1997, p. 28) 
Qualitatively speaking, the PLAN remained inferior to the Japanese naval Self-Defense 
Force, the Indian Navy, the combined naval forces of ASEAN, and elements of Taiwan’s 
navy, (Morgan, 1994) and in any major naval engagement between the PLAN and 
Taiwan’s navy, the latter was believed to be more likely to gain the upper hand. 
(Shambaugh, 1996, p. 1315) The PLAN’s submarine fleet had some comparative 
advantage with the launching of the indigenously manufactured Song diesel submarines 
in 1994, and the purchase of four Russian Kilo attack submarines in 1995 and 1996, and 
Taiwan only had two World War II vintage (Guppy class) and two Dutch-built Zvaardvis 
diesel submarines. But Taiwan’s relative shortage of submarines was compensated by the 
lease of Perry and Knox frigates from the U.S., both of which had advanced acoustic 
tracking and countermeasure devices, and the latter was designed primarily as anti-
submarine (ASW) platforms. 
With relatively superior air and sea power, the burden on Taiwan’s anti-landing 
capabilities was greatly reduced and the possibility of an engagement between Taiwan’s 
army and the PLA on the shores or inland seemed to be distant. Nevertheless, Taiwan 
consolidated its anti-landing capabilities by acquiring advanced ground force weapons 
systems and increasing mobility and firepower. The 260,000-man army was seen as “one 
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of the most highly trained and best equipped ground forces in the Western Pacific.” 
(Yang, 1998, p. 150) On balance,  
“For its size, Taiwan has one of the finest militaries in the world… In many 
categories, Taiwan’s weapons inventory is qualitatively superior to the 
PRC’s at present (particularly naval) and in the near future (air)… Taiwan 
has its weaknesses—particularly in anti-submarine warfare and anti-
ballistic missile defense—but in both cases the ROCOT is moving to remedy 
the deficiencies.” (Shambaugh, 1996, p. 1318) 
3.1.2. Possible course of action 
As a result of limited budgetary resources and qualitatively inferior military capabilities, 
by the mid-1990s the PLA presented Chinese leaders with few credible military options 
to deal with Taiwan. As a Taiwanese analyst noted, before July 1995 “whether the PRC 
had the intent and capability to attack Taiwan by force was more a political issue than a 
security one”. (Cheng, 1996) That is, the debate on China’s military threat on the island 
was motivated more by domestic political considerations and ideological battles than by 
genuine security concerns. The lack of genuine security concerns stemmed from the lack 
of tangible military threats from China.  
Almost all military analysts agreed that an amphibious invasion of Taiwan was an 
unrealistic option due to China’s inability to establish air supremacy over the strait and 
very limited amphibious lift capability.57  As John Shalikashvili, then Chairman of the 
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff observed in April 1996, China has “no capacity to invade 
Taiwan.” (Klintworth, 1998, p. 12) Kenneth Bacon, then the U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
                                                          
57 For why air superiority and amphibious lift capabilities are critical for a successful amphibious attack, see O’Hanlon, 
2000. For a minority view that a full-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan is the PLA’s most likely form of use of force, 
see Cheung, 1997, p. 57. Cheung argued that “massive surprise attacks have distinguished PLA opening campaigns in 
the past, such as in Korea in [1950], India in 1962, and Vietnam in 1979. More importantly, [Chinese] military planners 
believe that the gulf in cross-strait relations would be so wide by the time the leadership resorted to force that limited 
attacks would be futile in dissuading Taiwan … and that the only viable option would be to invade the island.” 
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Defense, concurred that Taiwan was able to withstand a Chinese amphibious assault. 
(Lin, 2009b, p. 254) Likewise, the possibility and chance of success of an all-out 
amphibious attack from China was also discounted in Taiwan. Sun Chen, then ROC’s 
Defense Minister, remarked to lawmakers in November 1993 that the ROC military are 
“confident of repelling any invasion by mainland China.” (Taipei Voice of Free China, 
November 20, 1993, FBIS-CHI-93-224) It was believed that in the unlikely event that the 
PLA prevailed at air and sea battles and it came to the final stage of an amphibious war—
landing on the island, “the landing side may not have full assurance of success but will 
have a pretty great chance of failure!” (Chien-Tuan K’E-Chi, April 1, 1995, FBIS-CHI-
95-126) There were also voices in Taiwan that faulted the Taiwanese media for 
exaggerating the Chinese military might and downplaying Taiwan’s military 
preparedness. (Taipei CNA, November 4, 1995, FBIS-CHI-95-214) Even PLA strategic 
planners, who certainly did not want to admit in public the inability to launch a successful 
amphibious attack, acknowledged that a full-scale seaborne invasion of Taiwan’s west 
coast was “impractical, too costly, too predictable and potentially suicidal.” (Klintworth, 
1998, p. 156)  
While amphibious attack seems to be out of the question by the mid-1990s, naval 
blockade is seen by many as the most likely form of use of force against Taiwan. Indeed 
effective blockade could exert strong pressures upon Taiwan’s economy and society 
given its very high dependence on shipping for exporting and importing, and energy 
supplies. But this is no easy task for the PLA Navy. As pointed out earlier, the PLAN’s 
surface combatants were in qualitative terms significantly inferior to Taiwan’s navy. 
64 
 
(Shambaugh, 1996, p. 1313) Taiwan’s anti-submarine, submarine-hunting, and 
minesweeping capabilities were deemed sufficient to thwart a naval blockade, and unless 
the PLA was willing to pay a high price it was hard to impose an armed blockade against 
Taiwan. (Chien-Tuan K’E-Chi, April 1, 1995, FBIS-CHI-95-126) Moreover, a blockade 
of Taiwan would very likely elicit international responses as it compromises free and 
open sea lanes of communication, especially from countries which had close economic 
relationship with Taiwan. In fact one Taiwanese legislator, Dr. Ting Shou-chung, 
suggested that the most effective way to counter blockade is not military approach but a 
macro-strategy which built Taiwan an economic hub in Asia so that a blockade against 
Taiwan was not tolerable for other countries as it would substantially hurt their economic 
interests. (Chien-Tuan K’E-Chi, April 1, 1995, FBIS-CHI-95-126)      
Missile campaign constituted another alternative use of force for the PLA. China’s 
development and deployment of medium- and short-range ballistic missiles such as DF-
11, DF-15, and DF-21 caused considerable consternation on Taiwan, as those missiles 
could be used to strike military targets such as command and control centers, airbases, 
airplane runways, naval bases and even civilian infrastructures, the lack of pinpoint 
accuracy of those missiles notwithstanding. To counter the missile threat, Taiwan had 
assiduously built up its anti-missile capabilities. Indigenously Taiwan developed the Tien 
Kung (Sky Bow) series of theatre defense missiles from early 1980s. (Bowen, 1996) In 
addition, Taiwan also concluded an agreement with the U.S. for two batteries (200 
missiles) of the Patriot ABM system updated after the Gulf War. (Taipei CNA, July 2, 
1994, FBIS-CHI-94-130) Although even with these tremendous efforts the island was 
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still far from missile-proof, Taiwan’s ballistic missile defense did receive a major boost, 
providing some psychological comfort for the populace. (Shambaugh, 1996, p. 1316) 
In a nutshell, by the mid-1990s, China’s options of the use of force against Taiwan were 
quite constrained. Amphibious attack remained far beyond the PLA’s reach; naval 
blockade was a possibility but its chance of success was not assured and it entailed undue 
cost and risk; the SRBMs and MRBMs did give the PLA some comparative advantage in 
that respect, but they had to penetrate Taiwan’s improved and sophisticated missile 
defense system, a task made harder by the limited number of missiles in the PLA 
inventory at that time. Both sides across the Taiwan Strait seemed to grasp the reality. 
Lin Chong-Pin, a respected Taiwanese military analyst, pointed out that Beijing would 
mostly prefer harassment tactics such as military exercises, missiles testing, submarines 
cruising in the vicinity of Taiwan to wage socio-political pressures and the “orthodox” 
military options such as occupation of offshore island, attacking Taiwan’s military 
facilities, blockade, or amphibious landing were “improbable”. (Lin, 1997, pp. 328-331) 
In fact, Taiwan’s security specialists were reassured by what they observed during the 
1995-96 PLA military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. (Klintworth, 1998) China’s own 
“after-action assessments” after the crisis revealed that the PLA capabilities against 
Taiwan were quite limited, (Shambaugh, 2005a, p. 69) and the PLA’s internal publication 
suggested that “in solving the problem of Taiwan’s return to the motherland, the use of 
force would be a really unwise decision. Peaceful reunification is the best way out.” 
(Munro, 1994, p. 367) 
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3.2. Alliance strength: endeared to the U.S. 
In terms of alliance strength between the U.S. and Taiwan, three major aspects will be 
examined: security commitment, political relations and arms sales. In all three aspects 
Taiwan had witnessed encouraging signs and their confidence to count on the U.S. help 
was boosted during the period of 1988~1994. In order to establish diplomatic relations 
with the PRC, the United States agreed during the 1978 normalization negotiations to 
sever official relations with Taipei, terminate the bilateral defense treaty, and withdraw 
all of its troops from Taiwan. On the other hand, the U.S. insisted on continual economic, 
cultural and other unofficial relations with Taiwan, expressed its interest in a peaceful 
resolution of the Taiwan issue, and did not succumb to Beijing’s demand to stop selling 
weaponry to Taiwan.58 Most significantly, the Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act 
(TRA) to provide Taiwan with an ambiguous but nevertheless security commitment.59 
Since the TRA left the president with sufficient flexibility to respond to a militarized 
conflict across the Taiwan Strait, the abandonment fear for Taipei was acute and it had 
always resorted to additional evidences such as the U.S. top officials policy statements, 
public talks, hearings, etc. to detect any possible strengthening or weakening of the U.S. 
security assurances.  
3.2.1. Security commitment 
Toward late 1980s and early 1990s, the U.S.-China relationship faced enormous 
challenges due to the Tiananmen crackdown and the disappearance of the common Soviet 
threat. To some extent Taipei emerged as a beneficiary of the changing strategic 
                                                          
58 The U.S. did agree to a one-year moratorium on arms sales to Taiwan. For the politics of the normalization 
negotiations between the U.S. and China, see Ross, 1995; Romberg, 2003; Tucker, 2009. 
59 For more detailed discussion about the TRA and its aftermath, see Myers, 1989.   
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landscape, as the U.S. became more willing to confront rather than accommodate China 
on the Taiwan issue. In November 1991, President Bush named China, together with 
North Korea and Burma as the “important sources of instability” in Asia; (Bush, 1991a) 
One month later, he emphasized that the U.S. wanted peace across the strait. (Bush, 
1991b)  Moreover, James Lilley, the U.S. ambassador to China from 1989 to1991 
delivered much stronger words regarding Taiwan at Harvard’s Kennedy School in 
December 1991. Lilley said that the U.S. would not allow the use of force against Taipei 
by Beijing, and if that happens, the president could take defensive military actions in 
accordance with the TRA even without the approval of the Congress. Although Lilley 
clearly did not speak on behalf of the U.S. government at that time, he was a confidant of 
President Bush and already appointed assistant secretary of defense for international 
security affairs, so Taipei tended to believe that his words did carry some weight. (Chen, 
1995, pp. 160-162) These may seem to be minor developments and do not imply major 
favorable policy adjustments beyond the basic parameters of strategic ambiguity. This is 
indeed true and some Taiwanese analysts concurred that no fundamental change took 
place in terms of U.S.-Taiwan relations despite the end of the Cold War. (Lin, 1992) But 
Taipei’s security is so dependent on Washington that it has over years developed the 
habit of reading the latter’s every word meticulously sometimes to the extent of over-
interpretation so even minor rhetoric changes from U.S. officials could influence Taipei’s 
perception of U.S. security assurances and assessment of its security environment.     
That the U.S. word and deeds has been closely monitored and scrutinized by Taipei can 
also been seen from the first Gulf War’s subtle impact on it. On the one hand, the war 
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demonstrated that militarily powerful countries, under certain circumstances, were still 
willing to resort to force and the weaker countries could be defeated and occupied in a 
very short period of time. On the other hand, however, the international condemnation of 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the U.N.-sanctioned military action indicated the universal 
perception of the illegitimacy of Iraqi use of force. More importantly, the United States 
was willing and able to step up and adopt a more aggressive interventionist policy after 
the Cold War.60 These all seemed to bode well for Taipei, whose security was precarious 
and relied heavily on the U.S. security guarantees.61     
President Clinton started his first term from January1993. Both the president and his 
foreign policy team planned “business as usual” and did not intend to change the 
fundamentals of the U.S “One China policy”.  (Christopher, 2001) Yet a few changing 
elements seemed to enhance Washington’s security assurances. The U.S. government had 
long maintained that its policy was based on the three communiqués with China and the 
TRA, but did not specify what would happen were there a conflict between the 
communiqués and the TRA. In early 1994, Warren Christopher, Secretary of State of the 
first Clinton administration, explicitly stated that the position of the TRA is above 
communiqués, since the former is a law and the latter are policy statements. (Guo, 2009) 
Later on under congressional pressure President Clinton signed into law the 1994-1995 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, in which Section 531(2) read that “Section 3 of the 
Taiwan Relations Act take primacy over statements of the United States policy, including 
communiqués, regulations, directives, and policies based therein.”(Public Law 103-235, 
                                                          
60 Interview with a former ROC senior official in the Lee Teng-hui administration, Taipei, June, 2009.  
61 It was also cautioned that the Kuwait/Taiwan analogy cannot be drawn too far given the difference of their 
international status and strategic importance, as well as the power differentials between China and Iraq. See Wu, 1992.  
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1994) Since the security provision of section 3 is arguably the most important part of the 
TRA, the elevation of its status could be seen as an enhancement of the U.S. security 
commitment. Thus although on balance strategic ambiguity was still in place and no 
racial change befell the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan during the Bush 
administration and the first Clinton administration, a few policy statements, rising U.S. 
international interventionism and the elevation of the TRA status tended to give Taiwan 
the impression that the U.S. had indeed strengthened its commitment to protect Taiwan, 
more or less. (Chen, 1995)  
3.2.2. Political relations 
Political relations between the U.S. and Taiwan was also expanded and upgraded during 
this period. First of all, high-level official contact increased considerably. After the U.S.-
PRC normalization, high-level official contact between the U.S. and the ROC was greatly 
curtailed, if not outright banned, to maintain unofficiality between Washington and 
Taipei. But in the early 1990s, seniors officials from Taipei managed to make private or 
secret visits to the U.S. frequently, the most significant of which included Foreign 
Minister Fredrick Chien (1991) and President of the Judicial Yuan Lin Yang-kang’s 
(1992) trips. (Guo, 2009) On the other hand, several U.S. former senior officials such as 
Caspar Weinberger, George Schultz, and Gerald Ford left their footprints in Taiwan. (Ma, 
1999) On top of that, the USTR Carla Hills’ trip to Taipei in December 1992 marked the 
first U.S. cabinet-level official’s visit since 1979, followed two years later by 
Transportation Secretary Federico Pena as the second.  
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The Clinton administration’s most notable adjustment of political relations with Taiwan 
was the Taiwan Policy Review, released in September 1994 and “the first of its kind 
launched by any administration of either political party” since 1979. (Lord, 1994) The 
bulk of the review included permitting high-level U.S. economic and technical officials to 
visit Taiwan, establishing a sub-cabinet economic dialogue with Taiwan, name change 
for Taiwan’s de facto embassy—from “The Coordination Council for North American 
Affairs” (CCNAA) to “The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office” 
(TECRO), supporting Taiwan’s membership in organizations where statehood is not a 
prerequisite and its voice to be heard in organizations where its membership is not 
possible, etc. These adjustments were moderate from Taipei’s perspective, especially as 
regards the continual refusal of Taiwanese top leaders to visit the U.S. and lack of 
support for Taiwan’s U.N bid.62 (FBIS-CHI-94-174, September 08, 1994) Although not 
fully meeting the high expectations of Taipei, these were positive steps after all.63 In 
some sense the review institutionalized the progress and improvements of U.S.-Taiwan 
relations in the previous fifteen years since 1979, and Taiwan could use it as a 
springboard to seek new breakthroughs (Chen, 1995, p. 272) 
The U.S. support for Taiwan’s membership in important international organizations is yet 
another manifestation of the strengthened relationship. Taiwan’s participation in 
intergovernmental organizations declined sharply and rapidly after it was replaced by the 
PRC in the UN and the U.S.-PRC normalization in the 1970s, and by 1990 the Asian 
Development Bank remained the only important body that Taiwan had a seat in. The 
                                                          
62 For a very critical Taiwanese view that the Taiwan Policy Review actually in many aspects amounted to a 
“demotion” instead of “upgrading” of U.S.-Taiwan relations, see Chang, 1995. 
63 Interview with former ROC officials, June 2009. 
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diplomatic winter finally came to an end when Taipei, along with Beijing and Hong 
Kong, joined the APEC as a full member in November 1991.(Taipei CNA, November 13, 
1991, FBIS-CHI-91-219) Beijing only agreed to Taipei’s admission after the United 
States exerted strong pressure during the negotiation stage. (Chen, 1995, p. 319) 
Moreover, in July 1991 President Bush for the first time showed explicit support of 
Taiwan’s accession to GATT “on terms acceptable to GATT contracting parties”. (Taipei 
CNA, July 20, 1991, FBIS-CHI-91-141) 64 The GATT subsequently established a special 
working group on Taiwan’s application and granted it observer status in September 1992. 
After the Democrats took back the White House, they seemed to have a more 
comprehensive plan to help Taiwan join international bodies whose membership does not 
imply statehood, as articulated in the Taiwan Policy Review. The Clinton administration 
even informed Taipei to draft a wish list of intergovernmental organizations for further 
study and consultation.   
3.2.3. Arms sales 
Since the 1982 U.S.-PRC communiqué was signed, the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan has 
been governed by the communiqué, as well as the TRA and to a lesser extent, Reagan’s 
“Six Assurances”. But the ambiguous and mutually contradictory language of the TRA 
and the 1982 communiqué left much room to different interpretations and even policy 
reversal. Since the U.S.-supplied weapons systems were often seen not only as 
enhancement of Taiwan’s actual war-fighting capabilities, but also as a critical indicator 
                                                          
64 Domestic politics played a prominent role in Bush’s decision: he hoped that support of Taiwan’s GATT application 
would be exchanged for congressional support to extend China’s MFN status for another year.   
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of greater or lesser U.S. support for Taiwan,65 the change of the U.S. arms sales policy 
has had great impact on Taiwan’s appraisal of U.S. dependability.  
There are two major types of U.S. arms transfers: the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
program, and the commercial sales. The FMS is conducted through government-to-
government channel and the US government essentially either purchases weaponry from 
manufacturers or draws from DoD stocks and resells it to foreign customers. In terms of 
commercial sales, American companies directly sell weaponry to foreign governments, 
upon approval by the Department of State’s Office of Munitions Control. (Hickey, 1994, 
pp. 43-47) Both in terms of amount of transactions and publicity, the FMS has assumed 
more importance than commercial sales.66 The FMS agreements declined perceptibly 
since the mid-1980s, giving the impression that the U.S. had followed the 1982 
communique not to allow arms sales to Taiwan to exceed, either qualitatively or 
quantitatively, the level of those supplied during 1979~1982. But the Bush 
administration’s decision to approve 150 F-16s in September 1992 apparently “liberated 
Taiwan from virtually all the constraints imposed by Reagan” (Tucker, 2009, p. 192) and 
reversed the ten-year policy of reining in arms sales to Taiwan.  
A variety of factors coalesced to prompt President Bush’s sudden turnabout on F-16s: 
domestic political imperative to win the 32 Texas electoral votes in a hotly-contested 
presidential campaign by offering more jobs to the F-16 manufacturer, the Texas-located 
                                                          
65 Whether arms acquisition from the U.S. mainly serves military or political purposes is related to the larger question 
whether the ROC military capability itself is “primarily for political purposes, as part of a larger strategy toward 
Beijing and Washington, or primarily for genuine warfighting purposes, to deter or defeat a possible attack from the 
Mainland”. For discussion of this question, see Swaine, 1999. In reality it may not necessarily be “either or”, but a 
mixture of political and military objectives.  
66 The U.S. also provided technological assistance and technology transfers to Taiwan, especially since the 1980s.  
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General Dynamics; the PRC’s acquisition of two dozen Su-27s from Russia and Taiwan’s 
deteriorating air power; Taiwan’s ongoing negotiation with France for Mirage 2000-5, 
etc. (Mann, 1999c; Romberg, 2003, pp. 150-154; Suettinger, 2003; Bush, 2004; Tucker, 
2009, pp. 181-192) After the sale, the PRC and U.S. also engaged in a fierce debate on 
whether the F-16 sale violated the 1982 communique that could never be resolved due to 
the ambiguous and ill-defined language of the text. What was less uncertain and more 
relevant for the analysis here, however, was the deal’s impact on Taiwan. Senior 
Taiwanese officials one after another praised the sale with jubilance.67 Prime Minister 
Hao Po-tsun said that the move is “a welcome indication of American resolve to preserve 
stability, prosperity and freedom in the ROC.” (Taipei CNA, October 7, 1992, FBIS-
CHI-92-195) The Foreign Ministry said in a statement that “this important and positive 
decision demonstrates once again the willingness and determination” of the U.S. 
government to “faithfully implement the TRA”. (Taipei CNA, September 3, 1992, FBIS-
CHI-92-173) Chen Li-an, the defense minister, hailed the sale as “a major political 
breakthrough” between the U.S. and Taiwan. Lee Teng-hui himself also tended to think 
of the U.S. policy shift as basic, which “became a hopeful symbol that Taiwan could trust 
Washington more and not find that it had simply been caught in politics as usual.” 
(Tucker, 2009, pp. 191-192) 
There are a number of reasons for the changed nature of the U.S.-Taiwan relations during 
this early post-Cold War period. The end of the Cold War and disappearance of the 
common Soviet threat probably stands as the most important one. For the United States, 
                                                          
67 Within the government and military, only the Air Force chief expressed disappointment at the jet models that 
Washington was willing to sell to Taipei. (China Post, September 4, 1992, FBIS-CHI-92-174) 
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the strategic imperative to court China in order to counter the Soviet expansionism 
evaporated almost overnight,68 and as a consequence Beijing’s pressures and demands as 
regards Taipei did not have to be taken as seriously as in the Cold War days. Taipei thus 
fortuitously became a major beneficiary of the changed international environment. The 
momentous change and its impact on Taipei, of course, did not go unnoticed by the 
Taiwanese. Taipei reckoned that after the Cold War the United States would “consider its 
own national interests first, Taiwan’s need second, and possible reaction from Peking 
last,” and even speculated on the (ir)relevance of the Shanghai Communique. (Taipei 
CNA, February 28, 1992, FBIS-CHI-92-041) To be fair, it is not so much that the end of 
the Cold War automatically pushed the United States to the eastern side of the Taiwan 
Strait as it is that with the old consensus underpinning a relatively stable strategic 
bilateral relationship gone and a new one yet to be established, the U.S. China policy 
became more volatile and more susceptible to congressional pressures and Taiwanese 
lobbying, both of which worked to the advantage of the ROC. In James Mann’s words, 
with the end of the Cold War, the United States was “willing to deal with Taiwan in new 
ways, no longer giving China the veto power it had earlier enjoyed.” (Mann, 1999, p. 
272) 
Even before the end of the Cold War, the U.S.-China relations were dealt a body blow in 
the middle of 1989 after the Tiananmen demonstrators were cracked down by the 
Chinese government. The crackdown was a wakeup call for many Americans who used 
                                                          
68 The real story, of course, was more complicated. The Bush administration initially intended to preserve strong 
relationship with the PRC, but soon found out that it was increasingly hard to justify it on strategic grounds. The fact 
that the White House had to resort to the nuclear and missile proliferation issue to assert China’s strategic value in fact 
served to testify the disappearance of the old anti-Soviet rational for U.S.-China close ties.   
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to believe that the post-Mao economic reform and open-door policy was transforming 
Beijing’s repressive regime and Beijing was a different sort of benign communism from 
Moscow and might one day become prosperous and democratic. If the end of the Cold 
War altered the strategic landscape of U.S.-China relations, the Tiananmen crisis 
significantly undermined the erstwhile positive popular perception of Beijing and popular 
support of close ties with China. In fact the negative feelings were so strong that 
President Bush was widely criticized by the Congress, the media and the American public 
as “kowtowing” to Beijing when he tried to preclude a free fall of U.S.-China relations by 
sending twice his national security advisor Brent Scowcroft and deputy Secretary of State 
Lawrence Eagleburger to Beijing in 1989. (Rosenthal, 1989; Hoagland, 1989) On the 
other hand, Taiwan had witnessed great strides in terms of political liberalization and 
democratization since the late 1980s, with martial law lifted, opposition party legalized, 
and direct legislature elections to be expected in early 1990s. The cross-strait contrast 
could not be sharper after the Tiananmen crisis: while Beijing has “butchered China’s 
young,” Taipei has offered wealth and increasing political freedom to its citizens. (The 
Economist, July 1, 1989) With the U.S. and other western countries imposing sanctions 
on China, Taipei estimated that Washington-Beijing relationship was unlikely to be as 
close as it used to be in the foreseeable future. (Lin, 2002, p. 242) Nancy Tucker, a 
prominent historian of U.S.-China relations, concurred that “Taiwan’s emergence as a 
morally superior and clearly democratic society complicated restoration of ties with 
Beijing.” (Tucker, 2009, p. 177) 
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Lastly, Taiwan’s economic success also went some distance to explain its increasing 
appeal to the U.S. government. In 1992 Taiwan accumulated the largest foreign exchange 
reserves in the world. In early 1991 Taiwan approved am ambitious Six-Year National 
Development Plan with an expenditure projected at $303 billion for the 1992~1996 
period. The project not only aimed at upgrading the infrastructure and preparing Taiwan 
“for the post-industrial telecommunication and service society,” but also became “the 
most important lever that the ROC can use in the realm of international politics.” 
(Domes, 1992, p. 43; Domes, 1993, p. 54) The huge two-way trade volume between 
Taiwan and the U.S. made Taiwan the latter’s sixth biggest trading partner, and Taiwan 
purchased twice U.S. goods as the PRC did. Taipei thus had taken pains to spread the 
idea in Washington that “Taiwan is an economic entity too important for America to 
allow to be swallowed up by the mainland.” (Robinson, 1996, p. 1348) Taipei’s financial 
prowess almost went beyond the economic sphere when an offer was promised to 
contribute $300 million for the U.S. military operations in the Persian Gulf but was 
ultimately declined by Washington out of concern for Beijing’s sensitivity. (Tucker, 
2009, p. 178) At the grassroots level the USA-ROC Economic Council and the American 
Chamber of Commerce in Taipei were both much larger than their PRC-oriented 
counterparts. (Robinson, 1996, pp. 1348-1349) 
3.3. Pragmatic diplomacy: bearing fruit 
Since succeeding Chiang Ching-kuo’s presidency in 1988, Lee Teng-hui initiated a 
diplomatic offensive dubbed as pragmatic diplomacy. The ROC’s diplomacy was 
“pragmatic” during the Lee Teng-hui era in comparison with its previous orthodox and 
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rigid diplomacy. The “orthodox” diplomacy was predicated upon a strict interpretation of 
the “one-China” principle, i.e., the ROC was the sole legal government of China and 
would server diplomatic relations with any foreign governments who recognized the 
PRC. The rigidity, coupled with the PRC’s rising strategic importance and international 
status, resulted in a diplomatic debacle for Taipei after it was expelled from the U.N. and 
the U.S.-PRC rapprochement was underway. Taipei’s diplomatic allies decreased sharply 
from 67 in 1970 to a merger 22 in 1988. It seemed that the ROC would soon fall into 
oblivion if it insisted on fighting the legitimacy battle with the PRC. It was against this 
background that Lee Teng-hui proposed more pragmatic and realistic attitudes toward 
diplomacy.  
In July 1988, Lee proclaimed that the ROC “will adopt a more pragmatic, flexible and 
forward-looking approach to develop a foreign policy based primarily on substantive 
relations”, and the next year in March 1989, he further explained that “[w]hen a country 
wishes to have diplomatic relations with Peking, it does not necessarily mean that the 
ROC has to server its contact with that country. Peking’s diplomatic gains, in other 
words, need not be interpreted as the ROC’s total loss as it has been.” (Hsieh, 1996, p. 
75) The objectives and content of the pragmatic diplomacy, as Frederick Chien, then the 
ROC’s Foreign Minister stated, are three-fold: 1) to consolidate and strengthen existing 
diplomatic ties through cooperation in the fields of finance, economy, transportation, 
industry, fisheries, agriculture, and medical care; to develop and upgrade substantive ties 
with countries without diplomatic relations with Taiwan through bilateral cooperation in 
such areas as trade, culture, technology, environmental protection, and to establish semi-
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official relations; and 3) to participate or resume participation in international 
organizations and activities according to a more flexible formula. (Chien, 1991) The crux 
of the diplomatic offensive was to increase Taipei’s international participation and its 
visibility as a viable and independent political entity, hence to highlight its sovereign 
status and rights not to be attacked or coerced by mainland China.  
The first seven to eight years (1988-1996) during Lee’s rule were the golden times for the 
pragmatic diplomacy and immediate tangible results had been achieved with Taipei’s 
aggressive diplomatic endeavors. The number of diplomatic allies climbed up from 22 in 
1988 to 30 in 1995 and 1996. The achievements on formal diplomatic relationship was 
not dramatic, though, especially given that most of the newly-acquired allies were tiny 
and impoverished and hard to locate on the world map, and during this period Taipei lost 
three most important long-term allies, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and South Africa in 
1990, 1992,and 1997 respectively. However, pragmatic diplomacy also scored a fair 
amount of successes on other fronts. In 1988 Taipei held nominal membership in 12 
IGOs, and in reality the Asian Development Bank (ADB) was the only significant IGO in 
which Taipei was a member. In the years afterwards, Taipei joined a few more IGOs, 
most notably APEC in 1991. In November 1992, Taipei was also readmitted to the GATT 
with observer status under the name “Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu Customs 
Territory, Chinese Taipei”. Furthermore, the Lee government on average signed 43 
international agreements with 25.7 partners each year, much higher than the average of 
25 agreements with 15.7 partners during the Chiang Ching-kuo era (1975-87) or 16.5 
agreements with 11 partners during the Chiang Kai-shek era (1950-75). (Chen, 2002, p. 
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34) Taipei was also very proactive in the so-called “visit diplomacy”, making use of 
every possible opportunity to visit diplomatic allies or non-allies. Lee visited 15 
countries, 7 of which did not have diplomatic relationship with Taipei. Lien Chan, the 
premier from 1993 to 1997, visited nine countries, including six non-diplomatic-allies. 
More importantly to Taipei, the benefits of pragmatic diplomacy lay in its semi-official 
relations with important regional players and the major powers. The U.S.-Taiwan 
relationship was already discussed above, but Taipei’s efforts went beyond that. Due to 
geographical proximity and substantial economic influences in forms of investments, 
trade flows, financial assistance and development expertise, Taipei’s biggest 
achievements out of pragmatic diplomacy can be said to be in the ASEAN countries. 
Some in Taipei even imagined at that time that “dual recognition” may be realized in 
Southeast Asia, most possibly Singapore. (Chen, 2002, p. 81) Although formal 
diplomatic relationship turned out to be still far beyond Taipei’s reach, significant 
improvements of bilateral relations were reflected in the upgrading of the Taiwanese 
representative offices and ASEAN countries’ offices in Taipei and the expansion of their 
functions and privileges, the proliferation of ministerial-level visits, and Lee and his 
premiers’ widespread footprints in this region. In some instances, Southeast Asia served 
as the “trial ground” for Taipei’s innovative diplomatic initiatives before they were 
practiced in other regions. (Chen, 2002, p. 85)   
Once a forgotten corner for Europeans during the 1970s and 1980s, Taipei also upgraded 
and improved its relations with Europe. In 1991 the French Minister of Industry and 
Regional Planning, R. Fauroux broke the ban on European cabinet-level officials to visit 
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Taiwan, followed by more than 30 current ministers and former government heads from 
Europe. Taipei also completed several arms deals with France, Italy, Belgium and 
Germany, the most important of which was French decision in November 1992 to sell 60 
Mirage 2000 fighters and at least one thousand short- and medium-range missiles. (Hsieh, 
1996, pp. 89-90) Representative offices of European countries in Taipei and Taipei’s own 
overseas offices were upgraded and their functions were expanded.  
As the Cold War ended, East European countries in the former Soviet bloc became a new 
battleground for Taipei. With promised financial assistance and large-scale investments, 
Taipei established a number of trade and representative offices with de facto consulate 
functions in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, etc. It also successfully arranged several 
high-level visits and sought to cultivate good personal relations with local political parties 
and elites. (Tubilewicz, 2000) Meanwhile, starting with a trade mission to the Soviet 
Union in 1988, Taipei’s relations with Moscow were resumed and direct trade and postal 
relations and direct investment were realized. After the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, the Moscow-Taipei Economic and Cultural Coordination Commission was 
established between the ROC and Russia. 
Pragmatic diplomacy paid off, and observers started talking about “Taiwan’s expanding 
role in the international arena”. (Yang, 1997) Aside from Taipei’s proactive and 
relentless efforts of seeking international visibility, several other factors contributed to 
the limited success. First of all, the end of the Cold War and the new world order brought 
the erstwhile ideological rivalry to a close and that allowed Taipei to reach out to Eastern 
Europe and former Soviet republics. Second, Beijing’s strategic importance was 
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downgraded in the minds of the Western countries as the Soviet Union adopted “New 
Thinking” and eventually collapsed and the Tiananmen crisis further strained Beijing’s 
relations with them. In addition, during the initial period of Lee’s pragmatic diplomacy, 
Beijing held a “wait and see” attitude briefly and did not carry out an all-out campaign 
against it.  
Perhaps more importantly, the booming economy offered Taipei self-confidence as well 
as leverage to conduct economic and trade diplomacy. Between 1952 and 1989, Taiwan’s 
economic growth averaged 8.9 percent and in the early 1990s it exports shifted from 
labor-intensive goods to high-value added and high-tech products. In 1993 Taiwan 
ranked twentieth in GNP, and stood as the twelfth largest exporter, fifteenth largest 
importer, the ninth largest foreign investor, and the largest holder of foreign reserves. 
“The rising wealth was flooding Taiwanese ankles” was used to portray its economic 
powerhouse status. (Wang, 1999, p. 246) Taiwan’s economic strength, under the new 
world order with economics ascending over politics, greatly benefited its diplomacy: 
“[t]he most conspicuous beneficiary has been Taiwan, whose political non-existence in 
the eyes of its trading partners for more than a decade has been at odds with its status as 
the world’s 13th-largest trading nation. The most prominent loser appears to be Peking, 
which can no longer command deference from the world community, even in areas where 
it has direct interests.” (Baum, Cheung, and Kaye, 1992) 
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3.4. Domestic constraints  
3.4.1. Resource constraints:  “the rising wealth was flooding Taiwanese ankles” 
Four decades of sustained and rapid economic growth produced an affluent society and 
resource-abundant government. As of 1993 Taiwan ranked twentieth in GNP, and stood 
as the twelfth largest exporter, fifteenth largest importer, ninth largest foreign investor, 
and largest holder of foreign reserves. As a result Taiwan’s military modernization 
programs and diplomatic endeavors benefited enormously from the government’s 
resource abundance. Taiwan increased its military budget steadily throughout the 1980s 
and early 1990s. In fact for most of the time during this period Taipei’s defense budget 
was higher than that of Beijing’s. Although many would point to the potentially large 
amount of hidden revenues of the PLA, given China’s vast territory, tortuous border and 
extended coastline and the fact that the PLA was about eight times the size of Taiwan’s 
military,69 that more spending on military came from Taipei is still quite impressive. In 
addition, Taipei could utilize the special budget mechanism to fund overseas weaponry 
procurement.70 In the early 1990s, “special budget” helped Taipei to purchase 150 F-16s 
from the U.S. and 60 Mirage-2000 and 6 Lafayette frigates from France. (Chase, 2008, p. 
35) Several factors prompted Taiwan to increase its military spending. The most direct 
reason was that “much of Taiwan’s military arsenal was approaching obsolescence” by 
the early 1980s. (Hickey, 1994, pp. 47-48) But unlike the financially constrained China in 
the 1980s, rapid economic growth in the previous two decades on the island accumulated 
                                                          
69 As of 1995, China’s total armed forces stood at 2,930,000, while Taiwan had 376,000, IISS, 1995. 
70 According to the ROC’s Budget Act, the Executive Yuan may propose a special budget outside of the annual general 
budget under the following circumstances: national defense emergence facilities or war; major national economic 
event; major calamities; major political event that takes place irregularly or once every few years.  
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enough wealth for the government to expend on military modernization and made 
affordable the high-priced foreign weaponries. Lastly, although political liberalization 
and democratization gradually took shape from the mid-1980s, there were still relatively 
little public and legislative oversight and scrutiny of defense budget and policy before the 
mid-1990s, especially given the simultaneous control of the executive and the legislature 
by the ruling KMT party.71 
3.4.2. Political constraints: Lee Teng-hui’s consolidation of power  
When Chiang Ching-kuo died of a heart attack in January 1988, Vice President Lee 
Teng-hui was sworn in as the fourth president of the ROC. At that time doubts abounded 
in foreign countries as well as in the island that Lee Teng-hui was able to consolidate his 
power. Many suspected that “he will have to content himself with being a transitional 
leader, titular head of a small collective of men who will chart Taiwan’s future.” 
(Haberman, 1988) Although serving in the government since 1972 consecutively as 
Minister without Portfolio, Mayor of Taipei (1978-1981), Governor of Taiwan Province 
(1981-1984), Vice President (1984-1988), Lee did not have a real power base and was 
perceived more as a scholar and technocrat than a politician. Moreover, since Lee was a 
native Taiwanese and received education in Japan in his youth, the politically dominant 
Chinese mainland elites viewed him warily both because the advancement of 
democratization pursued by Lee would threaten their political power and that Lee might 
harbor a hidden Taiwan independence agenda. (Copper, 2009, p. 53) Indeed around Lee 
there were a few other prominent KMT elites that could conceivably emerge as an 
                                                          
71 For the Legislative Yuan’s role in Taiwan’s defense and security policies, see (Swaine, 1999, 2001)  
84 
 
alternative to him or at least challenge his authority: Li Huan, Secretary General of the 
KMT; Yu Kuo-hua, the premier; Lin Yang-kang, a Taiwanese and a former Interior 
Minister, and General Hao Pei-tsun, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff. (Butterfield, 1988)  
However, “initial assessments overestimated the strength of the conservative forces 
around Lee and underestimated his political skill.” (Bush, 2005, p. 25) After a few intra-
party power struggles Lee Teng-hui successfully consolidated his power and established 
himself as the new paramount leader in the government and KMT. The first test came not 
long after Chiang Ching-kuo’s death. When Lee was about to be designated as acting 
KMT chairman to complete his succession as both government and party head, Madame 
Chiang, widow of Chiang Kai-shek and having resided in the U.S. since 1975, intervened 
and proposed rotating party chairmanship or at least postpone the designation. (Zou, 
2001, pp. 62-66) Given the belief that conservative KMT elites would not tolerate a 
native Taiwanese to be both president and the KMT chairman, Lee was seen as “certainly 
unlikely to win party leadership.” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 6, 
1988) Nevertheless, the intervention failed, as the KMT Central Standing Committee 
(CSC) unanimously endorsed Lee’s chairmanship. Surprised media hasted to point out, 
correctly in retrospect, that Lee was “poised to become the dominant force both in island 
politics and over the ruling KMT party well into the next decade.” (Rusk, 1988) In 
addition, Taiwanese military also pledged allegiance to the new president. (Taylor, 2000, 
p. 424) 
In July 1988 the KMT’s 13th National Congress officially elected Lee Teng-hui as the 
party chairman. More significantly, the reshuffled KMT Central Standing Committee, 
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historically the most powerful organ in the quasi-Leninist party-state, reflected a 
favorable trend for Lee. Out of the 31-member committee 16 were native Taiwanese, for 
the first time giving the majority of the populace also the majority in the highest decision-
making body. (Taipei International Service, July 16, 1988, FBIS-CHI-88-137) By a 
different measure, the reformist party cadres and bureaucrats, two groups mostly likely 
allied with President Lee due to his manifest reform impulse and being a technocrat 
himself, made great strides into the CSC. (Wu, 1989, pp. 395-399) Clearly the 13th Party 
Congress “was a defeat for the older-generation conservatives.” (Moody, 1992, p. 159) 
After the Party Congress, Lee Teng-hui unilaterally reshuffled the cabinet, adding more 
Taiwanese and young technocrats with overseas educational background to important 
government positions. The revamped cabinet was portrayed by political analysts as “a 
Lee Teng-hui cabinet”, and the move itself was such a show of strength that Lee himself 
had to allay fears of being dictatorial by clarifying that he was not a strongman and did 
not intend to become one. (Taipei International Service, July 29, 1988, FBIS-CHI-88-
137)   
Another political storm loomed in early 1990, when the National Assembly, which was 
an equivalent of an electoral college in the U.S. and met every six years, was slated to 
meet in March to elect the ROC’s 8th President. A challenge to Lee was mounted within 
the KMT by the popular Taiwanese politician Lin Yang-kang and Chiang Wei-kuo 
(Chiang Kai-shek’s second son), allegedly supported by a good many conservative 
assemblymen. But the anti-Lee campaign soon dissipated due to Lee’s assiduous work to 
secure assemblymen’s endorsement and several KMT elder’s pleas for unity. (Zou, 2001, 
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pp. 71-78) As it turned out, Lee Teng-hui received 641 of the total 668 votes (95.96%) 
from the National Assembly,  giving him the much-needed mandate to carry out domestic 
political reforms, mainland policies and international initiatives that the assumption of 
presidency upon Chiang Ching-kuo’s passing could not provide. Soon after the 
presidential election, Lee Teng-hui reshuffled the cabinet again. The most dramatic and 
surprising move was Lee Teng-hui’s decision to replace Premier Lee Huan with Hao Pei-
tsun, a career military man and former Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff and Defense 
Minister. Although the pick invited protests from opposition politicians and student 
groups and raised the fear of the military intervention in politics, (Taipei International 
Service, May 5, 1990, FBIS-CHI-90-088) it was among Lee Teng-hui finest political 
maneuvering: it effectively ended Lee Huan’s (Lee Teng-hui’s primary challenger at that 
time) political power and his coalition with Hao Pei-tsun, and forced Hao to be 
decommissioned and reduced his strong influence in the military. (Zou, 2001, p. 93) This 
and other cabinet appointments through which “Lee put his own men in the high 
command” made one observers to claim that “for all practical purposes, the Lee Teng-hui 
Era had begun.” (Tsai, 2005, p. 178)  
The last step for President Lee to consolidate his power and come to be in firm control of 
both the government and KMT was after the 1992 Legislative Yuan election, the first 
island-wide election for the ROC’s legislative body after the resignation of all so-called 
“senior legislators” that were elected in 1947 on mainland China. The KMT suffered a 
major setback, turned in the worst election result in the KMT history.72 Lee used the 
                                                          
72 The KMT nominees captured 53% of popular vote and 96 seats (60%), while the opposition DPP got 31% of popular 
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pretext of the election of the new Legislative Yuan to force the Hao Pei-tsun cabinet to 
resign en masse in early 1993. (Rigger, 1999a, p. 167) Chiang Wei-kuo, then Secretary-
General of the National Security Council, was also removed from office. (Tsai, 2005, p. 
188) Since Hao and Chiang constituted Lee’s last two serious challengers, their sacking 
left Lee’s power nearly unrivaled. The new premier, KMT secretary-general, governor of 
Taiwan, and defense minister, etc. were all Lee Teng-hui’s allies, confidants, or students. 
Lee also tightened his control over the KMT’s finances by creating a new agency within 
the KMT to manage the party’s “enormous assets and extensive enterprises” and 
appointed his confidant to be the treasury czar. (Tsai, 2005, p. 188) In August 1993 a 
group of KMT legislators, suspicious of Lee’s long-term commitment to unification and 
dissatisfied with his “autocratic dealings” with opponents in the party, left the KMT and 
founded the Chinese New Party. While the defection dealt a blow to the KMT as a whole, 
it also “left Lee Teng-hui stronger than ever”. (Rigger, 1999a, p. 168) 
In a nutshell, during the first few years of Lee Teng-hui’s rule, there were plenty of intra-
party power struggles between Lee and his opponents, or between the mainstream faction 
and the non-mainstream faction. The mainstream faction, identified with President Lee 
and his close supporters, represented the KMT’s reformist wing; the non-mainstream 
faction was mainly composed of KMT’s mainlander elites and wary of Lee’s reform 
programs, especially those having a bearing on Taiwan’s symbolic connections with 
mainland China. However, to the surprise of many people, Lee consolidated his power 
successfully after the 1990 presidential election at the earliest or the sacking of General 
                                                                                                                                                                             
vote, and 50 seats (31%).  
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Hao in Januray 1993 at the latest. The triumph of Lee and the mainstream faction owed to 
several factors: Chiang Ching-kuo’s designation of Lee as his successor; Lee’s 
extraordinary knack of political struggle; and his high popularity,73 especially among 
native Taiwanese electorate. One last reason had to do with the bigger picture: Taiwan’s 
gradual democratic transition. The democratization process worked to Lee’s advantages 
in two senses. Firstly, democratization led to power redistribution inside the KMT. Since 
in order to survive and thrive, the KMT now had to compete in the open political market, 
thus individuals and groups that were in a better position to bring electoral benefits and 
successes to the party tended to be favored. They were usually reformist party cadres, 
mass media and elected representatives, (Wu, 1989) many of whom found affinity with 
President Lee instead of his conservative opponents. Secondly, Lee also understood well 
how to construct reform programs to amass support from and increase his popularity with 
the electorate, which in turn could be used to “do battle with hard-liners”. As put 
succinctly by Shelly Rigger, “KMT reformers gained an advantage over hard-liners 
because the citizens … desired democracy.” (Rigger, 1999a, p. 132 and p. 147) To some 
extent consolidating power and promoting democracy became two sides of the same coin 
for Lee Teng-hui: to consolidate power he had to clear away conservative opponents by 
moving democratization forward; and to promote democracy he again had to outwit the 
hard-liners. He achieved both.        
                                                          
73 Public surveys showed that Lee’s approval ratings always remained above 80 percent during that period. (Chao and 
Myers, 1998, p. 181) 
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3.5. Sovereignty assertiveness: one China and opening up 
The above discussion demonstrates that power shift was favorable and domestic 
constraints were weak during the early years of the Lee Teng-hui era, and the theory 
predicts low degree of sovereignty assertiveness. Below I will examine if this is indeed 
the case. 
When Lee Teng-hui assumed the presidency upon Chiang Ching-kuo’s death in 1988, the 
official line of the ROC was that reunification has to occur under the Three Principles of 
the People—nationalism, democracy, and equitable distribution of wealth, the KMT’s 
founding ideology. On the matter of cross-strait exchange, it was the Three No’s policy: 
no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise.74 Lee Teng-hui vowed to carry on these 
policies and fulfill the mission of unification for the Chinese nation. Then at his 
inauguration as the 8th president of the ROC in May, 1990, Lee Teng-hui proposed a 
more specific approach to achieve unification, the first time for Taipei. The conditions he 
set for the discussion of unification were for the PRC to democratize, renounce the use of 
force, and exercise diplomatic restraint. Lee also emphasized that both Taiwan and the 
mainland are “indivisible parts of China”. All Chinese were “compatriots of the same 
flesh and blood” and should therefore work together to achieve the common goal of 
national unification through peaceful and democratic means. (Lee, 1990) 
Meanwhile, institutional structures were also established to direct, supervise, and 
implement mainland policies. These institutions were the National Unification Council 
                                                          
74 The Three No’s policy was a response and refusal to the PRC’s “One Country, Two Systems” proposal offered by 
Beijing during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Taipei believed that Beijing’s offer was to treat Taipei as a local 
government with a subordinate status.  
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(NUC), headed by Lee, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) under the Executive Yuan 
(cabinet), and the semi-official Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF), with the NUC setting 
broad policy guidelines, the MAC for policy-planning, implementation, and enforcement, 
and the SEF interacting directly with the PRC and dealing with practical matters. In 
February 1991the NUC passed the National Unification Guidelines (NUG). The NUG 
stated explicitly that the goal was to “establish a democratic, free and equitable 
prosperous China,” and four principles should be adopted:  
Both the mainland and Taiwan areas are parts of Chinese territory. Helping 
to bring about national unification should be the common responsibility of 
all Chinese people; 
The unification of china should be for the welfare of all its people and not be 
subject to partisan conflict; 
China’s unification should aim at promoting Chinese culture, safeguarding 
human dignity, guaranteeing fundamental human rights, and practicing 
democracy and the rule of law; 
The timing and manner of China’s unification should first respect the rights 
and interests of the people in the Taiwan area, and protect their security 
and welfare. It should be achieved in gradual phases under the principles of 
reason, peace, parity, and reciprocity. (The NUC, February 23, 1991) 
The NUG also envisioned a three-phased unification process: exchanges and reciprocity 
(short term), mutual trust and cooperation (medium term), and consultation and 
unification (long term). In short, in reiterating the unwavering goal of national unification 
Lee’s stance was in consistent with his predecessors’, although he actually outlined more 
specific and relatively flexible plans for realizing that goal. As for the attitude toward 
Beijing, by terminating the “period of national mobilization for the suppression of 
communist rebellion” and abolished the “temporary provisions” of the Constitution in 
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1991 Taipei shifted its long-standing position that Beijing was a “rebel regime” to one 
that regarded Beijing as a (legitimate) “political entity” ruling the mainland area. In effect, 
this move also amounted to a formal and unilateral renouncement of the use of force as a 
means of national unification.  
Negotiations were held since the end of 1991between the SEF and its counterpart, the 
ARATS (Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait) but the two sides soon 
realized that without some agreement, however ambiguous, of the one-China principle it 
was almost impossible to move forward even on the functional issues.75 To further clarify 
Taipei’s understanding of one China and the nature of cross-strait relations, the NUC 
passed a significant resolution titled “the Meaning of ‘One China’” on August 1st, 1992, 
and it stated,  
“Both sides of the Taiwan Strait agree that there is only one China. 
However, the two sides of the Strait have different opinions as to the 
meaning of ‘one China.’ To Peking, ‘one China’ means the ‘People’s 
Republic of China (PRC),’ with Taiwan to become a “Special 
Administration Region’ after unification. Taipei, on the other hand, 
considers ‘one China’ to mean the Republic of China (ROC), founded in 
1911 and with de jure sovereignty over all of China. The ROC, however, 
currently has jurisdiction only over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. 
Taiwan is part of China, and the Chinese mainland is part of China as well.” 
(The NUC, August 1st, 1992) 
The resolution further emphasized that China was in a temporary state of division after 
1949 and the two sides of the Taiwan Strait had been ruled by two political entities and 
the reality should not be denied for any unification schemes. Later through numerous 
exchanges of ideas Beijing and Taipei finally decided to solve the one China impasse 
                                                          
75 Secrete talks were also held between Beijing and Taipei and actually preceded the public talks between the SEF and 
ARATS. See Zou, 2001.  
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through respective interpretations. Beijing stated that “both sides of the Taiwan Strait 
uphold that One-China principle and strive to see national unification. However, in 
routine cross-strait consultations, the political meaning of ‘One China’ will not be 
involved.” Meanwhile, Taipei’s statement was that “although the two sides uphold the 
One-China principle in the process of striving for cross-strait national unification, each 
side has its own understanding of the meaning of One China.” Taipei’s understanding 
was, of course, based on the August resolution. The spirit of this shared understanding 
became the so-called “1992 consensus”. The climax of cross-strait interaction during that 
period came in April 1993, when the two heads of the SEF and ARATS and also senior 
politicians, Koo Chen-fu and Wang Daohan had a historic meeting in Singapore and 
signed four agreements.76  
It turned out that the Koo-Wang meeting did not make the road to cross-strait 
reconciliation any less bumpy and different conceptions of the one-China principle 
resurfaced again and again as to disrupt the whole process. For Taipei it was caught 
between two increasingly contradictory goals: its adherence to the one China policy and 
longing to present itself as a legitimate political entity.77 If it straitjacketed itself too 
tightly with the one-China principle, Taipei apprehended that it might constitute 
surrender to Beijing’s claim that Taipei was a local government of the PRC; if it asserted 
too strongly that it was a sovereign political entity equal with the PRC, it inevitably 
                                                          
76 The four agreements are: the “Agreement on Document Authentication,” the “Agreement on Tracing of and 
Compensation for Lost Registered Mail,” the “Agreement on the Establishment of Systematic Liaison and 
Communication Channels between the SEF and ARATS,” and the “Koo-Wang Talks Joint Agreement.” 
77 Taipei claimed that it formulated the term “political entity” to “serve as the basis of interaction between the two 
sides”, since its meaning is “quite broad”, and “can be applied to a state, a government, or a political organization.” The 
MAC, 1994.   
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distanced itself from at least the PRC’s stricter interpretation of one-China. Lee’s 
predecessors in Taiwan did not face this problem, since they never recognized the 
legitimacy of the PRC’s communist regime. For them, there was only one China, i.e. the 
ROC; the PRC was a rebel organization to be vanquished. But as soon as Lee recognized 
the PRC as a political entity ruling the mainland in 1991, how to reconcile the 
coexistence of two political entities with the one China policy became a big problem for 
Taipei.78 If before 1993 Lee Teng-hui and other political leaders in Taipei were more 
explicit on holding firmly the one China policy, after 1993 they titled toward 
emphasizing and highlighting the ROC’s sovereignty and equality with the PRC. As 
Bush observed, “Lee Teng-hui’s approach to the PRC shifted in 1993. The key 
component of his prior approach persisted: the PRC must acknowledge the ROC as an 
equivalent political entity; it must accommodate Taipei’s role in the international system; 
and it must renounce the use of force. But he changed his emphasis, tone, and style, 
moving from ambiguity toward greater clarity.” (Bush, 2005, pp. 45-46) 
Taipei’s statements during this period can be characterized as “qualified one China policy” 
or “one China policy with adjectives”. During an interview in August, 1993, Lee 
reiterated that the two sides across the Strait were “two coexistent political entities”, and 
China was a “divided country.” Later that year Chiang Ping-kun, the ROC’s Economic 
Minister, made a fuss at APEC in Seattle by saying that the government policy was a 
“one-China-oriented two-China policy over a certain period of time”. In another word, 
one China is the future, two Chinas are the present. In April, 1994, Lee stated that “the 
                                                          
78 Not a problem for the PRC, since it has never recognized the legitimacy of the ROC. The PRC’s position has been 
quite consistent: There is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the government of the PRC is the 
sole legal government representing the whole of China. 
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current stage is that ‘the ROC is on Taiwan’ and ‘the PRC is on the mainland’. We 
should forget words like one China, two Chinas…” (Academia Historica, 2000) In April, 
1995, as a response to Jiang Zemin’s generally conciliatory “eight points”,79 Lee Teng-
hui brought up his “six points” when he addressed the NUC.  Lee reiterated the four 
principles laid out in the NUG, reaffirmed the goal of unification but emphasized that 
unification has to be achieved by recognizing the reality of a China divided and ruled 
separately after 1949. “Only when the reality is reckoned with objectively can the two 
sides forge a consensus more quickly on the meaning of ‘one China’.” (Academia 
Historica, 2000, p. 80-81) Lee also urged the two sides to participate in international 
organizations equally and Beijing to renounce the use of force. 
Looking back at the evolution of Taipei’s position on the one China policy and its stance 
on unification before the mid-1990s, several features can be identified. First, by and large 
Taipei stuck to the one China policy. Not only did Taipei reaffirmed its adherence to one 
China, but also it made specific plans for achieving unification and reached out to 
conduct negotiations with the mainland, only on functional issues notwithstanding. 
Although later on Taipei’s one China policy such as “one divided China”, or “two Chinas 
over a certain period of time” was more qualified and less unconditional, it routinely 
hastened to add that it resolutely opposed either “two Chinas” or “one China, one 
                                                          
79 Jiang’s eight points are: 1) “adhering to the principle of one China is the basis and prerequisite for peaceful 
reunification”; 2) “we do not have objections to the development of nongovernmental economic and cultural ties 
between Taiwan and other countries”; 3) “it has been our consistent stand to hold negotiations with Taiwan authorities 
on the peaceful reunification of the motherland”; 4) “we shall try our best to achieve the peaceful reunification of  
China since Chinese should not fight Chinese”; 5) “…we shall spare no effort to develop economic exchange and 
cooperation between the two sides…”; 6) “the splendid culture… constitutes an important basis for the peaceful 
reunification of the motherland”; 7) “the lifestyles of our Taiwan compatriots and their desire to be masters of their own 
country should be fully respected”; 8) “we welcome leaders of Taiwan to visit the mainland in their proper status; we 
also are ready to accept invitations to visit Taiwan.” The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council.   
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Taiwan”. For example, when Chiang Ping-kun suggested the “two-China policy over a 
certain period of time” at APEC in 1993, the MOFA of ROC quickly clarified that 
Chiang’s statement was a direct response to Jiang Zemin’s claim that Taiwan was a 
province of the PRC and that the ROC still held the one China policy and pursued 
unification. (Academia Historica, 2000, pp. 53-55)  
Second, Taipei’s policy was full of flexibility. Indeed Taipei came up with many a 
creative terms to capture the nature of cross-strait relations in a way favorable to itself but 
also in no violation of the one China policy. Some of the interesting terms included “one 
country, two governments,” “one country, two districts,” “one China, two equal political 
entities,” “one China, different interpretations,” “one-China-oriented two-China policy 
over a certain period of time,” “the ROC is on Taiwan and the PRC is on the mainland,” 
etc. 
Third, Taipei’s interaction with the mainland was infused with a strong sense of 
confidence. The confidence resulted largely from Taipei’s perceived comparative 
advantage of its political and economic systems and Taiwanese leaders did not hesitate to 
highlight its political and economic achievements and the disparity across the strait. In 
another word, “Taiwan was not just a part of China; it was the best part of China.” (Bush, 
2005, p. 53, emphasis original) In July, 1994, the MAC issued a “prospectus” 
comprehensively reviewing the relations across the Taiwan Strait and maintained that the 
essence of China’s division was “a struggle between systems”: 
“The fundamental reason why China cannot be unified is not, as Peking 
would have it, that a section of the Taiwan population wishes to separate 
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itself from China, neither is it due to the ‘interference of certain foreign 
forces.’ It is that the political system and level of economic development in 
mainland China, and its frequent large-scale and violent power struggles, 
have destroyed people’s confidence in the CCP regime… If there was 
freedom and democracy in mainland China and if its economy came up to 
modern standards, who among the Chinese would not wish to see their 
country united? How could foreigners interfere? The crux of the problem 
thus lies with no one else but the CCP regime itself. This is why the ROC 
government has repeatedly insisted that ‘there is no Taiwan problem, only a 
China problem.’” (The MAC, 1994)  
3.6. Conclusion 
During the period of 1988-1994, Taiwan’s security environment was noticeably 
improved and these six to seven years is arguably the best and golden time in terms of 
Taiwan’s security and survival since 1979: Taiwan’s military maintained its qualitative 
edge over the PLA, U.S.-Taiwan relations was to some extent strengthened, and Taipei’s 
international standing was elevated under the banner of pragmatic diplomacy. 
Furthermore, examination of the domestic constraints suggests that Taiwan was doubly 
blessed at this time: although there were plenty of power struggles in the initial years 
during Lee Teng-hui’s reign between the mainstream and non-mainstream factions, Lee 
quickly outwitted his major opponents and consolidated power; resources were abundant 
during this period due to Taiwan’s economic boom, leaving Lee with few constraints for 
resource mobilization.  
It is easy to portray the adherence to the one China policy during Lee Teng-hui’s early 
years as some kind of policy inertia, i.e., it is simply a continuation of Lee’s 
predecessors’ policy so it does not even need an explanation. However, this is at best 
only partially true. Lee Teng-hui’s mainland policy is not just an extension of the Chiang 
Ching-kuo era, and there were a great deal of initiatives in addition to the continuation of 
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one China: Taipei opened up and reached out to mainland China, endorsed the National 
Unification Guidelines and established institutional structures to take charge of cross-
strait interaction, and went to the negotiation table with Beijing. Although the opening up 
started with Chiang Ching-kuo’s historic decision allowing Taiwanese to return to the 
mainland for family visits in 1987, the extent and scope of cross-strait exchange pursued 
and achieved after Lee assumed power far exceeded the small and cautious first step 
taken by his predecessor. As a result, although not formally scraping the Chiang Ching-
kuo—endorsed “Three No’s Policy” (no contact, no negotiation, no compromise), Lee 
harbored significant reservations about its utility and continual sanctified status and in 
practice most of the Three No’s caveats remained only on paper. (Wang, 1993, pp. 108-
110) Given that the Three No’s policy was understandably the weaker side’s strategy, 
(Wang, 1993, p. 110) its gradual erosion is a reflection of Taipei’s growing confidence 
about its security environment and superiority of its political and economic systems.80 In 
another word, the relatively benign security environment from the late 1980s to the early 
1990s did not only dis-incentivize Taipei to be assertive on a separate sovereignty, but 
also to push it to open up to the mainland. On top of this, domestic political constraints 
on Lee’s mobilization capacity was low due to his quick consolidation of power and 
resource abundance on countering China’s military threat, further strengthening Lee’s 
confidence in opening up. But the whole incentive structure was going to evolve in a way 
unfavorable to Taiwan’s security after the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis and as a result 
Taiwan’s sovereignty assertiveness would gradually grow.  
                                                          
80 There were interlocutors in Taiwan pointing out that Lee’s confidence was so high at that time, especially after 
witnessing the 1989 Tiananmen crisis and perceiving chaos on the mainland or even the CCP’s downfall , that he 
actually did harbor the ambition of “bidding for power on the central plains” (Zhu Lu Zhong Yuan), i.e., reunifying 
China under the ROC’s banner. But this is something that is hard to be confirmed.  
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Chapter 4 The Taiwan Strait Crisis’ Aftermath: the Late Lee Teng-
hui Years (1995-1999) 
 
The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis constituted a watershed event in cross-strait relations. 
Many saw the crisis brewing in May 1995, when the White House reversed its previous 
decision under very strong congressional and media pressures and approved a visa for 
Lee Teng-hui to visit Cornell University, his alma mater. China responded by cancelling 
a scheduled second Koo-Wang meeting, suspending dialogues with the U.S. on human 
rights, trade and non-proliferation issues, and most significantly, conducted several 
rounds of missiles firing and live-fire military exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan. The 
Clinton administration responded to the most provocative PLA exercises in March 1996 
by sending two aircraft battle groups to the Taiwan area and after the conclusion of 
Taiwan’s first-ever direct presidential election the crisis quietly died down at the end of 
March.81 China thus engaged in coercive diplomacy in order to reverse an ominous trend 
of what it saw as Lee’s intensified separatist activities and the U.S. complicity in 
fomenting Lee’s separatism. The United States, for its part, assembled the biggest 
military presence in East Asia since the Vietnam War to demonstrate its security 
commitment and maintain reputation as a trustworthy ally. The fallout of the crisis also 
profoundly influenced the PLA’s military modernization, relations of the Beijing-
Washington-Taipei triangle and security structure in the region.  
                                                          
81 There are many excellent analyses of the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis. See (Garver, 1997; Mann, 1999b; Tyler, 1999; 
Zhao, 1999; Ross, 2000; Swaine, 2001; Whiting, 2001); for some insiders’ accounts, see (Tucker, 2001; Carter and 
Perry, 1999; Christopher, 2001; Suettinger, 2003b; Qian, 2003) For perspectives from Taiwan, see (Chou, 1996; Chang, 
1998; Tsai, 2007a) For perspectives from mainland China, see (Wu, 2004). 
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First of all, the crisis not only added further urgency to China’s military modernization, it 
also shifted the modernization from “threat-diffuse” to contingency-driven, (Culver and 
Pillsbury, 1998, p. 70) meaning that the previous uncertainties of the most likely military 
challenges to the PLA evaporated and the Taiwan scenario emerged as the locus of the 
PLA’s military modernization and planning. As David Shambaugh noted, “many 
elements of PLA planning, training, and procurement… dominated by the specter of a 
military conflict with the United States over Taiwan. Exercises, force deployments, and 
weapons procurement (particularly from Russia) are preparing the PLA for such a 
conflict.” (Shambaugh, 2002, p. 4) As a consequence of the PLA’s concentrated 
endeavors, Taiwan’s traditional qualitative military edge was going to be gradually 
eroded.  
Moreover, Beijing’s overall approach to deal with Taipei also changed and started to put 
more emphasis on hardline policies—military pressures and international isolation. 
Although Beijing’s post-Mao Taiwan policy had always been a combination of “carrot 
and stick” under the auspices of “one country, two systems”, the practice of the latter was 
pretty lax before the crisis. After the Cornell visit, however, Chinese leaders came to the 
conclusion that Lee was bent on permanently separating Taiwan from China and the 
accommodating approach was failing and could prove to be disastrous to the cause of the 
Chinese nation’s unification. (Zhao, 1999) In one analyst’s words, the leadership 
consensus shifted from “inducement to pressure”, with the PLA playing a larger role in 
the decision-making process regarding Taiwan. (You, 1999)  
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The unfolding of the Cornell episode and the crisis also damaged mutual trust between 
Washington and Taipei. Officials from the State Department and NSC of the Clinton 
administration had a strong sense of resentment against the Lee government’s 
manipulation of the U.S. political system by circumventing the executive branch and 
leveraging strong congressional pressures against it. (Suettinger, 2003) p. 219 Moreover, 
Lee’s speech at Ithaca went far beyond what was promised as mostly a retrospective on 
Lee’s Cornell years and Taiwan’s economic development to be highly political. In State 
Department official Winston Lord’s words, Lee “totally double crossed us.” (Tucker, 
2001, p. 481) In the rest of the chapter, I will examine the power shift and changing 
security environment for Taiwan after the crisis, discuss the domestic constraints, and 
trace the degree of sovereignty assertiveness during the late Lee Teng-hui years. 
4.1 Military balance: the PLA’s aspirations vs. capabilities 
4.1.1. Military balance 
As discussed above, the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis significantly influenced PLA 
strategists’ threat perceptions and a potentially across-the-board and more balanced 
military modernization program was since then transformed into one keenly focused 
Taiwan. However, it would take time for the PLA’s endeavors to come to fruition and as 
of the late 1990s there still existed an “aspirations vs. capabilities” gap between “the 
vision of a future the PLA describes in many journal essays and the capability of China’s 
defense industries and armed forced to achieve the vision.” (Godwin, 2000, p. 25, italics 
original) In terms of the military balance across the Taiwan Strait, one oft-cited DoD 
report concluded, “despite the modest qualitative improvement in the military forces of 
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both China and Taiwan, the dynamic equilibrium of those forces in the Taiwan Strait has 
not changed dramatically over the last two decades, except in a few niche areas like 
China’s deployment of SRBMs.” (U.S. Department of Defense, 1999b, p. 26) Thus the 
competitive modernization across the Taiwan Strait during this period led to a more or 
less standoff of military power between Beijing and Taipei, although it would not take 
long before this situation began to change.  
Due to the very long “lead time” of indigenous arms research, development and 
production and China’s less-than-capable defense industry,82 major progress in 
modernizing its armed forces during this period mostly came from foreign technology, 
either in the form of direct purchase of complete weapons platforms or technological 
cooperation in upgrading existing weapons or build new military hardware.83 The heavy 
reliance on foreign technology manifested itself mostly clearly in the PLA Air Force’s 
efforts to acquire modern fighter aircrafts. The indigenous fourth-generation fighter—J-
10 took almost three decades to enter the testing and evaluation phase in 1998, and the 
PLA had to turn abroad for immediate needs. During 1995-1996, Beijing purchased an 
additional 48 SU-27 fighters from Russia and negotiated a contract to co-produce two 
hundred SU-27s over the next ten-to-fifteen years.84 (Moscow ITAR-TASS, April 13, 
1997, FBIS-UMA-97-103) The first two co-produced SU-27s (designated the J-11 in 
Chinese) were assembled with assistance from Russia technicians at Shenyang Aircraft 
                                                          
82 In PLA specialist David Shambaugh’s words, “there is probably no area of China’s national defense establishment 
more in need of modernization than its defense industries (military-industrial complex)… China’s own industries, 
scientists, and technicians have consistently failed to keep pace with either their nation’s defensive needs or global 
standards.” (Shambaugh, 2002,  p. 225)  
83 For a comprehensive study of China’s foreign arms acquisition during the 1990s, see (Fisher, 1999) 
84 China took delivery of the first batch of twenty-six SU-27s in 1992.  
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Corporation and tested in December 1998. At the end of 1999 China also signed another 
contract for 40 fourth-generation “plus” SU-30s from Russia. (Shambaugh, 2002, p. 262-
263) These most advanced fighters were complemented by over 2,000 obsolete J-6, 
several hundred J-7 and J-8, and 500 aging H-5 and H-6 bombers. Additionally, the 
PLAAF’s aerial refueling, airborne early warning and control (AWAC) and airlift 
capabilities were still limited and in need of development. (U.S. Department of Defense, 
1999b) 
The Taiwan Air Force, though smaller in size, had a larger number of advanced combat 
aircrafts than the PLAAF during this period. The deliveries of 150 F-16 and 60 Mirage 
2000-5 fighters were completed during 1997-1998 and Taipei also rolled out 130 Ching-
Kuo Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDF) (Taiwan Central New Agency, October 20, 1998, 
FBIS-CHI-98-293) According to the 1999 U.S. Defense Department Report, the IDFs 
could be used for low altitude interception and ground attack; the F-16s for mid-altitude 
offshore interception and ground attack; and the Mirage 2000-5s for high-altitude 
offshore interception. (U.S. Department of Defense, 1999b) Moreover, Taiwan’s air 
defense capability, composed of an early warning network, ground-based SAMs and the 
above-mentioned modern fighters, appeared to be quite formidable to the PLAAF. (Hong 
Kong Ta Kung Pao, September 12, 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0923) 
The PLA Navy (PLAN) also made some modest progress in modernizing its surface 
combatants, submarines and naval aviation but had yet fundamentally changed the 
balance of naval power across the strait. At the turn of the century the PLAN’s major 
surface combatants included about 20 destroyers and 40 frigates, with sixteen Luda-class 
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DDGs that started to join the PLAN in 1971, two Luhu-class DDGs which were built in 
the mid-1990s, one Luhai-class DDGs the first of which was commissioned in 1999, 
twenty-eight Jianghu-class FFGs that started to enter into service in the mid-1970s, and 
nine Jiangwei-class FFGs that were built in the 1990s. (Cole, 2001) pp. 98-104 
Moreover, during 1996-1997 China concluded a deal with Russia for two Sovremenny-
class DDGs, which constituted the most potent surface combatant after China took 
delivery of them in 2000. (Moscow Interfax, November 25, 2000, FBIS-CHI-2000-1127) 
There were also several hundred smaller patrol boats for littoral operations. Moreover, 
the PLAN had one of the world’s largest naval air arms with over 500 fixed-winged 
aircraft and about 30 helicopters, but most of them were obsolescent and had only limited 
maritime strike capability. The PLAN’s sealift capability was likewise unimpressive and 
could probably transport one infantry division.85 (U.S. Department of Defense, 1999b) 
On balance, the PLAN’s surface forces suffered at least four apparent weaknesses: area 
anti-air warfare (AAW) defense, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), system integration and 
maintenance and supply. (Cole, 2001) 
On the other hand, the submarine force was clearly the PLAN’s biggest advantage vis-à-
vis its Taiwanese counterpart, with about 60 diesel and nuclear-powered submarines. 
However, the bulk of the force was still the 1950- and 60-vintage Romeo- and Ming-class 
SSs, and had only a handful of relatively quieter and more capable submarines—the three 
indigenously-produced Song-class SSs and four Russia-produced Kilo-class SSs. The 
Kilos, in particular, represented “an impressive leap forward for the PLA submarine 
                                                          
85 The PLAN could possibly use merchant ships to augment its sealift capability, but that is historically difficult. (Cole, 
2001, p. 103) 
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forces,” although they seemed to encounter some operation and maintenance problems. 
(Shambaugh, 2002, p. 273) The inventory also included one Xia-class strategic ballistic 
missile submarine (SSBN) and five Han-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) 
and the PLAN planned to develop newer types to replace them.     
Taiwan’s navy, for its part, had about 40 major surface combatants, composed of eight 
licensed-produced Perry-class FFGs, six Lafayette-class FFGs purchased from France, 
eight Knox-class FFGs leased from the U.S., and more than a dozen older, WWII-vintage 
Gearing-class destroyers. In addition, there were about 100 patrol boats, 30 mine warfare 
ships, and 25 amphibious vessels. (U.S. Department of Defense, 1999b) Taiwan’s small 
naval air force was tasked with ASW and composed of about 20 ASW helicopters and 30 
fixed-wing aircrafts. Taiwan’s submarine fleet, as noted above, was quite small, with 
only two relatively modern Zvaardvis Design boats bought from the Netherlands in the 
late 1980s and two WWII-vintage Guppy II boats acquired from the U.S. in 1973 for 
ASW training. Despite being outnumbered, Taiwan’s navy led the PLAN in many 
technological areas, especially air defense, surveillance and C4I. (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 1999b)  
As the 1995-96 crisis demonstrated, Chinese leaders clearly viewed its short-range 
ballistic missiles (SRBM) as one of the most potent weapons to put military and political 
pressures on Taiwanese leaders and populace. Due to China’s relative successful story of 
indigenously developing and producing ballistic missiles and the inherent difficulty of 
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missile defense,86 a steady buildup of SRBMs opposite Taiwan understandably received 
high priority for the PLA in addition to other conventional military modernization 
programs. The two principle SRBMs in China’s arsenal were DF-15 and DF-11, the 
former of which was “test-fired” during the 1995-96 crisis. The U.S. Pacific Command 
estimated that the PLA deployed about 200 ballistic missiles targeting Taiwan by the year 
of 2000 and increased the number by 50 a year. (Kan, 2000) The 1999 DoD report 
expected these SRBMs to be most likely used against air defense installations, airfields, 
naval bases, C4I nodes, and logistics facilities. (U.S. Department of Defense, 1999b) 
Moreover, China was also assiduously developing first-generation land-attack cruise 
missiles (LACM), which were expected to be operational early in the 21st century and 
was seen by some Taiwanese analysts as even a greater threat due to its accuracy and 
stealth. (U.S. Department of Defense, 1999b; Lin, 1999b, pp. 8-9) Taiwan’s ballistic 
missile defense capability was limited to the Modified Air Defense System (MADS)—a 
modified PATRIOT system which was acquired in 1997 and provided some point 
defense against SRBMs.87  
                                                          
86 For an excellent account of China’s ballistic missile programs, see (Lewis and Di, 1992)   
87 The Patriot system belongs to the so-called lower-tier ballistic missile defense, as is the Navy Area Defense that is 
based on the AEGIS ships and has not been provided to Taiwan by the U.S. At the end of the 1990s, there were also lots 
of discussions about possible inclusion of Taiwan in the U.S.-led upper-tier missile defense system, such as Theater 
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Navy Theater Wide (NTW) programs. For a brief classification of different 
missile defense systems, see “How missile defense works” at the DoD website. The issue became salient when the 
1999 National Defense Authorization Act directed the U.S. defense secretary to study the “architecture requirements for 
the establishment and operation of theater ballistic missile defense (TMBD) systems” for Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan. (U.S. Department of Defense. 1999a) A heated debate ensued regarding the feasibility and desirability of 
having Taiwan participate in the development of upper-tier missile defense system. The Taiwanese government took an 
ambiguous attitude due to the early stage of the upper-tier system and uncertain effectiveness, exorbitant costs and 
potential “crowding out” effect on other important military modernization programs, and vehement opposition from 
Beijing. In August 1999, Taiwan’s Defense Minister Tang Fei said that Taiwan was committed to develop the TMD, but 
that meant an independent lower-tier Taiwan Missile Defense system. (Taiwan Central News Agency, August 23, 1999, 
FBIS-CHI-1999-0823) For a set of good analyses of the debate, see (Lin, 1999b; Mulvenon, 1999a; Fisher, 1999a; 
Christensen, 2000; Henry L. Stimson Center Working Group, June 2000; Lee, 2001; Chen, 2002) 
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In addition, the PLA also demonstrated enormous interest in information warfare (IW) 
after the 1991 Gulf War, in which the PLA strategists believed the U.S. informational 
superiority played a significant role in its impressive victory.88 However, as of the late 
1990s China’s information warfare program was still in the early stages of research and 
higher priority was given to defensive IW programs and information technology 
development. (U.S. Department of Defense, 1999b) PLA specialist James Mulvenon also 
concluded in 1999 that the PLA IW capabilities may be growing, but “they do not match 
even the primitive sophistication of their underlying strategies, which call for stealth 
weapons, joint operations, battlefield transparency, long-range precision strike, and real-
time intelligence.” (Mulvenon, 1999b, p. 185) In other words, like the PLA’s other 
modernization programs, much of the IW capabilities discussed in Chinese military 
journals still remained largely aspirational. Lastly, Taiwan’s role as one of the world’s 
largest IT producers meant that it did not lack the essential engineering capabilities and 
human resources to engage in offensive and defensive IW related activities if it deemed 
them as necessary. (U.S. Department of Defense, 1999b) 
4.1.2. Possible course of action  
The 1995-96 crisis demonstrated that the PLA was certainly capable of doing some “low-
level intimidation” against Taiwan. These intimidation tactics included military exercises 
and missile testing as well as confrontations at sea or in the air and various kinds of 
covert subversion, which would exert sometimes significant psychologically pressures 
                                                          
88 For a discussion of the PLA’s doctrine and strategy of information warfare, see (Mulvenon, 1999b) For China’s 
actual progress in this regard, see Stokes, 1999, Chapter 3. For a Taiwanese view of the PLA’s information warfare, see 
(Peng, 2004) 
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upon Taiwanese society.89 However, whether the PLA could do something more serious 
was in great doubt,90 so the more interesting question is what kinds of higher-intensity 
military actions were within the PLA’s reach after a few years of Taiwan-contingency-
driven military modernization. Among the major possible courses of military action were 
naval blockade, missile strikes, and amphibious assault.  
Naval blockade was seen by many Chinese as well as Taiwanese experts as probably the 
most likely option if the PLA decided to resort to the use of force given Taiwan’s 
unusually high dependence on foreign trade and energy importation. (Song, 1996; Chai, 
1996) Some Chinese analysts also believed that blockade had the advantages of “variety, 
flexibility, and controllability.” (Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, September 10, 1999, FBIS-
CHI-1999-0910) However, on the critical question of whether the PLA was capable of 
conducting an effective blockade against the entire island or even one or two ports, views 
were mixed. The 1999 DoD report took an optimistic view that the PLAN’s numerical 
advantage over Taiwan’s surface combatants and submarines could prove overwhelming 
over time and barring third party intervention, a concerted Chinese military action could 
shut off Taiwan’s key ports and sea lines of communication (SLOCs). (U.S. Department 
of Defense, 1999b) In contrast, a 2001 RAND report penned by PLA specialists Swaine 
and Mulvenon concluded that even a partial blockade of Taiwan was very difficult for the 
PLAN in the near term. (Swaine and Mulvenon, 2001, p. 115) The divergent assessments 
were probably a reflection of the evolutionary nature of the cross-strait naval and military 
                                                          
89 The term “low-level intimidation” was borrowed from Bitzinger and Gill. (Bitzinger and Gill, 1996, p. 2). Swaine 
and Mulvenon also had some discussion of the “low-level intimidation”. (Swaine and Mulvenon, 2001, pp. 114-116) 
90 As Shambaugh noted, the PLA’s own “after-action assessments” after the 1995-96 crisis discovered that its 
capabilities against Taiwan were quite limited. (Shambaugh, 2005a, p. 69) 
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balance during this period and the fact that the success of blockade ultimately hinges 
upon Taiwan’s political will, popular morale and the prospect of international support.  
Ballistic missiles was one of the few areas where the PLA had apparent comparative 
advantage and the increasing number of SRBMs deployed in southeast China could be 
used for both counter-force (striking airfields, ports, and command and control center) 
and counter-value purposes. As noted earlier, Taiwan’s missile defense capabilities were 
quite limited, and much of its more capable air defense capabilities, such as E-2T 
AWACs, the Changbai phased-array radar system, SAM systems, were of much less use 
to counter the missile strikes than those carried out by airplanes. (Shambaugh, 2002, p. 
323) Moreover, the PATRIOT system acquired from the U.S. was deployed around 
population centers in Taipei and not intended to protect critical military installations. 
(Taiwan Central News Agency, January 23, 1997, FBIS-CHI-97-016) However, Chinese 
missiles forces had their own shortcomings at that time. The SRBMs were not accurate 
enough, with the DF-15s having a CEP of 300 meters and the DF-11s 150 meters. (Kan, 
2000) The inaccuracy meant the problematic use of these missiles to carry out counter-
force precision strikes; but China would also have qualms about using them for counter-
value purpose, as attacks against civilians would more likely generate a “rally ‘round the 
flag” effect and create an indignant and unruly population that did not serve Beijing’s 
political objective.91 In addition, the number of SRBMs was estimated at 100~200, which 
undoubtedly constituted a major threat but might not be sufficient for some kind of 
saturation attack that could maximize its effectiveness. Still the prospect looked dim for 
                                                          
91 For a seminal work on “rally ‘round the flag” effect, see (Mueller, 1973) 
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Taiwan’s missile defense as China was expected to increase both the number and 
accuracy of its SRBMs in the coming years.  
An all-out amphibious assault was a worst-case scenario for Taiwan but fortunately (for 
Taiwan) a last resort for the PLA. A successful amphibious campaign is multi-faceted 
and requires concerted “air assault, airborne insertion, special operation raids, 
amphibious landings, maritime area denial operations, air superiority operations and 
conventional missile strikes.” (U.S. Department of Defense, 1999b) Most of the 
necessary conditions, especially the establishment of air and sea superiority, amphibious 
lift capabilities, and joint operations, had been the PLA’s traditional weak points and 
would unlikely be met in the medium or even long term. Moreover, the massive 
movements and amassing of troops entailed for amphibious campaign would not escape 
the U.S. and Taiwan intelligence and make strategic surprise next to impossible.92 
(Swaine and Mulvenon, 2001, p. 125) The 1999 DoD report noted that a PLA 
amphibious assault would still succeed if there were no third party intervention and 
Beijing were willing to accept the enormous political, economic, diplomatic, and military 
costs. (U.S. Department of Defense, 1999b) But these were very problematic assumptions 
and the U.S. involvement and associated costs would certainly weigh heavily in Chinese 
decision-making regarding the use of force against Taiwan.  
                                                          
92 Shambaugh pointed out that the weather and geography of the Taiwan Strait and the western side of the island also 
work against amphibious landing and attack. (Shambaugh, 2002, pp. 325-326) 
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4.2. Alliance strength: military exchange and political tilt  
4.2.1. Security commitment 
One of the most consequential changes in East Asian strategic landscape in the second 
half of the 1990s that potentially had significant implications for Taiwan’s security was 
the strengthening and upgrading of the U.S.-Japan alliance, embodied in the 1996 Joint 
Declaration on Security and the 1997 new Guidelines on U.S.-Japan Defense 
Cooperation. Both the timing and substance of the declaration and new guidelines 
seemed to suggest that these moves were in direct response to what Tokyo and 
Washington had perceived as Beijing’s aggressiveness during the 1995-96 crisis and that 
the U.S.-Japan alliance was being transformed from a relic of the Cold War to counter the 
Soviet threat to a new alliance fixating upon regional contingencies, including potential 
conflicts across the Taiwan Strait.  
First of all, the new declaration was announced in April 1996 during President Clinton’s 
visit to Japan but also shortly after the PLA’s most provocative missile testing and 
military exercises and the U.S. dispatch of aircraft carrier battle groups in March 1996, so 
the timing seemed to be strong vindication of Beijing’s suspicion that the strengthened 
alliance was aiming at China and meddling in the Taiwan issue. However, the timing was 
somewhat coincidental. The original plan was to sign the declaration in November 1995 
during the annual APEC summit but the U.S. domestic budget crisis kept President 
Clinton at home so the declaration had to wait another few months before it was officially 
signed. This small change of timing was thus “fateful” and “what might have been a 
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modest bureaucratic achievement instead took on the character of a new strategic 
initiative.” (Green, 2001, p. 90)  
More importantly, the idea of strengthening of U.S.-Japan alliance was fomented long 
before any PLA missiles were fired into the waters near Taiwan. Early during the post-
Cold War years, a variety of factors had shaken the foundations of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance—economic and trade frictions, Japanese domestic political storm against the 
U.S. military bases in Okinawa, the alliance’s inability to effectively deal with the North 
Korean nuclear crisis, etc.—and for a while the phenomenon of “alliance adrift” 
concerned those in both Washington and Tokyo who saw continuation and strengthening 
of the alliance in the interests of both countries and crucial for the peace and prosperity of 
the Asia-Pacific region. (Funabashi, 1999) Thus both sides took steps to revitalize the 
alliance. The U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region released in February 
1995 and supervised by Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph S. Nye, Jr. reaffirmed the 
U.S. commitment to a long-term engagement in East Asia and made it one cornerstone to 
rebuild the alliance to meet post-Cold War security challenges.93 (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 1995; Nye, 1995) The Japanese government, for its part, revised the National 
Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in November 1995. One of the most salient themes in 
the new NDPO was the centrality of the alliance not only to Japan’s security but also to 
the peace and stability of the whole Asia-Pacific region. (Funabashi, 1999, pp. 264-268) 
In light of these developments, the 1996 joint declaration and 1997 revised defense 
guidelines were natural next steps for Tokyo and Washington to realize new aspirations 
                                                          
93 For criticisms of the report, see (Johnson and Keehn, 1995) 
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for an old alliance. However, as noted earlier, intervening events across the Taiwan Strait 
greatly complicated Beijing’s perception of and attitude toward these efforts at alliance 
revitalization.  
Secondly and perhaps more importantly, the revised defense guidelines notably added a 
new section referring to “cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan” that will 
impinge on Japan’s security, in which case Japan would be expected to conduct a variety 
of logistic, intelligence, surveillance, minesweeping and other support activities in 
cooperation with the U.S. forces. (The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, 
1997) The guidelines further stated that the concept of “situations in areas surrounding 
Japan” is not “geographic”, but “situational”. Thus whether the Taiwan Strait was 
included was subject to perpetual speculation. China saw the phrase just a euphemism for 
the U.S.-Japan alliance’s attempted intervention in the Taiwan Strait, while the U.S. and 
Japan reassured that they were not aimed at China on one hand and refused to explicitly 
rule the Taiwan Strait out despite China’s repeated requests on the other.94 In fact this 
was probably calculated ambiguity since it served the U.S. and Japan’s interests best. As 
one scholar noted, it enabled the U.S. and Japan “to de-emphasize the clear cut 
geographical specification of Taiwan” as part of the alliance’s concern but retained “the 
option to operate in the Taiwan Strait if necessary.” (Hughes, 2004, p. 181)  
In a nutshell, it is an oversimplification to argue either that the revitalization of U.S.-
Japan alliance did not have anything to do with the Taiwan scenario or that it was purely 
                                                          
94 Even the Japanese officials themselves had contradictory statements regarding the Taiwan Strait scenario, which 
further aggravated the confusion. For example, in August 1997 the LDP secretary general promised during his visit to 
Beijing that Taiwan would not be included, while the next day the Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary responded that 
Taiwan could not be excluded. (Green, 2001, p. 91-92) 
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a response to the 1995-96 crisis. Moreover, the fact that the initial impetus was nuclear 
crisis on the Korean Peninsula in and of itself did not prevent the alliance from expanding 
its functional scope to other contingencies such as the Taiwan Strait. All that said, for the 
analytical purpose here what mattered more were probably Beijing and Taipei’s 
perceptions of the alliance adjustments. As noted earlier, the prevailing view in China 
was that the alliance revitalization was a thinly veiled attempt to gradually remilitarize 
Japan and to jointly contain China’s rise in general and to interfere with the Taiwan issue 
in particular. (Garrett and Glaser, 1997; Christensen, 1999; Zhu, 1999a; Zhong, 2000; 
Guo, 2009) In Beijing’s eyes, Washington and Tokyo’s clarifications and assurances fell 
short of dispelling its apprehensions and were belied by other paralleling developments 
such as the proposed joint research and developments of the TMD system in East Asia.95 
Taiwan understandably also paid close attention to and welcomed the new developments 
of the U.S.-Japan alliance as the revised defense guidelines obliged “the two allies to 
effect closer cooperation to help ensure peace and stability in the region.” (Taiwan 
Central News Agency, September 26, 1997, FBIS-CHI-97-269) Despite the ambiguities 
on the “situations in areas surrounding Japan”, Taiwanese analysts in general tended to 
believe that the Taiwan scenario was indeed inside the purview of U.S.-Japan defense 
cooperation. First of all, the Taiwan Strait was crucial for Japan’s maritime transportation 
and conflicts in this area would inevitably affect Japan’s interests and “peace and 
security” and render Article 5 of the revised guidelines applicable. Second, the fact that 
the Japanese government had not explicitly excluded Taiwan from the guidelines 
                                                          
95 For Chinese concerns about Japan’s participation in the TMD system, see (Zhu, 1999b; Yan, 2000; Wu, 2003) 
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probably testified to its inclusion, which remained implicit simply to avoid further 
antagonizing China. (Chang, 1999; Chao and Ho, 2004) Thus in Taipei’s eyes, its 
security situation somewhat improved with the revitalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance 
and a potentially greater role played by Japan in a cross-strait conflict.  
Toward the end of the 1990s, another development that would have a bearing on U.S.-
Taiwan security relations was the introduction of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act 
(TSEA). The TSEA was seen by its advocates as a complement to the TRA and “to 
expand upon and make more explicit the provisions of one particular section of the 
TRA—Section 3, which deals with U.S. defense commitments.” (Dumbaugh, 2000, p. 1) 
In particular, the TSEA called for enhanced military exchanges and operational training 
with Taiwanese military officers, increased number of U.S. technical staff for the AIT 
office in Taiwan, and most significantly, the creation of secure direct communications 
between the U.S. Pacific Command and Taiwan’s military command. The new legislation 
also required an annual report to Congress detailing Taiwan’s defense requests and needs 
and how they were met by the U.S. administration. The bill passed in the House in a 
modified version by a wide margin of 341-70, but was ultimately shelved in the Senate.96  
The Clinton administration opposed the congressional moves steadfastly and threatened a 
veto on the grounds that the bill would undermine rather than enhance Taiwan’s security 
and East Asian stability, that some of the bill’s specific clauses on military matters 
constituted congressional interference in the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief to 
make military decisions, that the kind of interoperability between the two militaries was 
                                                          
96 Allegedly some congressmen in the House voted for the legislation as a balancing act so that later they could vote for 
China’s entry into the WTO without being seen as too pro-China and offending the Taiwan supporters too much.   
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incompatible with the unofficial relationship between Washington and Taipei, etc. 
(Xinhua Domestic Service, February 3, 2000, FBIS-CHI-2000-0203; Dumbaugh, 2000) 
The Taiwanese government adopted a low-profile attitude toward the TSEA without 
vigorously lobbying for it partly due to the Clinton administration’s warning not to do so 
and partly due to the murky legal status of the TESA vis-à-vis the TRA.97 (Lin, 1999; 
Tucker, 2009, pp. 244-248) Lobbying mainly came from a conservative group dubbed the 
Blue Team and the Taiwan independence-oriented Formosan Association of Public 
Affairs (FAPA).98 In any case, the bill aborted and it was as much a manifestation of 
executive-congressional political wrestling and some legislators’ efforts to derail 
Clinton’s China policy as it was out of concern of Taiwan’s security. The episode neither 
bolstered nor weakened the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan. 
4.2.2. Arms sales 
Even since the abrogation of the U.S.-ROC defense pact in 1979 bilateral military 
relations were essentially confined to arms sales and intelligence sharing. But after the 
1995-96 crisis, the Pentagon expanded the much-restricted military relations by having 
conducted a series of so-called “software initiative” that focused on discussions of 
strategy, training, logistics, command and control, etc. with their Taiwanese counterparts. 
The deepening military ties were spurred by the crisis, throughout which Pentagon 
officials realized that they knew so little about what the Taiwanese military were thinking 
                                                          
97 Interview with former senior NSC officials in the Lee Teng-hui administration, 2009, Taipei. 
98 The “Blue Team” is “a loose alliance of members of Congress, congressional staff, think tank fellows, Republican 
political operatives, conservative journalists, lobbyists for Taiwan, former intelligence officers and a handful of 
academics, all united in the view that a rising China poses great risks to America’s vital interests.” The term seemed to 
be borrowed from China’s military exercises usually conducted between a red and blue team. (Kaiser and Mufson, 
2000) 
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and doing and friendly firing upon each other was not unlikely. (Goldstein and Schriver, 
2001, pp. 162-163; Tucker, 2009, p. 227) But Clinton administration officials also 
believed that the “software” cooperation could serve multiple purposes: reducing “the 
sense of isolation in Taiwan” and “giving it military leaders a greater confidence in their 
ties with the United States,” gaining “better information about the thinking and plans of 
Taiwan’s armed forces,” and responding to the Republican-led and Taiwan-friendly 
Congress. It was also believed that the software initiatives were less offensive to China in 
comparison with hardware sales. (Mann, 1999b) 
According to Michael Pillsbury, several major steps have been taken during the late 
1990s in the realm of “software” cooperation. First was the “Monterey talks”, which 
commenced in December 1997 and served as the highest- and strategic level annual 
meeting for U.S. and Taiwanese senior security and defense officials. (Pillsbury, 2004) 
The U.S. delegation was composed of officials from the DOD, NSC and Office of the 
Vice President, and Taiwanese delegation included MND, MOFA and General Staff 
personnel. (Chase, 2005, p. 174) According to Alexander Huang, a senior Taiwan analyst 
who helped create the Monterey talks, these talks were “originally designed to be a 
strategic-level bilateral dialogue that senior officials from both national security teams 
can share their views on regional security assessments, threat perceptions, and to the best 
concerted action items.” (Minnick, 2006) The second major step was a visit of a special 
DOD delegation to Taiwan in 1998 to present to a group of Taiwanese military officers 
on the role of civilians in developing military plans and the process of developing 
national military strategy, including the concepts of integrated threat assessment and 
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strategic planning.99 Another step was the U.S. dispatching of a dozen DOD military 
survey and assessment teams to assess Taiwan’s military weaknesses and needs. 
(Pillsbury, 2004) The rising military-to-military interaction and exchange was thus a 
notable feature of the U.S.-Taiwan relations in the late 1990s.  
4.2.3. Political relations 
Political relations have always been the most volatile dimension. As tensions receded 
after the crisis was brought to a close, both Washington and Beijing realized that they had 
to rebuild the bilateral relationship that was important to each other and even move 
beyond the pre-crisis state. After a flurry of diplomatic missions by senior officials of 
both sides to both warm up the atmosphere and work out the technical and substantive 
details, President Jiang Zemin and President Clinton exchanged state visits in 1997 and 
1998. The catchword for the summit meetings was the symbolically significant but 
somewhat elusive goal of building “toward a constructive strategic partnership” for the 
twenty-first century.100 (Renmin Ribao Overseas Edition, November 10, 1997) Ever since 
Nixon’s historic trip in 1972, high-level official visits between Washington and Beijing 
would inevitably alarm Taipei, and the Clinton-Jiang summits, with the Taiwan issue 
being only one out of a long list on the agenda, were no exception. In the end Taipei’s 
                                                          
99 A Department of Strategic Planning and Integrated Assessment Office were established under the MND shortly 
thereafter apparently with the U.S. guidance.  
100 Anthony Lake, national security advisor from January 1993 to March 1997, later observed that the declared goal of 
building a strategic partnership with China “created illusions, and disillusion is very dangerous.” (Tucker, 2009, p. 224) 
For an analysis that views establishment of strategic partnerships with the U.S. and other major powers as one critical 
element of China’s grand strategy to ensure its continual rise, see (Goldstein, 2001, pp. 835-864) 
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worst fear of a fourth communiqué did not materialize, but the “three noes” caused 
considerable consternation and outrage on the island.101  
During his visit to China in June 1998, President Clinton took an opportunity of meeting 
with Shanghai community leaders to reiterate that “we don’t support independence for 
Taiwan or two Chinas or One Taiwan, one China. And we don’t believe that Taiwan 
should be in membership in any organization for which statehood is a prerequisite.” 
(Kan, 2011a, p. 58) The Clinton administration insisted that the “three noes” represented 
no change in U.S. policy and the fact that it was done as a response by President Clinton 
to audience comments at an informal roundtable forum in Shanghai instead of being 
enshrined in an official joint statement released in Beijing should further dilute its 
negative impact, if any, on Taipei.102 But critics quickly pointed out that the manner and 
context of the statements were new: “on Chinese soil, clustered together as a package of 
negatives directed at Taiwan, framed as a reassurance to China, devoid of the other 
elements of U.S. policy that were favorable to Taiwan, and given canonical status by 
public presidential utterance.” (Nathan, 2000, pp. 96-97)  
Others observed that there actually was one subtle change of policy regarding Taiwan’s 
membership in international organizations.  The original formulation of the three noes in 
                                                          
101 The “three noes” was not the only statement during Clinton’s China trip that concerned the Taiwanese. When 
President Clinton gave a speech in Beijing University, he seemed to suggest that the U.S. would encourage both sides 
of the Taiwan Strait to achieve peaceful unification instead of the customary U.S. position of peaceful resolution. But 
his staff said it was not a change of policy but a slip of the tongue.(Tucker, 2009, p. 235) 
102 The “three noes” as a policy package probably had its origin in August 1995, when President Clinton reportedly sent 
a secret letter to President Jiang Zemin stating that the U.S. would oppose or resist efforts by Taiwan to gain 
independence; would not support the creation of “two Chinas,” or one China and a separate Taiwan; would not support 
Taiwan’s admission to the United Nations. Later on October 31, 1997, U.S. State Department spokesman reiterated the 
three noes during a routine daily news briefing immediately after Jiang Zemin’s visit. That was the first public 
statement of the three noes. Moreover, earlier in 1998 U.S. Secretary of State Albright and National Security Advisor 
Samuel Berger both repeated the three noes during their visits to China. (Mann, 1999c, pp. 330 & 358; Suettinger 2003, 
p. 348) 
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Clinton’s secret letter to Jiang in 1995 indicated that the U.S. did not support Taiwan’s 
efforts to join the United Nations, but now the non-support promise was expanded to all 
international organizations with only sovereign states as members. Moreover, the Clinton 
administration’s 1994 Taiwan Policy Review pledged to help Taiwan gain admission to 
international organizations that did not require statehood for membership, but now the 
positive affirmation became a negative formulation that the U.S. would not support 
Taiwan’s efforts to join international organizations composed of sovereign states.103 
(Suettinger, 2003, p. 348-349; Tucker, 2009, p. 236)  
The immediate response in Taiwan was measured but soon gave way to an outburst of 
anger, apprehension, and sense of betrayal. Taiwanese analysts and scholars maintained 
that the three noes went beyond the U.S. longstanding policy on Taiwan, downgraded 
Taiwan’s sovereignty, undermined Taiwan’s bargaining power vis-à-vis Beijing, and 
would only embolden the latter to be more aggressive. Some lamented that the three noes 
represented the biggest diplomatic setback in the previous ten years. (Taiwan Central 
News Agency, July 5, 1998, FBIS-CHI-98-186; July 13, 1998, FBIS-CHI-98-194) It was 
also believed that there was a clear link between the U.S. willingness to establish a 
“strategic partnership” with China and the concessions made by President Clinton at the 
expense of Taiwan’s interests. (Kau, 1999; Lasater and Yu, 2000) Although Taiwan 
could probably take some comfort in the U.S. congressional and media’s blistering 
criticisms of the three noes statement, the Clinton administration’s tilt toward China 
seemed to be out of question for the Taiwanese.  
                                                          
103 But there was also one positive change for Taipei: the 1995 letter said that the U.S. would oppose Taiwan 
independence, while in 1998 it was that the U.S. would not support Taiwan independence.  
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In the latter half of the 1990s, there was also a sense in Taiwan that the U.S. was 
deviating from its longstanding hands-off attitude toward cross-strait dialogue and 
negotiation and actually actively encouraging or even pressing Taipei to come to the 
negotiation table with Beijing.104 In January 1998 and February-March 1999, former 
Defense Secretary William Perry twice led a delegation of former officials to visit Taipei 
and Beijing to encourage resumption of cross-strait dialogues.(Kan, 2011a, p. 25) 
Meanwhile, a number of former or future Clinton administration officials started to 
explore the idea of some kind of “interim arrangements/agreements” between Taipei and 
Beijing to reach a modus vevendi and stabilize the strait. The most notable versions came 
from Kenneth Lieberthal, who was a University of Michigan professor and joined the 
NSC as the Senior Director for Asian Affairs in August 1998, and Joseph Nye, former 
Assistant Defense Secretary during President Clinton’s first term.  Lieberthal proposed a 
50-year “interim arrangement” in which the PRC would renounce the use of force against 
Taiwan in exchange for Taiwan’s agreement not to declare independence. (Kan, 2011a, p. 
25) Nye’s “three-part package” presupposed a greater U.S. role for upholding “one 
China” and “no use of force”.105(Nye, 1998)  
On March 24, 1999, Stanley Roth, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs, infused the idea with some officiality when he addressed the Woodrow 
Wilson Center and the AIT in Washington, DC and brought up the possibility of “interim 
agreements” between Beijing and Taipei on “any number of difficult topics”.(Kan, 
                                                          
104 The Reagan administration’s “Six Assurances” to Taiwan state explicitly that the U.S. will neither play any 
mediation role between Taipei and Beijing nor exert pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC. (Kan, 2011a, p. 39) 
105 For other discussions of “interim agreements”, see (Manning and Montaperto, 1997; Harding, 1999; Johnston, 2000; 
Lieberthal, 2005) 
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2011a, p. 61) Although the notion of “interim agreements” seemed to be at least 
innocuous, Taipei still had two-fold concerns. First, “interim agreements” implied a 
timetable, which Taipei feared would amount to a unification timetable. Second, Taipei 
was also concerned that “interim agreements” might impose some kind of grand 
framework to preclude Taipei’s options other than unification. (Guo, 2009, p. 35) Simply 
put, Taipei worried that an “interim agreement” might turn out to be one similar to the 
Sino-British agreement regarding the status of Hong Kong. (Mann, 1999a) Despite these 
concerns, the Taiwanese government did not openly oppose the “interim agreements” 
proposal, but attempted to interpret the idea differently. Senior Taiwanese officials such 
as SEF Chairman Ku Chen-fu noted that “interim agreements” did not necessarily mean 
establishing a “big framework” for cross-strait engagement or talks but could be the 
“signing of multiple accords” on practical issues such as “repatriating mainland 
stowaways and hijackers, solving fishing disputes, and combating criminal activities.” 
(Taiwan Central News Agency, May 18, 1999, FBIS-CHI-1999-0518) Clearly the 
Taiwanese government felt the pressure and wanted to steer clear of any agreements with 
political implications.106 The bottom line, as then Chairman of the MAC Su Chi put it, is 
that “this idea itself was a good conceptual possibility, but given the U.S. tilt, it inevitably 
created a greater sense of anxiety in Taipei.”  (Su, 2009, p. 39) 
                                                          
106 In this regard, the Taiwanese government might be somewhat reassured when Stanley Roth used “interim 
agreements” in the plural form, which could be more easily interpreted in line with the Taiwanese preference for 
multiple accords on practical issues. Interview with one senior official in the Lee Teng-hui administration, June 2009, 
Taipei. Three months after Roth’s speech, AIT Chairman Richard Bush attempted to reassure Taiwan when he 
addressed the Taiwan Chamber of Commerce of North America in Chicago, “some people fear that maybe [Roth] had a 
specific type of agreement in mind, that the United States in effect was imposing such an agreement, and that such an 
agreement would be bad for Taiwan. Frankly, I think that these people are over-reacting. When Mr. Roth spoke of 
‘interim agreements,’ he was referring to agreements that are less than an ultimate resolution, less than comprehensive, 
less than total. But he also had in mind agreements that are objectively achievable, that are meaningful, and that lead to 
a significant reduction in tensions.”   (Bush, 1999) 
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Overall during the late 1990s the U.S.-Taiwan experienced both positive and negative 
developments for the latter. On the one hand, the revitalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance 
led most Taiwanese analysts to believe, rightly or wrongly, that it was about the Taiwan 
scenario, and the deepening military-to-military ties went beyond the traditional sole 
focus on military hardware sales. However, on the other hand, the U.S. political support 
for Taiwan seemed to wane noticeably after the three noes were announced in Shanghai 
and push for interim agreements added further pressure on Taiwan. These negative 
developments came against the background of the Clinton administration’s pursuit of a 
constructive strategic partnership with Beijing and to borrow again from Su Chi, “Taiwan 
experienced to the full the flavor of the United States’ ‘turning its back on one lover and 
going to another’.”  (Su, 2009, p. 39) 
4.3. Diplomatic standing: losing ground  
The Lee Teng-hui government’s pragmatic diplomacy had made significant headway in 
the early 1990s with the expansion and upgrading of its formal and substantive relations 
and increasingly active participation in international organizations. The progress was to 
be encountered strong pushback after hardline thinking dominated Beijing’s approach to 
Taiwan and after Beijing was alarmed by the successes of Taipei’s diplomatic offensive 
and determined to mount an intensified campaign on the international stage. In terms of 
formal diplomatic relations, the most notable development was South Africa’s switching 
side from Taipei to Beijing in 1997. The “fall” of South Africa was particularly painful 
for Taipei given the long-standing bilateral relationship and Taipei’s massive investments 
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in and aid to South Africa’s old and new regime.107 Lu Yi-cheng, a senior diplomat and 
the ROC’s last ambassador to South Africa, lamented that this diplomatic setback was on 
par with the ROC’s loss of the U.N. seat in 1971 and the U.S. de-recognition in 1979. 
(Liu, 2011) 
The loss of South Africa, Taipei’s last diplomatic ally with some political significance, 
was indeed significant. Beijing’s strategy toward the diplomatic tug-of-war with Taipei 
used to be “hold the big, release the small,” meaning targeting the relatively bigger and 
more influential countries while largely ignoring the tiny and impoverished ones. (Hu, 
1998a) As one scholar pointed out, Beijing’s establishment of diplomatic relations with 
Saudi Arabia, South Korea and South Africa were mostly driven by intrinsic economic 
and political importance of those countries themselves; they were not so much an attempt 
to further reduce the already small number of Taipei’s diplomatic allies. (Chen, 2002, p. 
49) But post-South Africa diplomatic battles heralded something new: Beijing was 
determined to try all means to win over all of Taipei’s allies, big or small. Taiwanese 
senior foreign ministry officials alleged in 1998 that China adopted a “three zeros” 
policy—“zero ally for Taiwan, zero international space for Taiwan and zero bargaining 
chips for Taiwan to negotiate with mainland China,” and that China intended to reduce 
the number of Taiwan’s allies to zero before 2000. (Hu, 1998b) The goal of “three zeros” 
policy did not materialize as Taipei managed to keep diplomatic relations with 29 
countries by 1999, but Taipei was clearly on the defensive, in sharp contrast to the golden 
years of aggressive pragmatic diplomacy in the early 1990s.  
                                                          
107 Conversely, Beijing saw it as a big diplomatic victory. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen recounted the story of 
South Africa’s termination of diplomatic relations with Taipei and establishment of diplomatic relations with Beijing in 
his memoirs, see (Qian, 2003, pp. 259-287). 
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Taipei’s substantive relations also encountered difficulties as Beijing practiced great 
power diplomacy and established various partnerships with the world’s leading states 
since the mid-1990s, including the U.S., Russia, and European countries.108 Although 
endeavors to cultivate partnership with other major powers were part of China’s grand 
strategy to ensure its continual rise during an era of U.S. supremacy and were not first 
and foremost about the Taiwan issue, Taiwan inevitably felt the pressure.(Tsai, 2004b) 
Since the potential economic and security benefits that were promised by the partnership 
would be jeopardized if China’s important interests were infringed upon, other major 
powers would be at least more cautious in accommodating Taiwan’s interests. However, 
it is also worth noting that even with the established partnerships, other countries are not 
always forthcoming in acceding to Beijing’s demands as regards Taiwan. One notable 
example was PRC President Jiang Zemin’s trip to Japan in November 1998, during which 
he failed to press the Japanese government to explicitly offer support for the three noes 
either in verbal or written form.109 Taiwan was placated that there was no any domino 
effect after President Clinton’s verbal statement in Shanghai.110 (Taiwan Central News 
Agency, November 29, 1998, FBIS-CHI-98-333) Overall Taiwan’s diplomatic standing 
became more precarious in the late 1990s as Beijing’s earlier lax approach turned into 
more intensified diplomatic strangulation, which was facilitated by its rising economic 
power, growing international influence and more adept diplomacy. But similar to 
                                                          
108 For an elucidation of China’s grand strategy and establishment of various types of partnership as one of its defining 
features, see Goldstein, 2005, chapter 6 and 7.  
109 Then Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi only stated that Japan does not support Taiwan independence, one of the three 
noes. In addition, Japan also refused to include a written apology in the 1998 Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration, which it 
did one month ago with the South Korean President Kim Daejung.    
110 Interview with senior NSC officials in the Lee Teng-hui administration, 2009, Taipei.  
125 
 
developments in the military realm, the late 1990s was also a transitional period and there 
was yet a diplomatic debacle for Taiwan.       
To summarize the power shift across the strait in the late 1990s: militarily the PLA’s 
modernization started to focus keenly on the Taiwan scenario but military balance was 
more or less kept in place with the exception of the PLA’s deployment of SRBMs; the 
U.S. seemed to have a bifurcated policy toward Taiwan with security commitment 
steadfast and political support dwindling; Taiwan’s pragmatic diplomacy began to lose 
ground to Beijing’s intensified diplomatic strangulation. Thus there was an adverse 
power shift for Taiwan in the late 1990s but the shift was relatively mild.  
4.4. Domestic constraints  
4.4.1. Resource constraints:  muddling through 
Taiwan’s economic growth slowed down in the 1990s but still remained respectable 
compared to other economies. From 1996 to 2000, it had an average annual growth rate 
of 5.76%, which was remarkable given that the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis hit many 
neighboring countries hard. Taiwan was not completely insulated from the aftermath of 
the crisis, but a combination of factors such as high excess saving rate, lower external 
debt and highly controlled financial liberalization process minimized the economic and 
societal shocks to Taiwan. Thus when other countries were suffering severe recession in 
1998, Taiwan still experienced a decent 4.6% growth rate.  
Moreover, fiscal conditions were improved. Taiwanese government budget deficit 
emerged in the late 1980s after a long-term balanced budget amid impressive economic 
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growth, and in 1992 and 1993 the deficit in each year exceeded the total cumulative 
budget deficit for the previous forty years. (Sun, 2001) The alarmed government started 
from 1993 to balance the budget through a series of fiscal reform measures. The budget 
deficit was brought under control in the late 1990s and in 1998 it even recorded a 
budgetary surplus due to a big revenue increase. (Chen, 2005, p. 386) Although the next 
year in 1999 the budget fell into deficit once again, the amount was quite small especially 
when compared to the looming deficit surge in the first decade of the 21st century.  
On the other hand, social welfare expenditure in Taiwan started to accelerate its 
expansion with democratization setting in and political competition intensifying. In 1995 
the landmark universal health insurance was instituted and doubled the population 
eligible for the state-run health insurance program. (Tang, 1997) With limited 
government budget, social welfare spending inevitably competed with expenditure on 
national defense and foreign affairs, and with political competition lurking in the 
background politicians tended to favor the former. But the late 1990s was still transitional 
and welfare spending pressures would be even greater afterwards. All in all, the Lee 
Teng-hui government was still able to maintain a decent defense budget well above three 
percent of Taiwan’s GDP, something that proved so elusive to achieve after Lee stepped 
down. 
4.4.2. Political constraints: the strongman of Lee Teng-hui  
Amid heightened tensions across the Taiwan Strait, Lee Teng-hui won the 1996 direct 
presidential election with a majority of 54%, outpolling three other candidates by a wide 
margin. The landslide victory provided Lee with much-needed popular mandate after his 
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consolidation of power inside the KMT. As Lee garnered more than twice as many votes 
as his nearest challenger, some from other political parties actually expressed concern 
that he might act without consultation and become dictatorial. (Tyler, 1996) However, as 
Taiwan’s legislative bodies became increasingly powerful and assertive and opposition 
parties’ challenges—both from the DPP and the KMT’s own splinters—mounted, there 
was no lack of political constraints for Lee Teng-hui. In the National Assembly election 
that was held concurrently with the presidential election, the KMT gained 54.79% of the 
seats with 49.68% of the votes, while the DPP won 29.64% of the seats with 29.85% of 
the votes. The New Party, formed after the non-mainstream KMT figures lost the 
political struggle against Lee, obtained 13.77% of the seats with 13.67% of the votes. 
Although the KMT had a majority in the National Assembly, that was a far cry from the 
¾ supermajority required for constitutional amendment.   
The KMT’s performance in the Legislative Yuan election that was held four months 
earlier in December 1995 further indicated that the legislative bodies were no longer at 
the mercy of the ruling party. The KMT barely maintained its majority after winning 
51.5% of the seats but that was only a three-seat majority.111 The KMT’s slack discipline 
and lax attendance in the LY meant that it actually could lose de facto majority at some 
moments and on some issues. (Rigger, 1999, p. 172) More dismal for the KMT was that 
its percentage of popular vote of 46% was below 50%, the first time in any major 
elections in Taiwan. The DPP and the NP won 33% and 13% of the LY seats 
respectively. The NP’s performance was especially startling for some observers given 
                                                          
111 The KMT’s majority was further reduced later after it expelled one legislator.  
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that it was only two years old by then and had little financial or organizational clout. 
(Copper, 1996, pp. 28-29) Despite their ideological differences, the DPP and the NP did 
cooperate with each other in the LY and challenged the KMT’s dominance. Thus coming 
into the latter half of the 1990s was a stronger presidency empowered by popular election 
facing more recalcitrant legislative bodies. As an astute politician, Lee Teng-hui would 
engineer to further strengthen the presidency through constitutional amendment.  
But since the KMT no longer enjoyed the ¾ supermajority in the National Assembly, it 
had to co-opt other political parties in order to push through constitutional reforms. An 
important step was the National Development Conference (NDC) that Lee convened at 
the end of 1996. The NDC brought together 170 representatives from major political 
parties as well as from the government, academia, business and the media to forge 
consensus on critical issues such as cross-strait relations, revitalizing the economy and 
reforming the constitution and polity.112 (Chao, Ramon H. Myers, and Robinson, 1997) 
The KMT and DPP managed to reach a number of consensuses, paving the way for 
constitutional amendment the next year.  
Table 4.1 Presidential Election, March 23, 1996 (Hsieh and Niou, 1996) 
Candidate Party  Votes (%) 
Lee Teng-hui KMT 54.00 
Peng Ming-min DPP 21.13 
Lin Yang-kang Independent* 14.90 
Chen Li-an Independent 9.98 
*Endorsed by the New Party. 
                                                          
112 Similarly, Lee Teng-hui convened a National Affairs Conference in 1990 shortly after he assumed presidency to 
promote political reform.  
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Table 4.2 National Assembly Election, March 23, 1996 (Hsieh and Niou, 1996) 
Party Votes (%) District  
234 seats 
List (I)* 
80 seats 
List (II)**  
20 seats 
Total 
334 seats 
Seats held before  
the election 
KMT 49.68 129 43 11 183 239 
DPP 29.85 68 25 6 99 56 
NP 13.67 31 12 3 46 3 
Other 6.80 6 0 0 6 7 
Total 100.00 234 80 20 334 305 
 
*Representing the nationwide constituency, allocated according to the district vote; 
**Representing overseas Chinese communities, allocated according to the district vote. 
 
Figure 4.1 Seats Distribution after the 1995 LY election  
 
 
The fourth constitutional amendment in 1997 had two most significant changes. First of 
all, the president could appoint the premier, head of the Executive Yuan without the 
KMT 
52% 
NP 
13% 
DPP 
33% 
Others 
2% 
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Election 
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approval of the LY. This change, combined with the abolishment of the requirement of 
the premier countersignature for the president’s personnel appointments that was made in 
the 1994 amendment, effectively turned the premier the “chief of staff” of the president. 
Moreover, the president may, within ten days following the passage by the LY of a no-
confidence vote against the premier, dissolve the LY. The LY’s power was also enhanced 
to some extent: a simple majority (instead of two-thirds) in the LY can now override 
cabinet’s veto power over any bill; and the impeachment power was transferred from the 
Control Yuan to the LY. Nevertheless, overall the 1997 amendment “strengthened the 
presidency at the expense of parliament and other branches of the government,” and 
moved the ROC polity closer to a semi-presidential system. (Myers, Chao, and Kuo, 
2002; Su, 2010b) Some scholars and politicians even criticized the amendment as 
creating an institutional basis for an imperial presidency. (Cheng and Liao, 1998, p. 56) 
The second significant change was the “freezing” of the Taiwan Province. In practice it 
means that after the current Taiwan Provincial Governor and the Provincial Assembly 
served out their terms at the end of 1998, there would be no more elections for them and 
a much downsized provincial government would be appointed by the president. The 
Taiwan Province, despite its existence in name, effectively ceased to be one level of 
government without independent budget or personnel. The oft-used rationale for the 
downsizing was the redundancy of the provincial government given its overlapping with 
the central government in terms of both geographical jurisdiction and functions and the 
resultant governmental inefficiency.113 But it was widely believed that there were other 
                                                          
113 The only areas not controlled by Taiwan Province were the offshore islands and the directly-controlled 
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two important factors at work: downsizing or even eliminating Taiwan Province was 
highly preferred by the DPP and thus became necessary in exchange for the DPP’s 
collaboration on other proposed reforms; the downsizing would undermine a potential 
political rival of Lee—Taiwan Province Governor James Soong Chu-yu, who was 
popularly elected in 1994 even before Lee himself obtained popular mandate in 1996 and 
built widespread local connections and unmatched island-wide popularity.(McBeath, 
2000, pp. 252-255) In any case, the freezing of the Taiwan Province enhanced the power 
of the central government and increased resources at its disposal.   
The KMT’s relative success in the 1998 LY election further consolidated its majority in 
the legislature and eased the difficulty of getting the LY on board for its policy initiatives. 
The KMT increased both its vote share and seats in the enlarged LY, while both the DPP 
and NP suffered setbacks. It was actually the first time since the early 1980s that the 
KMT managed to reverse a long-term trend of declining electoral performances in 
legislative elections. Meanwhile, the election also gave the KMT a more comfortable 
majority (55% seats share) in the LY than the precarious one it had after 1995. (Chu and 
Diamond, 1999, p. 812) The KMT gladly announced that it had achieved its goal of 
controlling the LY “substantially,” and that the outcome would facilitate legislation. The 
DPP and NP both expressed disappointment and pessimism about the election, and one 
senior DPP politician was even concerned that Taiwanese politics might revert “to a time 
when the KMT dominated.”(Copper, 1999, p. 34)  
                                                                                                                                                                             
municipalities such as Taipei City and Kaohsiung City. The Taiwan provincial government also exerted all functions of 
the central government except in the realms of cross-strait relations, national defense and foreign affairs.   
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To summarize the domestic constraints in the late Lee Teng-hui era: governmental 
resources might not be as abundant as the late 1980s and early 1990s, but continued 
economic growth and balanced budget weakened resource constraints on the government; 
in terms of political constraints, even when there was greater legislative activism, Lee 
strengthened his power through winning the first democratic presidential election, 
engineering constitutional reform, and achieving better results in the 1998 LY election. 
Simply put, domestic constraints were in general weak in the late 1990s.  
4.5. Sovereignty assertiveness: one China under fire  
So in the latter half of Lee Teng-hui’s rule, there was medium adverse power shift across 
the strait while domestic constraints were weak. Consequently sovereignty assertiveness 
rose to a limited extent. During this period, Taipei apparently became more skeptical of 
the one China policy, and Taiwanese officials frequently referred to “one China” as a 
“political trap” for Taiwan, as MAC chairman Chang King-yuh did in November 1996 
and the Premier Vincent Siew did in December 1997. Toward the end of 1996 the MAC 
issued an analysis of the PRC’s tactics of using “one China” to claim its jurisdiction over 
Taiwan. The MAC pointed out that the PRC attached so much importance to its “one 
China principle” just to negate the reality of the ROC’s existence. Moreover, the “one 
China principle” connoted opposition not only to Taiwan independence, but also to 
pragmatic diplomacy, the U.N. campaign, acquisition of advanced weaponry from 
foreign countries, or even defining the presidential election as realization of popular 
sovereignty. In February 1997 the Government Information Office under the Executive 
Yuan warned that if the PRC’s “one China principle” were accepted, then it amounted to 
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a “verbal annexation” of the ROC, and it was better to talk about “one divided China” 
than simply “one China”. (Academia Historica, 2000)  
In early 1998 Beijing and Taipei took positive steps toward resuming dialogue, which 
was suspended by the former in response to Lee’s Cornell visit in June 1995.  Five years 
after the first Koo-Wang talk in Singapore in 1993 the heads of the SEF and ARATS met 
again when Koo Chen-fu paid a visit to Beijing in October 1998. Although the 
resumption of the dialogue and Taipei’s willingness to discuss political issues were to 
Beijing’s pleasure, Taipei did not shy away from emphasizing the fundamentals of its 
position or soften its tones. In June 1998, two months after the SEF and ARATS already 
met in Beijing in preparation for Koo’s visit, the MAC claimed that the essence of cross-
strait conflict was the PRC’s attempt to annex the ROC. This was in stark contrast to the 
MAC’s 1994 formulation that the essence of China’s division was a competition between 
systems. During the meeting with his counterpart, Wang Daohan, Koo Chen-fu stressed 
once again that “one divided China” was not only a historical fact, but also political 
reality.  
The real revolutionary redefinition of Taiwan’s status and the nature of cross-strait 
relations had yet to come. On July 9, 1999, three months before Wang Daohan’s 
scheduled visit to Taipei, Lee Teng-hui brought forward the famous “special-state-to-
state theory” when he was conducting an interview with Deutsche Welle: 
“Since the PRC’s establishment, the Chinese communists have never ruled 
Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen, and Mazu, which have been under the jurisdiction 
of the Republic of China ... Since our constitutional reform in 1991, we have 
designated cross-strait ties as nation-to-nation (guojia yu guojia), or at least 
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as special state-to-state ties (teshu de guoyuguo de guanxi), rather than 
internal ties within ‘one China’ between a legitimate government and a 
rebellion group, or between central and local governments.” (Kan, 2011a, p. 
61)  
The new formulation was read by many as formally scrapping the one China policy. 
Referring to the special state-to-state theory, The New York Times reported, “Taiwan has 
abandoned the political formula that has long helped avert war with China, declaring 
today that it will no longer adhere to the principle that the Chinese mainland and Taiwan 
are two parts of the same country.” (The New York Times, July 13, 1999) It also dashed 
any hope of cross-strait dialogue during Lee’s presidency and China concluded that Lee 
was unmistakably a separatist and regarded his move as “an attempt to fundamentally 
change the status of Taiwan as a part of China.” (The Taiwan Affairs Office, 2000) 
4.6 Conclusion  
Taiwan’s security environment has been fundamentally reshaped after the Taiwan Strait 
crisis: the Taiwan scenario had become the key component of the PLA’s military 
modernization ever since and Taiwan’s pragmatic diplomacy encountered much stronger 
pushback from an alarmed Beijing; meanwhile, the Clinton administration’s perceived 
political tilt toward Beijing generated considerable anxiety in Taipei. On the other hand, 
Taipei could take comfort from that fact that Beijing’s military and diplomatic pressures 
were just off to the start and Washington strengthened its military ties with Taipei. On the 
domestic side, the Asian financial crisis did not hurt Taiwan’s economy as much as it did 
to other Asian economies, Taiwan’s fiscal situation improved, and Lee Teng-hui’s power 
was further strengthened through elections and constitutional reform, making resource 
mobilization more viable an option in response to the changed security environment. As a 
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consequence of the moderately adverse power shift and weak domestic constraints, 
Taiwan’s sovereignty assertiveness rose to a limited extent in the late 1990s. 
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Chapter 5 The Taiwan Independence Policy under Chen Shui-bian 
(2002-2007) 
 
This chapter tests the theory proposed earlier by examining the history from 2002 to 
2007, starting with Chen Shui-bian’s “one-state-on-each-side” statement and running 
through the remaining years of his tenure. As is the case with previous chapters, I will 
first examine the nature of the power shift and Taiwan’s security environment during this 
period, discuss the domestic constraints on Chen Shui-bian’s resource mobilizational 
capacity, and then trace the degree of sovereignty assertiveness.  
5.1. Military balance: shifting in favor of the PLA 
At the turn of the century, China specialist David Shambaugh warned of Taiwan’s 
“eroding military advantage” vis-à-vis China and its closing “window of invulnerability”. 
He surmised that the balance of conventional force across the strait will tip in favor of 
China sometime in the second half of the 21st century’s first decade. (Shambaugh, 2000) 
The unfolding of the cross-strait military development mostly countenanced his 
prediction. Through overseas acquisition of advanced weaponry and equipment 
complemented by indigenous production, the PLA had coupled its traditional numerical 
advantage with qualitative advancement to present Chinese leaders with more credible 
means to conduct coercive campaign against Taiwan and to deter, delay and complicate 
the U.S. intervention.  
5.1.1. Military balance 
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Some Taiwanese analysts contended that command of the air over the strait would be the 
key in the defense of Taiwan. (Yang and Su, 2004) As of 2006 China had more than 700 
fighter aircraft deployed within 600 nautical miles of Taiwan, and more than 150 were 
within range of radar. Most significantly, about 400 of them were four-generation 
advanced fighter aircraft. (National Security Council of the ROC, 2006) The advanced 
aircraft inventory was composed of Su-30MKK multi-role aircraft, Su-30MK2 maritime 
strike aircraft, Su-27SK fighter aircraft and its Chinese version of J-11, and the 
indigenous J-10. Moreover, China renegotiated the coproduction agreement with Russia 
to produce the multi-role Su-27SMK for the remainder of the production run. (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2006) In addition, the PLAAF had made substantial progress in 
acquiring other support aircraft as force multipliers and weapon systems, including 
transport aircraft, air refueling aircraft, AWACS aircraft, AAMs, ASMs, etc. (Saunders 
and Quam, 2007) During the course of modernizing aircraft and weapon systems, the 
PLAAF was transformed from a local air defense force to one with offensive capability to 
strike against ground and naval targets further from Chinese borders.114 
On the other side of the strait, the ROC had a relatively modern air force, but the 
qualitative edge was gradually eclipsed by the pace of PLAAF’s modernization. The 
ROC air force had about 330 modern fourth-generation aircraft, including 146 F-16 A/B 
fighters, 57 French-made Mirage 2000-5 fighters, and 128 Ching-kuo Indigenous 
                                                          
114 China’s 2004 Defense White Paper stated that the PLAAF “has gradually shifted from one of territorial air defense 
to one of both offensive and defensive operations,” a goal reaffirmed by White Papers in subsequent years. 
(Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, 2004) Still China does not have credible strategic air power due to 
the lack of capable long-range bombers, but it uses traditionally tactical platforms such as air-superiority fighters and 
fighter-bombers to carry out strategic operations in China’s periphery. One analyst characterized the doctrine as 
“offensive airpower with Chinese characteristics.” (Erik Lin-Greenberg, 2007, p. 67) 
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Defense Fighters (IDFs). (IISS, 2006) In addition, a number of support aircraft such as 
reconnaissance, transport, and patrol aircraft were also in the inventory of the ROC air 
force. With the PLAFF catching up in terms of equipment and training, the quantitative 
inferiority of Taiwan’s air force became a more serious problem. One Taiwanese analyst 
emphasized that “one should not underestimate the pressure of quantitative advantage on 
the shoulder of Taiwanese pilots.” (Chen, 2004, p. 42) The quantitative imbalance was 
exacerbated by a shortfall of pilots, as “the ratio of pilots to aircraft is dangerously low 
for sustained combat operations.”  
Bigger challenges for the ROC air force came from the lack of strategic depth and the 
“no-first-fire” rules of engagement. The Taiwan Strait is between 130 km and 220 km, 
and PLAAF aircraft could fly into Taiwan’s airspace within 8-15 minutes after taking off. 
If missile strikes were initiated by the PLA, Taiwan had at most 37-40 minutes to respond 
if missiles were detected immediately after they were moved to the launch sites but had 
only 3-4 minute response time if missiles were detected after being launched. The 
combination of the lack of strategic depth and “no-first-fire” meant that the ROC air force 
would most likely have to survive a first strike from the PLA and mount a counterattack 
with its remaining forces. (Chen, 2004, pp. 41-43) Arguably most significantly, Taiwan’s 
air bases would fall prey to air and missile strikes at the onset of a conflict, and without 
sufficient active and passive defense measures its runway, fuel supply sites, radar, C2 
facilities and aircraft would be damaged or destroyed and air power be neutralized. (Tsai, 
2004a)    
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Similar to the balance of air power, naval power was also shifting to the favor of the PLA, 
eroding the ROC navy’s qualitative advantage and ability to command the sea across the 
Taiwan Strait. As of 2006 the PLAN had seventy major surface combatants, fifty landing 
ships, fifty diesel submarines, five nuclear submarines, and forty –five coastal missile 
patrol craft. (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006, p. 48) In terms of surface combatants, 
China ordered two additional Sovremenny-class destroyers in 2002 from Russia to join 
the existing two which entered service in 1999 and 2001. Six indigenously-produced 
destroyers such as Luyang I (Type 052B), Luyang II (Type 052 C) and Louzhou (Type 
051C) with advanced hull designs, propulsion systems, sensors, weapons, and electronics 
also went into service during this period. Moreover, new classes of indigenous frigates 
[Jiangwei II (Type 053H3) and Jiangkai I (Type 054)] and fast attack craft [Houbei 
(Type 022)] were added to the fleet as well. (O'Rourke, 2011) The new classes of 
destroyers and frigates enormously strengthened the PLAN’s anti-air warfare capability 
and could “facilitate acquiring local air superiority during maritime operations.” (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2006, p. 30)  
In addition to surface combatants, the PLAN submarine force was “one of the primary 
thrusts of its military modernization effort.” (Office of Naval Intelligence, 2009) As of 
2007 the PLAN had a dozen Russian-made Kilo-class SSs and produced four classes of 
indigenously built submarines—Shang SSN, Yuan and Song SS, and Jin SSBN. The new 
classes of attack submarines, with larger weapons loadouts, better weaponry, improved 
quieting, and more advanced computer processing, were gradually replacing the older 
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and less reliable Romeo and Ming SSs and Han SSNs.115 The Jin SSBN equipped with 
the JL-2 SLBM gave the PLAN “its first credible second-strike nuclear capability.” 
(Office of Naval Intelligence, 2009, p. 23) 
On the other hand, as of 2007 the ROC navy had four destroyers, twenty-two frigates, 
sixteen landing ships, four submarines, and about fifty coastal patrol craft. (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2006) The major surface combatants included four 
decommissioned Kidd-class destroyers acquired from the U.S. during 2005-2006, which 
enhanced the ROC navy’s air defense, ASW, and battlefield management capabilities, as 
well as six French-designed Kang Ting (Lafayette) class frigates, seven Cheng Kung-
class frigates (U.S. Perry-class design), and eight Chi Yang-class frigates (formerly U.S. 
Knox-class) . (Cole, 2006) Although the relatively smaller surface fleet looked fairly 
capable, the ROC navy’s submarine force was nowhere near the PLAN’s. Taiwan had 
only four diesel-submarines: two modern Hai Lung-class ones (Zwardvis design) 
acquired from the Netherlands in the 1980s and two obsolete Hai Shih-class (U.S. Guppy 
II-class) ones that can only be used for training purpose. Moreover, Taiwan could only 
rely on a few dozen ship-based and shore-based ASW helicopters to counter the PLAN’s 
submarine threat, as only half of its twenty-one S-2T ASW aircraft were operational but 
still suffered from age and maintenance problems. “Simply put, Beijing is expanding and 
modernizing its navy, while Taipei is not,” (Cole, 2004) and as a result the naval balance 
of power was also shifting in favor of the PLAN.  
                                                          
115 The older and less capable submarines, however, could still be sued as minelayers or as bait or decoy submarines to 
draw out enemy submarines that can then be attacked by other Chinese naval forces. (O'Rourke, 2011, p. 23) 
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The growing number of increasingly accurate and lethal short- and medium-range 
conventional ballistic and land attack cruise missiles constituted probably the most 
credible and immediate threat to Taiwan. Both in practice and discourse the missile threat 
embodied the grave danger from and hostile intentions of Beijing. The deployment of one 
or more missile brigades opposite Taiwan allegedly started in 1994 and was subsequently 
augmented and accelerated after the 1995-6 crisis. (Pollack, 2006) The ROC’s 2006 
National Security Report put the number of total ballistic missiles within the range of 
Taiwan at eight hundred, complemented by two hundred cruise missiles.116 (National 
Security Council of the ROC, 2006, p. 33) A variety of warheads were also available, 
including runway-cratering submunitions, penetration warheads for hardened targets, and 
fuel air explosives. Electromagnetic pulse and radio-frequency warheads were also being 
researched. (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2006, p. 148)  
The ballistic and cruise missiles could serve as coercive capabilities as well as war-
fighting instruments.117 Conceivably they could be used to strike Taiwan’s airfields, 
command and control centers, air defenses, transportation systems and other military 
installations and civilian infrastructure in the opening phases of a military campaign in 
order to paralyze Taiwan’s military and demoralize the society. The missiles were also a 
critical component of the PLA’s anti-access/area denial strategy to deter, delay or 
complicate the U.S. military intervention. Taiwan’s air and missile defense capability 
                                                          
116 It was suggested that the number of missile transporter-erector-launchers is a better indicator of the missile threat, as 
it provides “a more accurate reading of operational effectiveness in terms of raid size”, “or the ability to overwhelm 
Taiwan’s missile defense architecture.” The seven missile artillery brigades opposite Taiwan had 168-336 launchers 
capable of reloading every 45 minutes. (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2006, p. 148) 
117 A senior official of the ROC Defense Ministry under the Chen Shui-bian administration laid out four uses of the 
missiles: psychological warfare, bargaining chips, economic benefits (available for sale if not used), anti-access to 
counter the U.S. intervention. He emphasized the missiles’ coercive use but discounted the possibility that they would 
actually be used for war-fighting purpose. Interview, June 2009, Taipei.  
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consisted of three PAC-2 batteries, the indigenous Tien-kung II SAMs, and some short-
range and vehicle-mounted air defense missile systems.118 (Chase, 2008, p. 108) These 
limited air and missile defense capabilities were far from sufficient to intercept the 
hundreds of missiles whose deployment left little time to respond to an incoming strike. 
Indeed, a full-scale PLA attack would have incoming missiles outnumber interceptors by 
six or seven to one. (Campbell, 2006, p. 21) In fact, Taiwanese government officials 
acknowledged their goal was not a foolproof defense but “to avoid diplomatic coercion 
and raise uncertainty in an opponent’s mind about the success of a quick, perhaps limited 
decapitation strike.” (Campbell, 2006, p. 21) 
The goal was quite modest but still its attainability was not guaranteed. Given the 
technical difficulty and political hurdles in building up an effective missile defense 
system as well as the unfavorable cost-effectiveness,119 some in Taiwan therefore called 
for developing medium- to long-range missiles of its own to serve as a deterrent 
weapon.120 Local media in Taiwan reported that the Chung-Shan Institute of Science and 
Technology (CSIST) had been researching and developing three new types of missiles—
the Hsiung-feng III supersonic anti-ship missile, the Tien-kung III anti-tactical ballistic 
missile, and the Hsiung-feng IIE cruise missile. (Tie, 2005) The Hsiung-feng IIE cruise 
missile was reported to have a range of up to 1,000 kilometers and could thus cover many 
                                                          
118 The six PAC-3 batteries that the Bush administration approved for sale to Taiwan were not appropriated full funding 
by Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan until 2008. (Kan, 2011b, p. 16) 
119 Political hurdles centered on the lack of consensus on the island as to whether and how an effective missile defense 
system should be built. Even the military was divided, with the Army opposing it, the Navy favoring it and the Air 
Force being split. The reason was that the Army would have to pay for the missile defense systems, while the Air Force 
and Navy would operate them. (Campbell, 2006, p. 22) The unfavorable cost-effectiveness was partly due to the fact 
that theoretically two missiles are required to intercept one incoming missile.  
120 During the late Lee Teng-hui years, there was already talking about using counterstrike missiles as a deterrent. For 
example, Liu Tai-ying, a close aide to Lee Teng-hui, trumpeted in August 1999 shortly after Lee’s “special-state-to-
state theory” controversy that if Beijing fired missiles at sea near Taiwan, then Taiwan could do the same near Hong 
Kong or Shanghai. (Zhao, 2002, p. 135) 
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military and civilian targets in China’s coastal areas and hit as far as Shanghai, which 
meant that the ROC military had a “strategic weapon” for the first time and had “far-
reaching military and political consequences.” (The China Times, 2005) 
The attention paid to establishing limited strategic counterstrike capabilities was 
accompanied by a subtle change of national defense strategy. During the Lee Teng-hui 
years, the declared strategy was “resolute defense, effective deterrence”, but Chen Shui-
bian reversed the order by placing “effective deterrence” ahead of “resolute defense”.121 
Moreover, there was a parallel adjustment of military strategy. The DPP and Chen Shui-
bian proposed the concept of “decisive battle offshore” during the 2000 presidential 
campaign and Chen reiterated it when he addressed the Army Academy in June 2000. In 
practice “decisive battle offshore” was to engage and defeat PLA invading force further 
from the island of Taiwan and push the battlefield westward to the center line of the strait 
or even to the interior of the mainland. The goal was to spare the island itself the deaths, 
damage and destruction resulting from a military conflict. Both “effective deterrence” 
and “decisive battle offshore” introduced a clear offensive component to Taiwan’s 
defense strategy and necessitated developing deep-strike missiles such as the Hsiung-feng 
IIE and adopting preemption.   
                                                          
121 “Effective deterrence” referred to “by establishing effective deterrent counterstrike and defense capabilities and by 
deploying forces capable of effectively neutralizing or delaying enemy attacks, the enemy will be persuaded to give up 
any military ambition after rationally assessing the outcome”; “resolute defense” meant “once deterrence fails and the 
enemy launches a military invasion against us, we will combine comprehensive all-out defense capabilities and joint 
operations capabilities to firmly defend our homeland and stop, defeat, and destroy the invading enemy.” (Ministry of 
National Defense of the ROC, 2004) It seemed that the National Defense Report conflated dissuasion by punishments 
and dissuasion by denial and put both of them under the term “deterrence”. For a succinct discussion of the strategic 
terms, see Goldstein, 2000. In addition, after the ROC government fled to Taiwan its defense strategy experienced 
several different periods: offensive defense (1949-1966), forward defense (1966-1979), defense in depth (1979-2000) 
[resolute defense, effective deterrence, 1996-2000], active defense (2000-2008). (Chen, 2009) 
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The adjustments of defense and military strategy were partly a reflection of the increasing 
military imbalance across the strait and Taiwan’s losing faith in a purely defensive 
strategy.122 But the new strategy itself encountered a few technical and political obstacles. 
First, it was doubtful if the Taiwanese armed forces had the capability to carry it out. In 
particular former Chief of the General Staff and Defense Minister Hau Pei-tsun pointed 
out that fighting a decisive battle was a strategy for the strong; Taiwan, as the weaker 
side, should aim at strategic sustainability and a protracted war. (Wang, 2001b, p. 187) 
Second, the offense-oriented strategy was potentially destabilizing and was viewed by 
Beijing as very provocative.123 (Wen Wei Po, 2000) Third, it was highly doubtful if 
Beijing would be deterrable by Taipei’s limited deep strike capabilities, especially if it 
was a counter-force conventional strike.124 Moreover, Taiwanese analysts pointed out 
that the CCP and PLA’s history fraught with grave losses and near annihilation endowed 
them with a culture that emphasized endurance for sacrifices. This also heightened the 
threshold for successful deterrence.(Chen, 2010, pp. 52-53) Some realized that the only 
way to possess an effective deterrent capability was to go nuclear.125 Lastly, the United 
States opposed Taiwan’s development of offensive weapons. The policy community in 
                                                          
122 For example, the impossibility of defending against all of China’s SRBMs was one major reason for those who 
opposed the PAC-3 purchase and turned to deterrent capabilities. (Chang, 2006) 
123 Taipei was not entirely clear about whether the offensive weapons would be used for counter-value or counter-force 
purposes. It would be even more provocative and escalation-prone if the missiles aimed at counter-value targets such as 
population centers such as Shanghai and civilian infrastructure such as the Three Gorges Dam. But the majority view 
among civilian and military officials seemed to espouse a counter-force strategy.(Chase, 2008, pp. 119-120) 
Interestingly, Beijing saw the “decisive battle offshore” strategy as both provocative and infeasible given Taiwan’s 
current military capability. (FBIS-CHI-2000-0804, 2000)  
124 In December 2003 the PLA’s Maj. Gen. Peng Guangqian listed six prices the China would be willing to bear if war 
became necessary: boycott of the 2008 Olympics, loss of foreign investment, deterioration in foreign relations, damage 
to the southeast coastal areas, economic slowdown or recession, and some sacrifices of the PLA. Although the 
statements were not from the very top Chinese leaders, they were meant to send the message that China was willing to 
pay “any costs” on the Taiwan issue and demonstrated the very high threshold to “deter” Beijing. (Peng, 2003; Kahn, 
2003)  
125 PRC analysts also realized that the offensive-oriented strategy increased Taipei’s incentive to pursue weapons of 
mass destruction. (Zhao, 2002, pp. 139-140) 
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the U.S. had divided opinions,126 but in 2006 and 2007 both AIT Director Stephen Young 
and NSC senior director Dennis Wilder unambiguously stated the U.S. government’s 
objection. (Kan, 2011b, p. 44) 
In addition to the shifting balance of air and naval power and the increasing missile threat 
for Taipei, the PLA had also been building a smaller and elitist army and made strides in 
electronic warfare, information operations, space weapons and C4ISR. Nevertheless, I 
will not devote too much space here to discuss those developments for a couple of 
reasons. First, the priority of PLA’s modernization was the navy, air force and second 
artillery force, (Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, 2004) and given the 
small possibility of an amphibious invasion whose success relied heavily on air and naval 
superiority, the PLA army was a less high-profile threat for Taipei. Second, despite the 
PLA’s keen interest and a few eye-catching breakthroughs in unconventional warfare 
options such as information and electronic warfare, those unconventional capabilities 
would most likely play a supporting role and could not conceivably be independently 
decisive in achieving military or political objectives.127 Most importantly, survey of 
developments in those areas only reinforces the conclusion that military balance had been 
shifting in favor of Beijing.   
                                                          
126 For commentaries from U.S. analysts, see (Roy, 2006; McDevitt, 2007; Tkacik, 2007) William Murray, an associate 
professor at the U.S. Navy War College and former Navy officer, proposed that instead of developing potentially 
destabilizing offensive counterstrike capabilities or engaging in symmetric countermeasures of attempting to maintain 
air and naval superiority, Taiwan should adopt a “porcupine strategy”,  hardening key facilities, building redundancies 
into critical infrastructure and processes, stockpiling critical supplies, and developing a mobile and elite professional 
standing army to dissuade the PRC from attacking and repel an attack if necessary. (Murray, 2008) Murray’s article, 
published in summer 2008 during the power transitional period from Chen Shui-bian to Ma Ying-jeou, made a splash in 
Taiwan. It was reported that the National Security Council of the Ma administration thought highly of Murray’s ideas, 
but the Defense Ministry and military dismissed it out of hand. (The LibertyTimes, December 2, 2008) For critiques of 
Murray’s article, see (Shen, 2008; Lin, 2008b) 
127 For more discussion on unconventional warfare options, see Fisher, 2006. 
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5.1.2. Course of action  
As a result of the PLA’s sustained Taiwan contingency-driven modernization after the 
mid-1990s, into the first decade of the 21st century Chinese top leaders had much more 
credible military options if they decided to employ military force against Taiwan. 
According to the Taiwan Security Research Group led by Chen Ming-tong, there were 
ten possible ways of the PLA’s use of force:  
1) The PLA could use its airborne troops, special operation forces, and 
amphibious forces to launch a direct attack on the island of Taiwan; 2) the 
PLA could launch a missile attack, destroying Taiwan’s economy and naval 
defense capabilities; 3) China could send a hostile air and naval fleet to 
cross the middle line of the Taiwan Strait; 4) the PLA could conduct large-
scale military maneuver and exercises along the southeast coast to wage 
psychological warfare; 5) the PLA could launch a surprise attack to occupy 
the less-fortified surrounding islands; 6) China could orchestrate its 
operatives to infiltrate and sabotage Taiwan; 7) the PLA could induce the 
ROC military on the frontline to open fire accidently; 8) the PLA could use 
“unlimited warfare” or information warfare against Taiwan; 9) the PLA 
could sabotage or invade Taiwan’s important military installations and 
governmental facilities; 10) the PLA could interfere with or completely 
close Taiwan’s surrounding waterways. (Chen and The Taiwan Security 
Research Group, 2005, pp. 251-252) 
Among those courses of action air and missile campaign, naval blockade and amphibious 
invasion constituted major military actions and areas where the PLA had made steady 
progress. One noted U.S. analyst pointed out that aerospace power became an 
increasingly powerful tool of PRC coercion as “the range and payload of PLA aircraft 
improve, land attack cruise missiles are fielded, and lethality and accuracy of PLA theater 
ballistic missiles increase.” (Stokes, 2005, p. 222) There could be different strategies for 
using air power for coercive purposes—punishment and risk (counter-value), denial 
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(counter-force) and decapitation,128 PLA writings tended to focus on denial in the context 
of the Taiwan Strait, i.e., degrading Taiwan’s defensive and counterstrike capabilities to 
the extent that its political leaders believed that continual resistance would be futile and 
they would be better off by acceding to Beijing’s demands. Potential targets by the PLA’s 
air and missile campaign included military command and control centers, early warning 
facilities, communication facilities, ground-based air defense, air bases, and surface-to-
surface missile sites. Other lesser targets could be naval bases, electrical power grids, 
logistics centers, etc. (Stokes, 2005, pp. 285-290) Chinese strategic culture’s emphasis on 
shock and surprise would magnify the PLA’s military advantage and maximize the air 
and missile campaign’s psychological effects on Taiwan’s political leadership and public.  
Moreover, Taiwan also took the PLA’s potential decapitation strategy very seriously. In 
August 2004 Taiwan’s Premier Yu Shyi-kun warned that Beijing learned from the U.S. 
operations in Iraq and began to practice a decapitation strategy to kill or capture its 
leaders. (The Taipei Times, 2004) In response, Chen Shui-bian and the Taiwanese 
military had taken a few measures to hedge against decapitation. First, an anti-
decapitation brigade was formally established in March 2006 to protect the Taipei 
metropolitan area. The brigade drew its members from the National Security Bureau’s 
Special Service Center, the Military Police, the Special Operations Forces, and the 
Marine Corps.(Huang, Zhang, and Xiong, 2007, p. 11) Meanwhile, the Chen Shui-bian 
government also hardened the presidential office and residence, and made contingency 
plans to help Chen’s escape through land, sea and air routes in a crisis. (Cheng, 2006) 
                                                          
128 For more elaboration on the differences of the coercive air strategies, see Pape, 1996.  
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Taiwan’s 2007 annual Han Kuang military exercises reportedly included how to keep up 
the resistance after the PLA’s initial attack brought about Chen Shui-bian’s “missing”. 
(Gong, 2007, p. 20) 
Naval blockade constituted another potent coercive tool that can be leveraged against 
Taipei. It could be directed against either shipping or key ports with missiles, torpedoes, 
or sea mines. The expansion and upgrading of the PLA’s submarine force and mine 
warfare capabilities added much credibility to naval blockade as a realistic option for 
Chinese leaders.129 Sea mines, in particular, were potentially effective given “the 
proximity of Taiwan to the mainland… Taiwan’s massive trade dependence… the 
inherent difficulty in clearing mines, and the extreme weakness of American mine-
clearing capacity…”130 (Christensen, 2001, p. 33) In fact one study concluded that the 
PLAN’s mine warfare capability already enables it to blockade Taiwan and other crucial 
sea lines of communication in the Western Pacific and the combined minesweeping 
capability of the U.S. and Taiwan’s is insufficient to respond to this growing threat.131 
(Erickson, Goldstein, and Murray, 2009) 
With an eye to possible U.S. intervention in a conflict across the Taiwan Strait and the 
still huge gap between China’s military and its U.S. counterpart in terms of technology, 
doctrine, training and experience, the PLA developed an asymmetric strategy of what U.S. 
                                                          
129 For accounts of China’s submarine force and mine warfare capabilities, see Goldstein, 2004; Erickson, Goldstein, 
and Murray, 2009. For a different argument that contended that the threat of a successful submarine blockade by the 
PLAN was overstated, see Glosny, 2004. In addition to the military challenges of conducting naval blockade, one 
salient downside is the “protracted nature”, i.e. although it “would have immediate economic effects, but would take 
time to realize decisive political results, diminishing the ultimate effectiveness and inviting international reaction.” 
(Christensen, 2001, p. 31; U.S. Department of Defense, 2007, p. 33)  
130 For an estimate of a blockade’s impact upon merchant shipping for Taiwan, see Grubb, 2007.  
131 Japan has some decent capabilities in terms of mine countermeasures (MCM), but its military support cannot be 
taken for granted in the event of a cross-strait military conflict.   
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analysts called “anti-access/area-denial”.132 A RAND report defined an anti-access/area-
denial measure as an “action by an opponent that has the effect of slowing the 
deployment of friendly forces into a theater, preventing them from operating from certain 
locations within that theater, or causing them to operate from distances farther from the 
locus of conflict than they would normally prefer.” (Cliff, 2007, p. 11) In order to achieve 
the goal of deterring, delaying and disrupting the U.S. military intervention, PLA 
strategists have paid particular attention to attacking U.S. C4ISR systems, logistic, 
transportation, support functions, air bases, sea lines and ports, and aircraft barriers. (Cliff, 
2007) Means for carrying out anti-access/area denial strategy include ballistic and cruise 
missiles, aircraft armed with precision-guided munitions, special operational forces, sea 
mines, jamming, anti-satellite weapons, computer network operations, electromagnetic 
pulse weapons etc.133 Taiwanese analysts also reckoned that the PLA’s anti-access/area 
denial capabilities has seriously challenged the U.S. military dominance in East Asia. 
(Tsai, 2008)  
Despite the PLA’s sustained modernization and impressive advancement in many areas, 
an amphibious invasion of Taiwan is still operationally challenging and politically risky. 
As the DoD 2006 report on Chinese military power stated, a successful amphibious 
campaign hinges on “establishing persistent air superiority over the Strait and Taiwan, 
the availability of amphibious and air lift, attrition rates, interoperability of PLA forces, 
                                                          
132 The U.S. DoD’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report referred to it as “disruptive” capabilities. (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2006) For a general discussion of the anti-access/area-denial challenges facing the U.S., see 
(Krepinevich,2003) 
133 A declassified report from the U.S. National Ground Intelligence Center dated August 17, 2005 claims that China is 
developing electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons for use in a Taiwan scenario.  (National Ground Intelligence Center, 
2005) 
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the ability of China’s logistics system to support the necessarily high tempo of operations, 
Taiwan’s will to resist, and the speed and scale of international intervention.” (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2006, p. 41) Many of these prerequisites, such as joint operations, 
logistic support, and air lift capability, have traditionally been the PLA’s weak points and 
thus introduced substantial uncertainties to an amphibious attack. This still does not say 
anything about international repercussions and a highly alienated Taiwanese society once 
a large-scale amphibious invasion is launched. Most Taiwanese analysts also discounted 
the possibility of an amphibious attack, not only due to the PLA’s questionable capability 
in this regard, but also because of Beijing’s political objective, i.e., unifying the island 
instead of destroying it.134 Former head of the National Security Bureau (1999-2001) and 
National Security Council (2001-2002) Ting Yu-chou elaborated on how the PLA’s use 
of force against Taiwan will look like in his memoirs: 
1) “Over-the-sea” attack will replace “cross-the-sea” attack… the PLA’s 
missiles and new classes of aircraft and submarines could all directly 
threaten the island of Taiwan and even the east coast; 2) “point” attack will 
replace “surface” attack, i.e., attack will aim at strategic locations such as 
political and military leadership, command centers, transport nodes, and 
energy supplies in order to reduce collateral damage; 3) “paralysis” attack 
will replace “annihilation” attack, i.e., precision-guided, sustained and 
violent pinpoint attack would paralyze our fighting force. The paralysis, 
coupled with psychological warfare, was to destroy Taiwan’s will to resist 
to coerce us to negotiate under disadvantageous circumstances and accept 
its political demand of “one country, two systems”.(Ting, 2004, p. 474)  
Ting’s analysis clearly regarded coercive use of force instead of an amphibious assault as 
the most likely scenario confronting Taiwan’s military. Moreover, Ting pointed out that 
the coercive campaign would probably combine multiple courses of action discussed 
                                                          
134 Interview in 2009 with former senior officials from the ROC’s Defense Ministry and the Mainland Affairs Council.  
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above to bring the greatest pressure to bear on Taiwanese government and people. In a 
similar vein, the 2006 National Security Report stated: 
In the event of a future Chinese invasion of Taiwan, it is highly likely that 
China will launch missiles to carry out precision strikes, combine its special 
operations forces with the personnel it has in place in Taiwan, and 
coordinate airborne, heliborne, and amphibious assaults to conduct 
simultaneous multipoint, multilevel attacks on Taiwan’s core political, 
economic, and other centers. This new type of warfare, put together after the 
integration of new military capabilities, is designed to allow the PLA to 
mount attacks from within and outside Taiwan, paralyze and control the 
core of Taiwan’s government and economy, and quickly destroy the 
government’s decision-making mechanisms and capabilities to respond, so 
that it may achieve decisive results on the battlefield. This, along with the 
implementation of its “three warfare” strategy to undermine the people’s 
understanding of who the enemy is, serve China’s political goal of fighting a 
“quick war with quick results.”135 (National Security Council, 2006, p. 41)  
 
5.2. Alliance strength: estranged Washington-Taipei ties  
The U.S.-Taiwan relations during the period of 2002-2007 had been on an ironic 
downward slope, and the tense relations between the Bush administration and Chen Shui-
bian’s government in Taiwan were oftentimes characterized by Washington’s public 
censure and Taipei’s surprising defiance. Indeed, as Richard Bush noted, the Bush 
administration started as “the most Taiwan-friendly administration since the termination 
of diplomatic relations (or since World War II),” but ended up “as probably the most 
hostile”. (Bush, 2007) Although the U.S. security commitment by and large remained 
steadfast, the “hostility” toward Taipei manifested itself clearly in the bilateral political 
relations and arms sales unexpectedly became another area of contention. 
                                                          
135 The “three warfares” refer to media warfare, psychological warfare and legal warfare. The “three warfares” were 
formally written into Regulations of the PLA on Political Work in December 2003. For a Taiwanese commentary on the 
“three warfares”, see Shu, 2008.  
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5.2.1. Security commitment 
At the beginning of the Bush presidency the U.S. security commitment to Taiwan seemed 
to be elevated to an unprecedented level when President Bush declared on national 
television on April 25, 2001 that the U.S. had a clear obligation to defend Taiwan and 
would “do whatever it took” in that regard. Although immediately the White House and 
State Department officials denied that there was any fundamental change of its “one 
China policy” or the traditional strategic ambiguity, the ROC in Taiwan did take the 
statement as a signal that “Washington’s commitment to maintain peace across the 
Taiwan Strait more convincing”. Moreover, the strengthening and deepening of U.S.-
Taiwan military relations, in the form of higher-level military exchanges and 
enhancement of interoperability, led many observers from Beijing to conclude that Taipei 
and Washington was establishing a “quasi-military alliance”. (Xin, 2009; Guo, 2009) 
Even after the September 11 terrorist attack, after when China’s cooperation and 
partnership became more important to the U.S. campaign against terrorism in Central and 
South Asia,136 the Bush administration reassured Taiwan that there was no quid pro quo 
on U.S. policy toward Taiwan.137 (Snyder, 2001) President Bush also reaffirmed the 
TRA-based commitment to Taiwan during the Shanghai APEC summit in October 2001, 
and further impressed the Taiwanese with his remarks on February 19, 2002 that 
“America will remember our commitments to the people of Taiwan” when he spoke to 
the Japanese Diet in Tokyo en route to Beijing. (Tung, 2004) 
                                                          
136 Indeed, China had been surprisingly forthcoming in terms of diplomatic support, intelligence gathering and sharing, 
and financial tracking and controls. (Christensen, 2002b; Kan, 2011c) 
137 Taipei was understandably very concerned about this possibility, as one Taiwanese MoFA official acknowledged that 
“we want to be very, very careful and be very observant to the conduct of business between Washington and Beijing 
because we don’t want our interests to be at the expense of this relationship.” (Hickey, 2004, p. 474) 
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However, the deteriorating political relations did spill over to the security arena by the 
end of President Bush’s first term, and compromised the U.S. security commitment to 
Taiwan, at least in word. On December 10, 2004 Richard Armitage described Taiwan as 
probably the biggest “landmine” in terms of U.S.-China relations when he discussed U.S. 
foreign policy on PBS in his capacity as the Deputy Secretary of State. Furthermore, 
Armitage clarified that under the TRA the US is “not required to defend” Taiwan, but 
only “to keep sufficient force in the Pacific to be able to deter attack”, and that the 
decision to defend Taiwan rested with the Congress instead of the administration. He also 
seemed to deviate from the previous U.S. stances on Taiwan’s sovereignty by saying that 
“we all agree that there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China.” (Kan, 2011a)  
Although Armitage’s statement was nothing more than a literal interpretation of the TRA 
since the U.S. in fact did not have obligations to come to Taiwan’s rescue under all 
circumstances under the TRA and it can be argued that Armitage merely reiterated 
existing Taiwan policy in different language, the shift in language and emphasis did raise 
doubts and confusion over Washington’s security commitment. (Snyder, 2004)Most 
interesting and potentially damaging to Taipei’s confidence in counting on Washington’s 
help is Armitage’s implying that defending Taiwan or not “are questions that actually 
reside with the U.S. Congress, who has to declare an act of war.”(Kan, 2011a) It is a 
well-known fact that since the U.S. was founded the Congress only formally declared war 
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against eleven countries during five separate wars, so Armitage’s words implicitly 
heightened the threshold for the U.S. use of force in the Taiwan Strait.138  
However, a more positive development from Taiwan’s perspective occurred in early 
2005. After the U.S.-Japan 2+2 meeting—meeting between the U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfield and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and their Japanese 
counterparts—a joint statement issued on February 19, 2005 laid out several common 
strategic objectives, one of which was “to encourage the peaceful resolution of issues 
concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue.” (Kan, 2011a) The wording was rather 
mild, but this was the first time that the U.S.-Japan alliance explicitly stated its strategic 
interests in regard to Taiwan and implied a greater role for Japan in case of any future 
conflicts across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwanese analysts tended to believe that “Washington 
is enhancing, not reducing, its military commitments toward Taiwan.”139 However, 
amidst tense and worsening political relations between Washington and Taipei and much 
to the latter’s chagrin, the Taiwan scenario was excluded from the shared strategic 
objectives in May 2007 after another round of U.S.-Japan 2+2 meeting. (The U.S.-Japan 
Security Consultative Committee, 2007) The good news for Taipei was that the 2007 
Joint Statement noted that both countries “reconfirmed” their commitment to the 
common strategic objectives identified in 2005, and the U.S. Secretary of State 
                                                          
138  It was striking that it was Richard Armitage who made those remarks given his enormous efforts to raise Taiwan’s 
profile in the initial years during Bush’s presidency.   
139 Some Taiwanese analysts doubted the significance of the joint statement for Taiwan’s security. Shaw argued that the 
statement merely showed the common concern of the U.S. and Japan instead of their willingness to intervene; 
moreover, peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue had been the U.S. and Japan’s long-held policy ever since the 
normalization of Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japanese relations in 1972 so there was nothing new; lastly, the statement on 
Taiwan was put in the broader context of promoting cooperative relationship with China and encouraging China to 
become a responsible and constructive player in international affairs. (Shaw, 2005) For Chinese concerns about the 
enhanced U.S.-Japan alliance, including its implications for the Taiwan issue, see (Wu, 2006c) 
155 
 
Condoleezza Rice also stressed after the meeting that the U.S. Taiwan policy remained 
unchanged. Seasoned Taiwanese analysts thus downplayed the significance of the 
changed wording and emphasized that it at most amounted to a tactical adjustment of the 
U.S. and Japan, especially in light of the hard-won improvement of Sino-Japanese 
relationship after Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe came into power in September 
2006 and China’s recent contributions to rein in North Korea’s nuclear ambition. The 
U.S. fundamental strategy and policy toward Taiwan, however, remained steadfast 
(Yang, 2007) On balance during the 2002-2007 period despite some small fluctuations 
brought about by what had happened on the political front between Taipei and 
Washington, the U.S. security commitment continued within the broad contour set by the 
TRA and successive administrations’ past practices. 
5.2.2. Arms sales  
The U.S. arms sales to Taiwan usually served dual purposes: enhancing the latter’s war-
fighting capabilities and demonstrating the former’s compliance with the TRA and 
security commitment.140 But the arms sales during this period ironically turned out to be 
a major source of friction for the bilateral relations and a manifestation of the strong 
domestic constraints facing President Chen Shui-bian. In April 2001 the Bush 
administration offered to Taiwan the largest arms sale package in history. The April 
package, together with a few other items approved later that year, was valued at US$ 15 
billion and intended to “reverse twenty year of relative neglect and frontload systems that 
                                                          
140 Some suspect that Taiwan’s weaponry procurement from the U.S. mainly serves the former’s political purpose of 
demonstrating the U.S. support instead of genuine military purpose of repelling a potential PRC military attack, which 
explains why Taiwan often prefers highly visible and big-ticket items. (Swaine, 1999, pp. 31-33) Interviews with 
Taiwanese civilian and military officers got mixed answers.  
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Taiwan had asked to be made available as the Clinton administration drew to a close.” 
(Stokes, 2006, p. 2) Most noteworthy were eight diesel-electric submarines, twelve P-3C 
ASW aircraft, and four decommissioned Kidd-class destroyers.141 (Kan, 2011b) The 
approval on the submarine sales was particularly striking given its arguably offensive 
nature and the U.S. twenty-year refusal to sell them to Taipei. Meanwhile, President Bush 
announced that he would drop the traditional annual arms talks process in favor of normal, 
routine considerations of Taiwan’s requests on an as-needed basis.142 (Kan, 2011b, p. 4)  
The initial elation at Bush’s decision in Taipei, however, was not translated into quick 
response and action. It was only after three years and after Washington pressed Taipei on 
procurement priorities that the Chen government finally decided in June 2004 to request a 
special budget from the legislature to buy the three big-ticket items—submarines, P-3Cs, 
and PAC-3 missile defense systems. But the opposition-dominated Legislative Yuan (LY) 
proved to be an insurmountable obstacle: despite being cut a few times from an original 
US$17.8 billion to $ 9.3 billion, the special budget was blocked in the Procedure 
Committee of the LY and kept from being considered at an extraordinary 56 times. The 
Chen administration finally gave up on the special budget efforts in early 2006 and turned 
to raising regular defense budget in 2007 and 2008 to finance the arms sales. (Chase, 
2008) The LY finally passed Taiwan’s 2007 defense budget in June 2007 with funds for 
P-3C, PAC-2 upgrades, and F-16 C/D fighters and approved $ 6 million for the 
submarine design phase.143 (Kan, 2011b)    
                                                          
141 The Bush administration deferred decisions on the more advanced Aegis-class destroyers.  
142 On the annual arms talks, see Kan, 2001. 
143 Neither the Bush nor the Obama administration has notified the Congress of the submarine design program, making 
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The drama of the arms deal in Taipei resulted from a variety of institutional, economic 
and political factors: overhaul of the defense establishment and increasing legislative 
oversight,144 financial hardship and soaring budget deficit, and sheer political wrangling 
between the incumbent Pan-green camp and the opposition Pan-blue camp. (Stokes, 2006; 
Chase, 2008; Roy, 2004) Moreover, the unusually big size of the 2001 arms deal 
surprised the Taiwanese defense establishment and overloaded the bureaucratic capacity 
to handle operational requirement documentation, systems analysis, budget planning, etc. 
in a timely manner.145 (Stokes, 2006) Some of these domestic constraints will be 
discussed in more detail later in the chapter. But whatever the reason, the message for 
Washington was crystal clear: Taipei lacked commitment for its own defense and 
attempted to free ride on Washington.  
Since 2003 an unusual near-consensus that Taipei was not serious enough about its own 
defense gradually took shape in Washington.146 Officials from the Defense Department 
and State Department, Congressmen, former officials, and policy community one after 
another urged Taipei to increase its defense budget and pass the special budget for the 
proposed arms sales.147 The U.S. frustration and dissatisfaction was aggravated by the 
feeling that it was offering what Taiwan had asked for and had already paid the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
it the only one pending from the decisions in 2001.  
144 As Ku Chung-lian, a legislator and former admiral commented, the fierce debate resolving around purchasing the 
Kidd-class destroyers marked that for the first time the LY’s oversight over defense and security issues went beyond 
merely disclosing foreign arms procurement scandals to the discussion of strategic doctrine and fore structure. (Ku, 
2003, p. 129) The four Kidds deal had a better fate than the rest of the arms deal, as Taipei agreed to buy them in May 
2003 and they were delivered in 2005 and 2006. 
145 Taipei was surprised because it had used a “spaghetti-on-the-wall approach” for arms procurement from the U.S., 
i.e., throw a list out and see what sticks. The U.S. usually approved only a fraction of the list.  
146 More sympathetic views toward Taipei were expressed by two Senior Country Directors for the PRC, Taiwan, and 
Mongolia in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security, see (Stokes, 2006; Blumenthal 
and Schmitt, 2005) 
147 See for example (Brookes, 2003; Tkacik,  2003; Logan and Carpenter, 2007; Young, 2007) 
158 
 
diplomatic price for irking China and now Taiwan was reluctant to pay. Initial appeals to 
Taipei for moving quickly on the arms deal finally turned into open complaints and 
explicit threat that the U.S. support hinged upon Taiwan’s own commitment and efforts. 
Richard Lawless’ (Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
2002-2007) blistering speech at the 2005 U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 
typified the kind of scathing criticisms and strong tone directed at Taipei, 
“Taiwan must fulfill its unwritten, but clearly evident obligations under the 
TRA by appropriately providing for its own defense … The U.S. ability to 
contribute to Taiwan’s defense in a crisis is going to be measured against 
Taiwan’s ability to resist, defend, and survive based on its own 
capabilities… As the long superpower, our interests are plentiful and our 
attention short. We cannot help defend you, if you cannot defend 
yourself.”148 (Lawless, 2005)   
Taiwan, for its part, was wondering why it could not even discuss the operational utility 
of the items included in the arms package,149 show concerns about overcharging, or 
explore the possibility of industrial cooperation in the production of some of the weapons, 
especially diesel submarines.150 The complaints mainly came from the opposition Pan-
blue camp, but pressures from the legislature and media led then Defense Minister Tang 
Yao-ming to openly respond that “Taiwan is a sovereign state. We will not buy every 
weapons system that the U.S. wants to sell to us. We will only buy the ones that really 
serve our defense needs.” (Roy, 2004, p. 3) Moreover, many in Taiwan saw an apparent 
                                                          
148 The speech was delivered by Edward Ross, a DSCA official, on behalf of Richard Lawless due to the latter’s delay 
in Beijing at the Six-Party Talks.  
149 The Kidd-class destroyers received most doubts about its operational utility, especially given that Taiwan requested 
up-to-date destroyers equipped with the Aegis radar system instead of the Kidds. For a detailed discussion of the 
politics of the procurement of the Kidd-class destroyers, see (Peng, 2005) 
150 Some legislators insisted that Taiwanese shipbuilders should produce at least some of the submarines, but the U.S. 
government did not support such a proposal on the grounds that it would not be cost-effective and would delay the 
program. The submarine deal was also complicated by the fact that the U.S. stopped manufacturing diesel-electric 
submarines in the 1950s and other non-U.S. manufacturers might not be able to withstand the PRC pressures. 
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lack of respect and even arrogance out of the U.S. impatient attitude and unfair 
accusation, since Taiwan was just implementing what the U.S. had encouraged it to do 
for many years—a truly democratic system and rule of law, and the long-drawn debate on 
the proposed arms package was all the more impressive given that military affairs and 
weapons procurement used to be the most secretive, least accountable and scandal-prone 
realm in the past.151   
More radical criticisms of the U.S. attitude pointed to perceived U.S. “extortion,” 
“sucker’s arms deals,” “arms dealers’ profits”, etc. (Kan, 2011b, p. 30) Ku Chung-lian 
even contended that the U.S. arms deal to Taiwan was a conspiracy to curtail Taiwan’s 
indigenous development and production and perpetuate its dependence on the U.S. since 
oftentimes the U.S. approval of arms sales coincided with major breakthroughs of 
defense technology on the island.(Ku, 2003, pp. 120-121) The Chen government was 
caught between a rock and a hard place, trying to convince the opposition of the necessity 
of the arms deal and secure budgetary support on the one hand and appeasing the U.S. 
impatience and reassuring about its commitment and resolve to self-defense on the other. 
Whoever to blame for the impasse, Randall Schriver’s personal bemoaning is better 
characterized as one for all sides involved in the arms deal. Schriver was the one who 
delivered the Bush administration’s exciting decision to Taiwan, but six years later, “I 
only feel regret, disappointment and frustration upon seeking the arms sales devolve into 
one of the most contentious bilateral issues between Washington and Taipei… the 
                                                          
151 Taiwan enacted two defense laws in 2002—the National Defense Act and the amended Organization Act of the 
MND. Among the important clauses were making weapons procurement more transparent, prioritization of indigenous 
development, production and maintenance of defense articles, and emphasis of technology transfers during foreign 
procurement. For a discussion of the two defense laws by one of its stalwart sponsors in the LY, see Tsai, 2011. 
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presentation we made to Taiwanese friends in 2001 has become a lingering source of 
dispute.” (Schriver, 2007) 
5.2.3. Political relations   
The evolution of political relations between Washington and Taipei during the Bush and 
Chen Shui-bian years turned out to be the most dramatic, unexpected and regrettable 
(especially for Taipei). As Tucker observed, the coming into power of the Bush 
administration in 2001 was auspicious for Taiwan in many aspects, since it “provided 
Taiwan an advantageous constellation of people and policies”,152 and Bush and his 
national security and foreign policy team were to build “a better U.S.-Taiwan relationship 
in a more vigorous, well-informed, and purposeful way than Taipei could have expected.” 
Moreover, the Taiwan-friendly policy was an unusual inter-agency consensus. (Tucker, 
2009, pp. 255-259) In addition to the arms sales and Bush’s “whatever it takes” statement 
in April 2004, the more accommodating and supportive gestures from Washington was 
also reflected on better treatment of U.S. visits by senior Taiwanese officials. Besides the 
three traditional principles of “comfort, safety, and convenience” applied to transit stops 
on the U.S. soil by senior Taiwanese leaders, the Bush administration seemed to add a 
fourth: dignity. (Liu, 2010, p. 2) 
President Chen Shui-bian had personally recalled the continued improvement and relaxed 
restrictions under the Bush administration. During his first transit stop as head of state in 
LA in August 2000, Chen could not engage in any public activities and was allowed to 
                                                          
152 These people included Richard Armitage (Deputy Secretary of State, March 2001-February 2005), Paul Wolfowitz 
(Deputy Secretary of Defense, January 2001-June 2005), Torkel Patterson (Senior Director of Asian Affairs of the NSC, 
March 2001-January 2002), James Kelly (Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, May 2001-
January 2005), and Randall Schriver (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, 2003－2005).   
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receive only 15 Taiwanese community representatives in the hotel room; in May 2001, 
Chen met more than twenty members of Congress in New York, visited the New York 
Stock Exchange and received 150 Taiwanese in a hotel restaurant; in October 2003, Chen 
shook hands with a large crowd of admirers outside his hotel, received the 2003 Human 
Rights Award presented by the International League for Human Rights, and toured in a 
cruise on the Hudson River. (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2003) A close aide to 
Chen admitted that the high-profile transit stop at New York in 2003 was the best that 
could be achieved without official relationship. (Wu, 2011, p. 42) Meanwhile, Taiwan’s 
Vice President, Annette Lu and Defense Minister, Tang Yao-ming also visited the U.S. in 
early 2002. Tang Yao-ming attended a U.S.-Taiwan Defense Summit in Florida in March 
2002, became the first Taiwan defense minister to make other than a transit stop in the 
U.S. since 1979, and met senior U.S. Pentagon and State Department officials like Paul 
Wolfowitz and James Kelly.   
In sharp contrast was the humiliating transit stop for Chen in May 2006. Chen was to pay 
official visits to two diplomatic allies—Paraguay and Costa Rica and was hoping to make 
layovers again on the U.S. soil. The U.S. allowed Chen to stop only at Hawaii and Alaska 
for refueling, and Chen chose to reject the meager U.S. offer to demonstrate his 
displeasure and fly westward instead over Abu Dhabi and Amsterdam en route to 
Paraguay. The whole trip took nearly forty hours and was ridiculed that it was “a lost trip” 
and “looking for landing spots only after (the airplane) taking off”. (Liu, 2010, pp. 154-
156) The “lost trip” episode, of course, was only one symptom of much larger problems 
underlying the strained political relations between Washington and Taipei.  
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From Washington’s perspective, President Chen was the one who should bear most, if 
not all, of the blame and responsibility for the broken U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Since 
August 2002, when Chen’s “one country on each side” statement shocked Washington, 
Beijing, and many on the island, Chen Shui-bian’s domestic political agenda and 
electoral imperatives had almost completely overrode his previous more restrained and 
cautious approach to cross-strait relations and considerations of the U.S. interests. In 
addition to the “one country on each side” statement, other notable provocations from 
Chen included proposing a referendum on a new constitution in September 2003, holding 
a “defensive referendum” alongside the presidential election in March 2004, abolition of 
the NUC and NUG in February 2006, holding a referendum on applying to join the U.N 
under the name of Taiwan alongside the presidential election in March 2008, etc. Chen’s 
image in Washington was characterized as “pushing the envelope”, “creating surprises”, 
“trouble-making”, “salami-cutting”, “brinkmanship”.153 (Liu, 2010, p. 9) The view of 
Chen as a “trouble-maker” was also nearly an inter-agency consensus in the U.S. 
government. Even the usually Taiwan-friendly members of the U.S. Congress were 
increasingly irritated by Chen. One indicator of decreasing congressional support for 
Taiwan was that the State Department officials were feeling “less pressure from Congress” 
on executive branch decisions concerning Taiwan, such as the U.S. apparent punishment 
of Chen by the 2006 transit stop decision. (Dumbaugh, 2007)         
                                                          
153 For a brief period after Chen’s second inauguration in May 2004, the U.S.-Taiwan relations was restored to a limited 
extent due to the U.S. satisfaction with his inaugural address, the National Day’s address in October 2004, and the “ten 
declarations” released after the NSC meeting in November. But the rebuilding of mutual trust lasted for only a few 
months.  
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Initially some thought that the discord between Washington and Taipei resulted from 
miscommunication, i.e. the latter received mixed messages from different U.S. officials 
affiliated with different governmental branches and possibly with different views on 
Chen’s policies.154 The lack of adequate communication always exists due to the 
unofficial relationship and highly restricted contact between high-level officials, a 
problem aggravated by Chen’s distrust of the Washington-based TECRO representatives 
due to their alleged pro-KMT stances.155 However, any kind of miscommunication, if 
ever existed, should have evaporated after senior officials from the White House, the 
State Department and the NSC one after another expressed the U.S. firm opposition to 
Chen’s policies through private channels as well as on public occasions. In Thomas 
Christensen’s (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
2006-2008) words, the U.S. had delivered “consistent, unmistakable, and authoritative 
messages over an extended period of time”, and the problem was not “misunderstanding 
or lack of communications”.  
So the real problem ran deeper than miscommunication. Taipei and Washington had 
increasingly divergent strategic interests and goals. As one close aide to Chen analyzed in 
2011, 
                                                          
154 One of the sources of mixed messages came from Therese Shaheen, then AIT chairwoman (2002-2004) and 
regarded by President Chen as a close ally. An oft-cited example was her famous public comment in 2003 that 
President Bush was President Chen’s “secrete guardian angel”. She also commented that Chen’s push for referendums 
sounded “reasonable and logical”. She resigned in April 2004 under strong pressures from the State Department. 
(Lawrence, 2004)   
155 The first two TECRO representatives—Chen Chien-jen and Lee Ta-wei—during the Chen Shui-bian administration 
were both KMT-cultivated professional diplomats. One the one hand, Chen Shui-bian suspected if they were able or 
willing to explain or defend his controversial policies; on the other hand, the U.S. government had doubts if they really 
represented the Chen government and what Chen had in mind. In April 2007 Jaushieh Joseph Wu was appointed to 
replace Lee Ta-wei to become the first head of TECRO from the DPP.  
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“Chen Shui-bian believed that the U.S. overlooked Beijing’s growing threat 
to Taipei and was also unable to push Beijing to talk with Taiwan’s 
democratically elected leaders and government, so Taiwan had no other 
alternatives but to rely on itself to safeguard its independent sovereignty and 
national security. The Bush administration believed that what Chen Shui-
bian had done was neither pragmatic nor conducive to cross-strait peace. 
Chen’s measures were only to consolidate the deep-green supporters 
without regard to seriously conflicting with the U.S. interests, and they 
could unilaterally change the cross-strait status quo and draw the U.S. into 
a military crisis in addition to the two ongoing wars. (Liu, 2010, p. 170)          
As the perception gap widened and strategic interests differed, Taiwan acutely felt a 
readjustment of the U.S. policy toward itself and the Taipei-Beijing-Washington 
triangular relationship. On April 21, 2004, James Kelly (Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 2001-2005) provided the most comprehensive 
authoritative report of the U.S. policy toward Taiwan of the Bush administration before 
the House International Relations Committee. Kelly’s testimony was seen as “the most 
negative statement of U.S. policy on Taiwan ever delivered publicly”,156 (Bush, 2005, p. 
252) and for the first time the U.S. indicated that its support for Taiwan’s democracy was 
limited.157 For Taiwan this meant that the U.S. had a double standard in promoting 
democracy and would choose to suppress Taiwan’s democratic developments if 
necessary. (Lin, 2009a, p. 354) Kelly also seemed to have a more expansive 
interpretation of President Chen’s “five nos” statements—first proclaimed in his first 
inaugural address in May 2000 and reiterated during his second inauguration in May 
2004. One of the “nos” was that no promoting “a referendum on unification or 
                                                          
156 In the author’s view, Christensen’s address before the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council in September 2007 was even 
more negative and harsher. (Christensen, 2007) But Bush wrote in 2005, before the Christensen speech was delivered.  
157 In Kelly’s original words, “as Taiwan proceeds with efforts to deepen democracy, we will speak clearly and bluntly 
if we feel as though those efforts carry the potential to adversely impact U.S. security interests or have the potential to 
undermine Taiwan’s own security. There are limitations with respect to what the United States will support as Taiwan 
considers possible changes to its constitution.” (Kelly, 2004) 
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independence”, but Kelly took it as “no plebiscite or referendum on sovereignty issues”. 
Since “sovereignty issues” covered issues other than unification/independence, the 
change of wording seemed to portend a more constraining U.S. policy on Taiwan.158 (Lin, 
2009a, pp. 355-356) Moreover, officials from the Bush administration often used 
President Chen’s “five nos” to press him to abide by his pledges, but they ignored the 
precondition to the “five nos”—“as long as the PRC has no intention to use military force 
against Taiwan”.159 (Lin, 2009a, p. 355; Liu, 2010, p. 23)     
On Taiwan’s sovereign status, the U.S. government became more straightforward and 
negative. In October 2004 Secretary of State Colin Powell stirred a diplomatic tempest 
when he said during an Asian trip that “Taiwan is not independent; it does not enjoy 
sovereignty as a nation”, and he seemed to imply a preference for “peaceful unification” 
between Taiwan and the PRC. Although the State Department quickly clarified that there 
was no change of the U.S. longstanding policy and Powell’s statement on peaceful 
unification was a slip of the tongue, Taiwanese media correctly pointed out that “the core 
problem” was not the “narrow question” of the accuracy of Powell’s statement but “the 
extent to which the triangular relationship between the U.S., Taiwan and the PRC has 
been transformed and how this transformation would influence Washington’s policy”. 
(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 2004) There was indeed no inconsistency with the 
                                                          
158 For example, the defensive referendum on national security issues—buying more missile defense systems and 
negotiation with Beijing—was not about unification/independence, but it did have some sovereignty implications. (Lin, 
2009, pp. 355-356) Clifford Hart (Director of Taiwan Coordination of the State Department) offered a similar 
expansive interpretation of Chen’s commitments, when Hart delivered a speech in the 2006 U.S.-Taiwan Business 
Council Defense Industry Conference: “we assign special importance to President Chen’s June 8, 2006 public 
reaffirmation of his commitments that Taiwan will not declare independence, change the national name, push for 
sovereignty themes in the constitution, or promote a referendum to change the status quo.” (Hart, 2006) 
159 What constituted “intention to use military force against Taiwan”, of course, is highly controversial. The Chen 
government pointed to Beijing’s rapid military modernization, especially the hundreds of SRBMs targeting Taiwan, as 
evidences, but obviously capability does equal to “intention”.   
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U.S. policy to say that Taiwan did not have sovereignty, but Washington had also been 
careful not to deny its sovereignty; there was a distance between non-recognition and 
active denial.160 Similar statements on Taiwan’s sovereignty were reiterated by Dennis 
Wilder (Senior Director in the NSC, December 2005-January 2009) in August 2007. 
(Dumbaugh, 2007, pp. 5-6) 
Another perceptible adjustment of the U.S. position on cross-strait relations was the shift 
of emphasis on the peaceful resolution of the cross-strait disputes: the Bush 
administration tended to stress that the Taiwan issue has to be resolved in a way 
acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, somewhat veering from the 
Clinton administration’s insisting that it be resolved not only peacefully but also “with 
the assent” of Taiwan’s people. (Kan, 2011a, p. 26) Although the change of working 
seemed to be minor and innocuous, it explicitly gave Beijing a voice and more legitimacy 
in determining Taiwan’s political development and its future. Given China’s rising 
ascendency and non-renouncement of the use of force, the co-determining the future of 
Taiwan put Taiwan in a disadvantageous position. (Lin, 2009a, pp. 364-367)  
On top of all the concerns about the U.S. policy adjustments on Taiwan’s political 
development, its sovereign status, and the resolution of cross-strait dispute was an 
emergent phenomenon of Beijing-Washington co-management of the Taiwan Strait. 
Chen Shui-bian lamented in early 2004 that “Beijing’s tactics of using Washington to 
pressure Taiwan is more and more evident.” On the other hand, Beijing did modify its 
insistence that Taiwan Strait issue was purely an internal affair and openly asked the U.S. 
                                                          
160 This is similar to the U.S. framing of its position on Taiwan independence: it does not support it. In most instances 
the U.S. has been careful not to say that it “opposes” it. 
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to join together to oppose Taiwan independence and safeguard cross-strait peace and 
stability.161 One notable example of such co-management was Bush’s public censure of 
Chen Shui-bian on the defensive referendum in the face of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao 
in December 2003. (Zhao, 2006, pp. 62-63) Another example was U.S. low-key reaction 
to the passage of the Anti-Secession Law by Beijing in March 2005 despite Taipei’s 
intensive lobbying in Washington. (Tan, 2005)   
The U.S. never recognized the so-called “co-management” and Thomas Christensen in 
September 2007 categorically denied that Washington coordinated its Taiwan policy with 
Beijing. (Christensen, 2007) Maybe Washington never intended to co-manage or 
coordinate its policy with Beijing, but the unintended perception on the island was the 
contrary. Taipei also reckoned that the U.S. policy adjustment tilting toward Beijing and 
implicit embracing of co-management to a great extent resulted from the U.S. changing 
strategic imperatives to combat terrorism and prevent nuclear proliferation and the 
increasing importance of China’s cooperation on addressing these issues, since after all 
the U.S. Taiwan policy was directly affected by its China policy, which was in turn 
affected by its strategic posture in the Asia-Pacific and the world.162 (Wu, 2010; Lin, 
2010; Dumbaugh, 2007) 
                                                          
161 For example, Chinese President Hu Jintao said after meeting with President Bush at the U.N. in New York in 
September 2005 that “I hope that the United States will join the Chinese side in safeguarding peace and stability across 
the Taiwan Straits, and opposing so-called Taiwan independence.” (Hu, 2005) Hu Jintao also emphasized the common 
interests of China and the U.S. to oppose Taiwan independence on several other occasions. See Kan 2011a; Wang, 
2005. Analysts from Beijing and Taipei also discussed the U.S.-China co-management phenomenon, see Tan, 2005; 
Wu, 2006b; Lin, 2007; Guo, 2007; Chen, 2006) Interestingly, analysts from Beijing believed that China’s willingness to 
co-manage the Taiwan Strait with the U.S. was a reflection of self-confidence, while at least one Taiwan analysts 
considered it as an indication of lack of confidence and ability to manage the Taiwan issue by itself. (Lin, 2009, p. 362) 
162 Former officials from the Bush administration tended to deny that the anti-terrorist campaign, the North Korea and 
Iran nuclear issues and China’s needed cooperation in those aspects necessitated a Taiwan policy flip-flop. As 
mentioned above, they attributed the breakdown of U.S.-Taiwan relations to the Taiwan government, especially Chen 
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5.3. Diplomatic standing: shrinking space for Taipei 
The first few years of the 21st century also witnessed a continual deterioration of 
Taiwan’s diplomatic standing. The fact that Taipei was losing out in the diplomatic tug-
of-war manifested itself in many fronts: formal diplomatic relations, substantive relations 
with major powers and important regional powers, participation in inter-governmental 
organizations, etc. The diplomatic failures certainly did a heavy blow to Taipei’s efforts 
to present itself as a sovereign political entity on the world stage.  
The Chen Shui-bian administration attached great importance to relations with “friendly 
countries”—a term for diplomatic allies, which was reflected by Chen and other senior 
officials’ unusually high frequency of visits to Africa, Central and South America and 
South Pacific, the main strongholds of Taipei’s formal diplomacy.163 Chiou I-jen, then 
Secretary-General of Taiwan’s NSC, advocated the “War-Flame Diplomacy” (fenghuo 
waijiao), taking aggressive measures and every opportunity to establish and upgrade 
relation with diplomatic allies and non-allies so that Beijing may not be able to take 
countermeasures for every case and Taipei could consolidate and even expand its 
diplomatic achievements. However, the diplomatic activism did little to change the cold 
reality for Taipei, and if anything, the reality got colder. When Chen Shui-bian and the 
DPP came into power in 2000, Taipei had 29 diplomatic allies, but the number decreased 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Shui-bian. For one example, Michael Green had this line of argument, see Tucker, 2009. 
163 Taiwanese leaders’ visits to diplomatic allies—especially those to Central and South America, of course, also 
provide them with opportunities to make stopovers on the U.S. soil.  
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to 23 in 2007. During this period Taipei lost Macedonia, Liberia, Dominica, Grenada, 
Senegal, Chad, Costa Rica, and Malawi and gained Kiribati and Saint Lucia.164  
The major cause of Taipei’s shrinking number of diplomatic allies was, as Chen Shui-
bian and other senior leaders often accused, Beijing’s diplomatic strangulation. As early 
as the late 1990s, Taipei already believed that Beijing adopted a “three zeros” policy and 
China’s rising economic power and political influence and adroit diplomacy in the first 
few years of the 21st century have made the “three zeros” policy an increasingly realistic 
goal for Beijing. Moreover, Beijing had utilized a variety of instruments against Taipei: 
money diplomacy, manipulation of veto power in the U.N. Security Council, professional 
lobbying, overseas Chinese connections, political party diplomacy, and parliamentary 
diplomacy, etc. (Chen, 2002, p. 48) The first two turned to be the most effective to deal 
with Taipei’s tiny allies. In terms of “money diplomacy”, the ROC’s MoFA officials 
candidly admitted that it was a losing battle to compete with Beijing due to the latter’s 
stronger financial prowess and less oversight on money spending.165 (Lai, 2006) China 
also did not hesitate to use its veto power on peacekeeping operations in the U.N. 
Security Council to sway small countries’ decisions on relations with Taipei.166 
                                                          
164 Taipei lost Nauru in 2002 but gained it back in 2005.  
165 Interview with ROC Foreign Ministry officials, Taipei, 2008. Tubilewicz and Guilloux concluded that to the 
contrary of many criticisms of the money diplomacy/chequebook diplomacy squandering taxpayers’ money, the Chen 
Shui-bian administration actually demonstrated “frugality” toward foreign aid to diplomatic allies, and this frugality 
contributed to Chen’s diplomatic failures. (Tubilewicz, 2011)  
166 In January 1997, China vetoed a U.N. mission to monitor the Guatemala peace accords due to its diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan, but later lifted its veto after a presumable compromise from Guatemala that it would not support 
Taiwan’s U.N. membership bid. The veto was China’s first time in 26 years on any matter other than the selection of 
the Secretary General. (Lewis, 1997) In the same year China also objected sending U.N. troops to Haiti for the same 
reason, but after the Chinese ambassador said that there were no new instructions from Beijing and left the Security 
Council chamber, the other 14 members authorized keeping 500 troops and additional civilian policy in Haiti.  In 
February 1999 China again vetoed an extension of the U.N. peacekeeping force in Macedonia for its diplomatic 
recognition of Taipei. (Lewis, 1999) Macedonia ultimately chose to abandon Taipei and reestablish diplomatic relations 
with Beijing in 2001. Incidentally, China’s three more recent uses of veto power (all together with Russia) were against 
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Relations with EU countries have long been secondary to those with the U.S. and Japan 
due to historical and strategic relations, but the Chen Shui-bian administration realized 
that the EU’s continual integration and enlargement increased its economic and political 
influence and attempted to adopt a “forward-looking” strategy in increasing the allocation 
of manpower and other resources to promote a “comprehensive relationship” with 
Europe. (Chen, 2000; MoFA of the ROC, 2002) However, the biggest achievement 
seemed to be the establishment of the “European Economic and Trade Office” (EETO) in 
March 2003 as the European Commission’s permanent presence in Taiwan. But the 
bilateral relationship was strictly confined to trade, investments, science, education, 
culture, etc., and the Chen administration could hardly move the bilateral relationship 
beyond “low politics” issues to the political or security sphere. Although the European 
Parliament (EP), often on the initiative of the EP-Taiwan Friendship Group, has been 
more sympathetic and vocal in support of Taipei’s participation in intergovernmental 
organization and expanding EU-Taiwan political ties and on other cross-strait issues, it is 
highly unlikely that its positions towards Taiwan would have any significant influence 
upon the EU and its Member States due to its marginal role in the decision-making 
process in external relations. (Lan, 2004; Chang, 2009) 
In fact some developments during this period suggested that the European Council and 
Commission and its Member States were much more susceptible to Beijing’s pressures 
and less forthcoming to support Taipei: the EU had not explicated stated support for 
Taipei’s bid for its participation in the World Health Organization (WHO); the EU, led 
                                                                                                                                                                             
U.N. resolutions on Myanmar in 2007, on Zimbabwe in 2008, and on Syria in 2011. 
171 
 
by France and Germany, was contemplating lifting the arms embargo on the PRC 
between 2003 and 2005; 167 leaders of the EU and some of its Member States publicly 
condemned the Chen administration’s provocative decisions such as holding referenda 
and abolishing the National Unification Council and Guidelines; the EU also condemned 
Taiwan’s veto of the nomination of a PRC national as a member of the appellate body of 
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in the WTO. (Su, 2010) This should come as no 
surprise, as one European scholar put it plainly, “the spectacular rise of China has made 
the EU member states unwilling to upset China. Taiwan’s interests can only be defended 
at the margin.” (Laursen, 2006) On top of this, a key difference between the EU and U.S. 
in regard to cross-strait relations is that Europe has no strategic interests or military forces 
in Asia, or any responsibility for the defense of Taiwan, nor is there an active pro-Taiwan 
lobby in Europe. (Shambaugh, 2005b, p. 20) Tien Hung-mao, former Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (2000-2002) and Representative to the U.K. (2002-2004) also acknowledged in 
2005 that for European countries cross-strait relationship is a “distant” issue and without 
considerations of democracy or human rights it is mostly an American thing, so Taiwan 
should not be too optimistic. (Tien, 2005) 
To Taipei’s further dismay, its Southeast Asian policy turned out to be an abysmal 
failure. In 2002 the Chen administration revived the “Southward Policy” to encourage 
Taiwanese businessmen to invest in Southeast Asian countries,168 but Taipei’s endeavors 
were significantly overshadowed by Beijing’s successful engagement in this region by 
                                                          
167 The process of lifting the arms embargo stalled after Beijing passed the Anti-Secession Law in 2005 and Washington 
demonstrated its strong opposition.  
168 The Southward policy (also translated as Go South policy) was initiated by Lee Teng-hui in 1993. For a detailed 
account of the ebb and flow of this policy, see Soong, 2006.  
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downplaying territorial disputes and focusing on trade relations.169 A Taiwanese analyst 
noted in 2005 that “Taiwan’s dealings with Southeast Asia in recent years have been 
frustrating. Senior government officials have had to travel under unnecessary restrictions, 
and Taiwan was excluded from a Southeast Asia-based FTA…Taiwan’s Southward 
policy has reached a dead end… at the same time, China has been gaining ground in 
Southeast Asia. Negotiations for the ASEAN-China FTA are ahead of schedule. China’s 
influence in Southeast Asia has been expanding in geometrical progression in recent 
years… China’s rapidly increasing influence on ASEAN also enhances its ability to 
oppress Taiwan. A senior editor of the Nation (Thailand) shared with the author last year 
that Taiwan had lost almost all of its political bases in Southeast Asia.” What is revealing 
is that the analyst was clearly nostalgic of the golden times of the pragmatic diplomacy 
by pointing out that during 1993-1994 President Lee Teng-hui could travel to Southeast 
Asian countries through “vacation diplomacy” and enjoyed diplomatic courtesy and 
dignity, which was impossible for now. (Lai, 2005)  
Given the many diplomatic setbacks encountered by the Chen administration, its 
relationship with Japan seemed rather to be an exception, which experienced quite 
noticeable upgrading and expansion. First of all, both side exchanged more frequent visits 
by former and incumbent higher-level political figures. Among others, Furuya Keiji, then 
vice-minister of Trade, Economics and Industry, became the highest-level Japanese 
government official to visit Taiwan since 1972 when he attended the funeral of an ex-
representative of Taiwan to Japan in May 2002. On the other hand, Yu Shyi-kun, ex-
                                                          
169 For the development of China-Southeast Asian relations during this period, see Vaughn, 2006.  
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premier and then acting DPP chairman, visited Japan in August 2006. Other seemingly 
minor but still unprecedented exchanges included Taiwan’s national day celebration in 
Tokyo in October 2002 attended and given speeches to by the speaker of the Diet’s 
House of Representatives and a cabinet minister and the Taipei office of the Japan 
Interchange Association’s (JIA) open celebration of the Japanese emperor’s birthday—a 
kind of “official” activity. (Bridges, 2008) Since 2002 Japan have also explicitly 
supported Taiwan’ bid for the WHA observer status. Most significantly, military 
exchange and security cooperation between Taiwan and Japan were growing steadily. In 
2002 a Ground SDF major-general took early retirement and assumed a post with the JIA 
in Taipei while Taiwan sent a lieutenant-general to TECRO in Japan, (Yan, 2006, p. 106) 
In 2005, Taiwan’s annual large-scale military exercise planned a hypothetical joint 
operation with both the U.S. and Japan and the three sides made assessment of the 
operation through war games using a hook-up of computers. (Bridges, 2008, p. 590) 
Lastly, the February 2005 U.S.-Japan joint security statement listed the “peaceful 
resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait” as a “common strategic objective”, 
further boosting Taiwan’s confidence in securing Japan’s military support in case of 
future conflicts.  
Developments in both Taiwan and Japan contributed to the warming bilateral 
relationship. The Chen administration recognized the importance of relations with Japan 
from the very beginning. It set up an inter-agency “Special Group for Japan Work” (Duiri 
Gongzuo Zhuananzu) inside the President Office in 2002 to coordinate activities of 
various ministries vis-à-vis Japan; the MoFA subsequently created its own small group 
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on Japan work. In March 2002 Foreign Minister Eugene Chien pointed out five priorities 
to improve relations with Japan, including high-level reciprocal visits, government-to-
government contact, peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, Japan-Taiwan FTA and 
Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. (Tsai, 2007b) Indeed, Taiwan’s 
goal was rather ambitious: it attempted to break the so-called “1972 system” limiting 
official exchanges between the two governments, establish a “semi-strategic partnership” 
with Japan and have Japan as a quasi-ally by conceivably passing the Japanese version of 
the TRA. (Kyodo News, 2005; Yan, 2006, Bridges, 2008) In contrast to its shortage of 
expertise in dealing with Washington, the DPP is filled with many more capable Japan 
hands to facilitate upgrading relations with Tokyo.170 On the other hand, developments in 
Japan’s domestic politics were also conductive to favorable policies towards Taiwan: 
pro-Taiwan Japanese politicians (“Taiwan Gang”) gained increasing prominence not only 
in the LDP but also in opposition parties such as the DPJ, while the MoFA and its “China 
School” were being marginalized in the decision-making process. (Wu, 2006a)  
In terms of participation in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), as of 2007 Taiwan 
had membership in 27 IGOs and their subsidiary bodies and observer status or associate 
membership in 21 other IGOs and their subsidiary bodies. (MoFA of the ROC, 2008) But 
much of Taipei’s membership and observer status belonged to those who were 
derivatives from other existing IGOs or government entities and were extended to Taipei 
through its membership in the parent organization. (Li, 2006, p. 614) The biggest 
achievement was Taiwan’s accession to the World Trade Organization after twelve years 
                                                          
170 For example, the two TECRO representatives to Japan under the DPP administration, Lo Fu-chen and Koh Se-kai, 
both were educate and had widespread connections in Japan. 
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of negotiations under the name “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen 
and Matsu” on January 1st, 2002. But its efforts on other fronts were largely futile, 
especially its bid for the U.N. and its affiliated agencies. The WHA case was particularly 
frustrating: neither its low-key approach by applying for an observer status as a “public 
health entity”, nor the more confrontational way of applying for a membership under the 
name “Taiwan”, nor the 2003 SARS epidemic or the U.S. and Japan’s explicit support 
helped Taipei make any progress.171 In other functional and politically insignificant 
international organizations, Beijing also pressed for “name changes” to “localize” and 
downgrade Taipei’s status. For example, in May 2007 the World Organization for 
Animal Health passed a resolution unilaterally proposed by China to refer to Taiwan as 
“Taiwan, China” and a “Non-sovereign Regional Member.” (MAC of the ROC, 2007) 
Jaushieh Joseph Wu, former Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council (2004-2007) and 
TECRO representative to Washington (2007-2008), accused China’s such tactics as “de 
jure unification”. (Wu, 2007)  
On balance, Taiwan’s diplomatic standing during the period of 2002-2007 deteriorated 
with a decreasing number of diplomatic allies, substantive relations with Europe and 
Southeast Asia overshadowed by the PRC’s rising economic power and political 
influence in these regions and participation in international organizations stagnating. 
Although Taipei-Tokyo relations made some headway, it was not sufficient to 
compensate for the overall shrinking international space for Taipei. This, combined with 
the shifting military balance in favor of the PLA and troubled U.S.-Taiwan relationship, 
                                                          
171 For a careful analysis of Taiwan’s evolving strategies for the bid for the WHA, see Chang, 2010.  
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left Taipei in the most precarious security environment since the end of the Cold War. 
Next I will examine the domestic constraints faced by Taiwanese leaders to see if they 
had enough domestic resources and extractive ability to respond to the new and perilous 
situation effectively. As my theory postulates, I will discuss both resource constraints and 
political constraints.   
5.4. Domestic constraints  
5.4.1. Resource constraints:  deficit and debt 
Three interrelated economic indicators suggest that the Chen administration did face 
strong resource constraints during this period: sluggish economic growth rate, swollen 
government budget deficit, and a changing government expenditure structure favoring 
social security programs. From 1952 to 2009, Taiwan’s average annual economic growth 
rate was 7.4% and one of the fastest in the world. But as Chart 1 shows, there is a gradual 
slowdown of the growth rate since the heyday of the 1970s and into the first few years of 
the 21st century its economic vitality resembled much less of its erstwhile “miraculous” 
days. The bursting of the dotcom bubble, the 911 terrorist attacks and the SARS epidemic 
all put downward pressures on its economy, and so did the island’s politics. Most 
significantly, Taiwan’s economy fell into recession in 2001 for the first time since the 
1950s. The proximate cause of the downturn was the Chen administration’s decision in 
October 2000 to halt the fourth nuclear power plant on the grounds that it was 
“unnecessary and would create unacceptable environmental and safety hazards.” 
(Landler, 2000) The project had already cost $1.4 billion, was one-third complete and 
part of it was contracted to U.S., Japanese and Korean companies. So the decision 
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damaged the government’s credibility among foreign investors and rattled domestic 
business community as well. By the end of 2000 Taiwan’s stock market fell by more than 
50%, defaults on loans surpassed the period of Asian financial crisis during 1997-98, and 
massive capital exodus to the mainland took place. (Wu, 2001b, pp. 47-48)  
Taiwan’s economy slowly recovered since 2002, but grew at an anemic rate during the 
remainder of Chen’s tenure. As a result this period witnessed Taiwan’s deteriorating 
economic power vis-à-vis other economies: its gross national product slid from the 16th 
largest in the world in 2002 to the 22nd largest in 2006; the size of its economy dropped 
from 30 percent of mainland China’s economy to 18 percent; its per capita income was 
surpassed by South Korea, etc. (Copper, 2009, p. 182) A related though different sort of 
resource constraints was Taiwan’s mounting budget deficit. The first huge budget deficit 
emerged in 1989, and the first half of the 1990s saw the first peak of deficit spending due 
to a new series of major infrastructure projects and expansion of social welfare programs. 
The budget deficit was brought under control during 1998-1999 but rose dramatically 
again due to sluggish or even declining revenue growth and further increase in social 
welfare spending. (CEFD of the ROC, 2010, p. 31) 
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Figure 5.1 Taiwan’s GDP Growth Rate (CEPD of the ROC, 2008)  
 
 
Figure 5.2 Taiwan’s Budget Surplus/Deficit172 (CEPD, 2010) 
 
                                                          
172 Net budget revenue excludes revenue from government bond issuance and borrowing, and surplus from previous 
fiscal year; net budget expenditure excludes debt principal repayments. In addition, before 2000, the fiscal year begins 
July 1 of preceding year and ends June 30. FY 2000 extends from July 1, 1999 to Dec. 31, 2000. Subsequent fiscal 
years follow the calendar year (from Jan. 1 to Dec. 31). 
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Figure 5.3 Taiwan’s Government Debt (Ministry of Finance of the ROC, 2011) 
 
Figure 5.4 Taiwan’s Debt/GDP Ratio (Ministry of the Finance of the ROC, 2011) 
 
 
In order to finance government expenditure, Taiwan’s government chose issuing bonds 
instead of raising taxes or printing money, because the latter two measures were 
unpopular and politically risky. The Taiwanese government has long been wary of 
inflation given the fact that hyperinflation was one of the reasons for the KMT’s losing 
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the mainland to the Communist Party, and indeed Taiwan has been one of the most price-
stable economies during the postwar history. (Cheng, Haggard, and Kang, 1998; CEPD 
of the ROC, 2010) Likewise, raising taxes was not an attractive option for any political 
party, and the competition between the KMT and the DPP actually resulted in a 
decreasing tax burden in Taiwan: from 20.1% of GNP in 1990 to 12.3% of GNP in 2003. 
(Chen, 2005) As a consequence the only way of financing the government’s excessive 
spending was issuing bonds, which in turn contributed to its snowballing government 
debt. As Chart 3 and 4 shows, Taiwan’s government debt skyrocketed since the mid-
1990s and accounted for roughly 30% of its GDP during Chen Shui-bian’s reign. The 
economic slowdown and rapidly growing budget deficit and government debt did not 
mean an automatic cut in military spending or diplomacy expenditure, but they made it 
harder for political leaders to justify pouring resources into these areas and made 
spending politics more contentious.   
Furthermore, as Table 1 and Chart 5 show, the expansion of social security spending in 
Taiwan had a more direct negative bearing on the financial resources available for other 
purposes, including national defense. The spending on social security accounted for 
18.6% of government expenditure in 1990 but rose to 26.7% in 2007, while spending on 
national defense dropped from 19.2% in 1990 to 11.2% in 2007. Both changing 
socioeconomic structures (aging population, rise of the dual-career family, decline in 
family functions, etc.) and welfare politics engendered by democratic transition led to the 
proliferation of social welfare programs, which “consisted of expansion of the scope of 
social welfare programs, the degrees of protection and coverage under various insurance 
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schemes, and the increasing numbers of eligible recipients under each program.” (Chow, 
2001, p. 21) 
Party politics in Taiwan also put a twist on the welfare politics. Historically the KMT can 
be characterized as a center-to-right party favoring national security and paying attention 
to social security only insofar as it concerned the politically privileged groups—the 
military, government employees and teachers, while the DPP is a center-to-left party and 
advocated expansion of social welfare programs for less privileged group. But the KMT 
co-opted the DPP’s positions in the 1990s,173 and became even more liberal after the DPP 
came into power in 2000 partly to embarrass the deficit-ridden DPP government. (Lee, 
2009) The end result was that each party tried to outbid the other in initiating electorally 
beneficial social welfare programs with little regard for the financial or national security 
consequences. Thus welfare politics in Taiwan was conducted at the expense of the 
defense budget, which did not only account for an increasingly smaller portion of 
government expenditure, but also stagnated or even declined in absolute terms into the 
21st century. Moreover, both quantitative and qualitative data revealed that foreign affairs 
budget was also woefully insufficient to engage in the diplomatic tug-of-war with 
Beijing. (Tien, 2005; Tubilewicz, 2011)  
 
 
 
                                                          
173 In fact one of the most significant developments in social security—the universal national health insurance, was 
introduced in 1995 under the KMT rule.  
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Table 5.1 Taiwan’s Government Expenditure Structure (in %) (CEPD of the ROC, 
2008)  
Period General 
Administration 
National 
Defense 
Education, 
Science & 
Culture 
Economic 
Development 
Social 
Security 
Obligations Others 
1986 11.4 24.9 20.9 25.1 16.1 0.9 0.8 
1987 11.2 23.2 20.8 26.7 16.1 1.1 0.9 
1988 11.0 22.1 20.3 26.5 18.2 1.1 0.8 
1989 8.1 15.6 17.0 44.8 12.7 0.9 1.0 
1990 11.5 19.2 20.7 27.5 18.6 1.5 1.0 
1991 12.0 17.8 22.6 25.2 18.8 2.6 1.0 
1992 12.7 15.3 20.8 29.6 18.8 2.2 0.7 
1993 11.9 14.4 19.9 31.1 18.2 3.6 0.8 
1994 11.8 17.6 20.9 25.6 19.2 4.1 0.6 
1995 11.6 14.1 18.7 22.9 21.7 10.2 0.6 
1996 13.2 15.5 20.3 17.9 26.9 5.8 0.5 
1997 13.0 15.5 20.0 15.7 28.9 6.2 0.7 
1998 12.9 15.7 20.7 16.8 27.4 5.8 0.8 
1999 13.6 14.0 20.9 17.1 26.9 6.9 0.6 
2000 14.9 11.4 20.9 15.1 28.7 8.6 0.4 
2001 14.5 10.9 18.9 17.6 30.0 7.6 0.6 
2002 15.2 10.5 20.4 18.9 26.4 8.0 0.6 
2003 15.0 10.3 20.9 18.3 27.6 7.2 0.5 
2004 14.9 11.1 20.6 19.0 27.4 6.2 0.6 
2005 14.8 10.8 20.4 20.2 27.4 5.7 0.7 
2006 15.3 10.5 21.6 17.0 28.9 6.1 0.6 
2007 15.0 11.2 21.8 16.4 26.7 5.9 1.5 
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Figure 5.5 The Development of Social Security in Taiwan174 (CEPD of the ROC, 2010) 
 
       
        
 
       
 
5.4.2. Political constraints: persistent executive-legislative impasse  
In addition to resource constraints, political constraints further circumscribed what the 
Chen administration were able to do in the face of an increasingly perilous security 
environment. Political constraints stemmed from constitutional and institutional 
characteristics as well as a few unforeseen developments of events, and Chen’s efforts to 
                                                          
174 Debt repayments are excluded from government expenditures.  
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break the constraints and expand his maneuvering space ultimately failed. To begin with, 
the ROC’s constitutional framework introduces a possibility of executive-legislative 
impasse and does not offer effective means of resolving it. The ROC’s original 
constitution adopted in 1946 on the mainland envisioned a parliamentary system, but 
after the KMT fled to Taiwan political power was concentrated in the hands of the 
presidency under martial law and the political system operated more like a presidential 
system in practice.175 Since the democratization process commenced in the late 1980s, 
the Lee Teng-hui-led KMT government initiated a series of constitutional reform that 
simultaneously empowered the presidency and the legislature without a clear orientation 
toward either presidential or parliamentary system.  
The problem is that to a great extent the constitutional amendments were made by “short-
term calculations and improvised compromises” without due attention to the coherence 
and rationalization of the whole system. (Chu, 2005, p. 48) As Shelly Rigger noted, “as 
the hegemonic party, the KMT was able to manipulate reforms in ways that prolonged 
the party’s influence at the expense of efficient, effective democratic institutions. Thus, 
the presidency was strengthened, but without regard for maintaining a workable 
relationship between executive and legislature, while the rubber-stamp legislature was 
given power without the resources to wield the power effectively. The opposition DPP 
acquiesced in many of these flaws reforms, because at one time they seemed to offer a 
shortcut to power.” (Rigger, 2005, p. 43)  
                                                          
175 Except for a few years immediately after Chiang Kai-shek’s death, the president has always held the dominant 
power. From 1975 to 1978, Vice President Yen Chia-kan became the president, but his power was overshadowed by 
then Premier Chiang Ching-kuo.  
185 
 
When the DPP and Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election in 2000, the political 
system in Taiwan resembled mostly closely the semi-presidential system practiced in 
France.176 But Taiwan’s system has its unique features which make it especially prone to 
unmanageable political gridlock. Firstly, after the 1997 constitutional revision the primer 
can be appointed by the president without the approval of the legislature. This effectively 
meant that the president did not have to pick a primer acceptable to the legislature, which 
augmented the president’s power and discouraged the president from seeking 
compromise with the majority party in the legislature.177 Secondly, since 1997 the 
president may dissolve the legislature only after a vote of no-confidence against the 
cabinet from the latter, and under these circumstances legislators in general refrain from 
initiating a vote of no-confidence because that would almost automatically trigger a 
dissolution and force them to face another costly and unpredictable election campaign. 
(Cabestan, 2008) So the president is not able to initiate to dissolve the legislature, while 
the legislature is not willing to take the initiative of a vote of no-confidence. The 
executive-legislature impasse, once formed, is likely to persist, and opposition legislators 
would turn the legislature into a battleground against policy proposals of the cabinet and 
president.  
Still all these problems of institutional design will not come into surface as long as one 
party dominates both the executive and legislature, which has been the case before the 
DPP’s presidential victory in 2000. But when Chen Shui-bian was inaugurated in May 
                                                          
176 French political scientist Maurice Duverger coined the term “semi-presidential system”. For discussions of the 
concept, see Duverger, 1980; Bahro, Bayerlein, and Vesser, 1998; Elgie, 2007. For the operation and evolution of semi-
presidential system in Taiwan, see Huang, 2006; Wu, 2009; Shen, 2011.  
177 Under the French Fifth Republic system, the president would be forced into “cohabitation” with a prime minister 
and cabinet in consistent with the opposition majority in the parliament.  
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2000 as the ROC’s 10th president, both he and the ROC’s political history were stepping 
into an uncharted territory of divided government. As of May 2000 the DPP held less 
than a third of the seats in the legislature, while the KMT held more than half. Although 
the December 2001 legislative election witnessed a huge failure for the KMT and another 
victory for the DPP, and the latter became the biggest party in the legislature, the blue 
camp—the KMT and its allied parties still held a thin majority. The uncomfortable 
situation still stayed three years later after the December 2004 legislative election. And it 
was not just the minority status of the DPP and the green camp in the legislature. Chen’s 
government was facing a “triple minority syndrome”: “he was elected as a minority 
president;178 his party is a minority party in parliament; and his faction, the Justice 
Alliance, remains a minority force within the DPP.” (Chu, 2001, p. 105)  
Still even combining the aforementioned institutional weaknesses and a divided 
government did not have to produce the political deadlock had Taiwanese politics not 
been so hypercompetitive and there been some degree of compromise. But for historical 
and institutional reasons politicians had been habituated to a winner-take-all mode of 
political competition and the spirit of compromise was alien to both political camps. 
(Rigger, 2005, pp. 28-29) This was manifested clearly in the early days of the Chen 
administration when both parties were confronted with the prospect of a divided 
government. Although Chen was receptive to drawing talents from other political parties 
for cabinet positions,179 he categorically rejected the idea of party-to-party negotiation 
over a possible coalition government with either the KMT or the PFP. (Chu, 2001, p. 103) 
                                                          
178 Due to the three-way race, Chen won the presidential election with only 39% of the votes.  
179 This was also partly attributable to the DPP’s shortage of talents and lack of administrative experiences. 
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The KMT, for its part, penalized those party members who agreed to serve in the cabinet 
by expulsing them from the party. A few months later the unmanageable executive-
legislative impasse was on full display after controversy erupted over Chen government’s 
decision to halt the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant, which was one of 
Chen’s campaign promises but firmly opposed by the majority pan-blue camp in the 
legislature. There was no institutional channel to resolve the standoff and finally it took 
the Council of Grand Justices to bring the dispute to an end.180 (Rigger, 2002) The 
nuclear power plant drama crystallized the confrontational political atmosphere and made 
inter-party or executive-legislative cooperation all but impossible.  
Taken together, the flawed institutional design, divided government and 
hypercompetitive political competition crippled the Chen government’s ability to take 
policy initiatives, including its ability to mobilize resources to respond to the adverse 
power shift and a rapidly changing security environment. In the legislature the KMT-led 
pan-blue camp played a quintessential obstructionist game. The fate of the special budget 
for the Bush administrations’ arms sales to Taiwan was a typical example: it was blocked 
more than fifty times in the legislature’s procedure committee and the pan-blue 
legislators opposed the very same articles the KMT requested from the U.S. before the 
DPP came into power. A DPP-leaning newspaper Taipei Times lamented the situation in 
January 2006, “national security has taken a back seat to partisan maneuvering in Taiwan, 
and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. The pan-blue alliance is 
pathologically opposed to any measure that would give the Chen administration a 
                                                          
180 The Council of Grand Justices ruled that the government’s decision was “procedurally flawed” and recommended 
that the cabinet ask for the legislature’s approval retroactively. Later executive-legislative negotiation produced an 
agreement to complete the fourth nuclear power plant but make no further nuclear plant constructions. (Rigger, 2002)  
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legislative victory. And the pan-green camp is powerless to implement any action on its 
own.” (Taipei Times, 2006)  
At times Chen attempted to improve the situation and break these political constraints. 
One such attempt was the appointment of Tang Fei, a KMT military general and ex-
defense minister under Lee Teng-hui, as his first premier.181 But Tang Fei was not able to 
help him in the legislature at all and the KMT legislators treated Tang as a betrayer 
instead of a comrade. Tang soon resigned due to his opposition to Chen’s decision over 
the fourth nuclear power plant. Another such attempt was made in early 2005. Chen tried 
to build some sort of coalition with the PFP—the junior partner in the blue camp—to 
overcome the green camp’s minority status, and in February he held a meeting with the 
PFP chairman James Soong and produced a ten-point joint statements.182 But due to 
mutual distrust the coalition building was short-lived, and soon James Soong followed on 
the heels of the KMT chairman Lien Chan to visit mainland China. Not only was Chen 
unable to build a successful coalition with non-green parties, but he was further 
weakened politically after a series of scandals involving his family members and close 
aides were exposed in 2006 and his popularity plummeted. Thus throughout the two 
terms Chen and his government faced unprecedented political constraints, which 
tightened the straitjacket already imposed by resource constraints.  
 
                                                          
181 For Tang Fei’s own account of the critical period of power transition from the KMT to the DPP and his experience 
as premier under Chen, see his recently-published memoir (Tang, 2011).  
182 For an analysis of the motives behind the Chen-Soong meeting and its failure, see Liu, 2010, pp. 92-99.  
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Figure 5.6 Seats Distribution in the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan (Central Election 
Commission, ROC) 
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5.5. Sovereignty assertiveness: Taiwan independence at its height  
So given the adverse power shift across the Taiwan Strait –the PLA’s growing coercive 
capabilities, troubled U.S.-Taiwan relationship and shrinking international space—and 
strong resource and political constraints, the theory expects to see a rise of sovereignty 
assertiveness from the Chen government. This is exactly what had taken place from 2002 
to 2007. It started in August 2002 with the “one-country-on-each-side” statement. In July 
2002, Beijing scored another success in the diplomatic battlefield with Taipei by luring 
away Nauru and announced the establishment of diplomatic relations on the very same 
day when Chen assumed the DPP chairmanship.183 Chen responded by saying that 
“Taipei would not rule out the possibility of going its own way”, and it was not long 
                                                          
183 Interview with Chen’s close aides revealed that the “Nauru Incident” was a proximate cause of Chen’s “one-
country-one-each-side” statement.   
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before he acted on his words. On August 3 addressing by teleconference to a group of 
overseas Taiwanese supporters in Tokyo, Chen dropped the rhetoric bomb, one 
comparable to that of the “special-state-to-state theory”, by asserting that “Taiwan is our 
country, and our country cannot be bullied, downgraded, marginalized, nor treated as a 
local government. Taiwan is not a part of any other country, nor is it a local government 
or province of another country. Taiwan can never be another Hong Kong or Macau 
because Taiwan has always been a sovereign state. In short, Taiwan and China are 
standing on opposite sides of the strait, there is one country on each side. This should be 
clear.” This is the so-called “one-country-on-each-side” theory (yibian yiguo). Beijing 
was again enraged, and Washington became concerned.  
The “one-country-on-each-side” formulation was followed by a series of moves that were 
deemed by Beijing as “creeping independence”, salami tactics to achieve formal 
independence. Taiwan seemed to be drifting further away from the mainland. Throughout 
most of the time in 2003 the issue of referendum became hotly debated in Taiwan. Calls 
for referendum to address issues such as nuclear power, the size of the legislature and 
Taiwan’s membership in the World Health Organization (WHO) came mainly from Chen 
and the DPP, still the minority in the legislature despite its control of the executive 
branch. Beijing watched these developments anxiously.184 Toward the end of the year, 
Chen announced that a “defensive referendum” would be held alongside the presidential 
                                                          
184 The issue of referendum in Taiwan raised two sorts of concerns to the PRC. First and foremost, a referendum might 
be used to change Taiwan’s legal status or sovereignty, such as its national title or territory. Second, even if the 
referendum only involved public policy issues instead of the sensitive issue on Taiwan independence, the use of an 
island-wide referendum would probably by itself lay bare Taiwan’s political separation from the mainland.  
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election the next March. 185  Chen initially claimed that the referendum would be used to 
call on China to withdraw ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan and to renounce the use of 
force against the island, but the final topics of the referendum were more carefully 
worded to be innocuous: whether the government should acquire more advanced anti-
missile weapons; and whether the government shall engage in talks with Beijing in 
establishing a peace framework.186  
Chen insisted the referendum was an attempt to safeguard Taiwan’s sovereignty and 
security by consolidating the Taiwanese “mental fortitude”, by bringing to other 
countries’ awareness China’s military threat, and by having the true voice of Taiwan 
heard by Beijing. (Central News Agency, December 6, 2003, FBIS 
CPP20031206000032) But for Beijing, the defensive referendum was “an important 
means for ‘gradual independence’ whereby to ‘show off sovereignty of Taiwan’ by a 
‘legal’ symbol and justify ‘independence’ awareness”, and it was “only an exploration, 
once the ‘independence’ forces deem the time is ripe, they would dish out an 
‘independence referendum’.” (The People’s Daily online, February 12, 2004) On top of 
the referendum issue, in September 2003 at a DPP meeting marking its 17th founding 
anniversary Chen also called for a new constitution to be completed by 2006, and he 
deemed a new constitution as “a necessary stop to build Taiwan into a normal, complete 
                                                          
185 According to the Referendum Law, passed on November 27, 2003, “the president is entitled to initiate a referendum 
on national security issues whenever the country faces an external threat that could interfere with national sovereignty.” 
Taipei Times, November 28, 2003. 
186 The exact wording of the referendum questions were announced on January 16, 2004: 1) the people of Taiwan 
demand that the Taiwan Strait issue be resolved through peaceful means. Should mainland China refuse to withdraw 
the missiles it has targeted at Taiwan and to openly renounce the use of force against us, would you agree that the 
Government should acquire more advanced anti-missile weapons to strengthen Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities? 2) 
Would you agree that our Government should engage in negotiation with mainland China on the establishment of a 
“peace and stability” framework for cross-strait interactions in order to build consensus and for the welfare of the 
peoples on both sides? The referendum ultimately failed on the Election Day (March 20, 2004) because of the less than 
50% turnout.  
193 
 
and great country.” (Central News Agency, October 3, 2003, FBIS 
CPP20031004000071) To China’s vigilance, the creation of a constitution was seen as 
the “Taiwan independence road map” contrived by Chen. (Xinhua Domestic Service, 
January, 2004, FBIS CPP20040103000041)  
 Chen won his second term by a razor-thin margin and made a fairly conciliatory 
inaugural speech on May 20 2004. He reaffirmed the assurances made four years ago and 
explicitly excluded such issues as Taiwan’s sovereignty and territory from the 
“constitutional reengineering project”. Although having rejected the “one China 
principle”, Chen acknowledged that so long as the Taiwanese people consented, any 
future between the two sides across the strait was possible. (The Washington Post, May 
21, 2004) But for those who believed that the inaugural speech signaled that moderation 
was restored and the previous radical stances were merely electoral tactics, they soon 
found themselves to be wrong. In the National Day’s speech on October 10 2004, while 
referring to the 1992 Hong Kong meeting as the basis for resuming dialogue and 
consultation, Chen also made strong statements with implications for Taiwan’s 
sovereignty, “Taiwan is a small country… The sovereignty of the ROC is vested in the 23 
million people of Taiwan… Taiwan is the Republic of China and the Republic of China 
is Taiwan.” (Central News Agency, October 10, 2004). Chen also continued to press on 
the constitutional reengineering project in October 2005 when he announced that 
constitutional reform would be a “bottom-up, outside-in” process, that is, “relevant 
proposals will be first initiated by the social groups before political parties are involved.” 
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The grassroots approach, if implemented, easily opened the door for radical 
independence-oriented constitutional drafts. (Romberg, 2006, p. 6) 
Another significant institutional change took place when Chen announced on February 27 
2006 that the National Unification Council would “cease to function” and the Guidelines 
would “cease to apply”. Although Chen himself never called an NUC meeting in his 
capacity as the head of the NUC, the NUC served as a manifestation of Taipei’s 
commitment, however symbolic and tenuous, to the long-term goal of unification, and its 
cancellation was perceived to be Chen’s attempt at further severing Taiwan’s relations 
with China. Furthermore, Chen indicated that Taiwan should adopt new strategy for its 
U.N. bid, that is, to apply for the U.N. membership under the name of “Taiwan”, instead 
of its official title, “the Republic of China”. (Central News Agency, September 13, 2006) 
Later Chen turned it into another referendum campaign that was to be held in tandem 
with the legislative elections at the end of 2007 or the presidential election in early 2008. 
Chen claimed that the referendum would probably even lead the U.S. to review its “one 
China” policy. (Central News Agency, October 21, 2007) Both China and the U.S. 
strongly and unmistakably opposed the proposed referendum, but only to no avail. 187 
Thus Chen ended his second term with continual and assertive push for more independent 
sovereignty for Taiwan.  
                                                          
187 The DPP-proposed referendum asked whether voters agreed that “the government should apply for U.N. 
membership under the name ‘Taiwan’.” (emphasis added) Lest it was outdone by the DPP on this issue, the KMT 
brought up its own version of referendum, which asked whether Taiwan should “return to the U.N. and to join other 
international organizations under the name ‘Republic of China,” or “Taiwan,” or other name that is conducive to 
success and preserves our nation’s dignity.” (emphasis added) Both referenda failed due to the below-threshold (50% of 
eligible voters) turnout.  
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5.6. Conclusion  
During the period of 2002-2007, Taiwan’s strategic environment deteriorated in terms of 
all the three dimensions I examined: the PLA’s growing coercive power and anti-
access/area-denial capabilities tipped the military balance across the Taiwan Strait, U.S.-
Taiwan relations turned from bad to worse despite a sound start due to increasingly 
divergent strategic interests and goals, and Taipei’s formal and substantive diplomatic 
relations were losing ground to Beijing. The perilous situation increased the Chen 
government’s incentive to respond by asserting Taiwan’s separate sovereignty. Moreover, 
tight resource and political constraints circumscribed the Chen government’s capacity to 
mobilize sufficient resources to respond strongly in military or diplomatic ways to the 
mounting multi-pronged threats to its security and survival. Sovereignty assertions, less 
effective and more provocative as they may be, are the very few alternatives left for the 
Chen government. To be sure, it is not argued here that domestic political and electoral 
considerations were absent from the story or Chen and his government were completely 
detached from parochial political interests. Indeed electoral considerations clearly 
impacted the timing and even substance of some of the sovereignty assertions. However, 
electoral politics cannot explain sovereignty assertiveness during the whole period of 
2002-2007, and it does not dictate that the Chen government’s stances on sovereignty had 
to be the way they were without the aforementioned external and internal constraints at 
work. 
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Chapter 6 Chen Shui-bian’s Initial Moderation (2000-2001) and the 
Grand Rapprochement under Ma Ying-jeou (2008-2010) 
 
In this chapter I will discuss the initial couple of years of the Chen Shui-bian 
administration (2000-2001) and the Ma Ying-jeou era (2008-2010). The two cases are 
grouped together because they prima facie challenge the predictions of my theory. 
Simply put, in both cases Chen and Ma adopted a low-sovereignty assertiveness approach 
without an apparent favorable power shift or stronger domestic mobilizational capacity. 
A closer look reveals that Chen’s initial moderation exposes the inevitable lacuna of my 
theory focusing on external and internal constraints but leaving out individual-level 
factors, while Ma Ying-jeou’s approach actually lends support to my theory.  
6.1. Chen Shui-bian’s surprising moderation  
The 2000 presidential election marked the first transfer of power to the opposition after 
five-decade rule by the KMT in Taiwan. Chen Shui-bian, the DPP’s candidate, edged out 
his opponents due to a split in the KMT. Since the DPP, as well as Chen himself, had a 
long record of advocating Taiwan independence, the somewhat surprising election 
outcome sparked a good deal of consternation among those who contemplated that 
tensions across the strait would rise with Chen and the DPP’s coming into power. Yet to 
the contrary of the pessimistic expectations, Chen’s initial approach to cross-strait 
relations demonstrated considerable moderation and conciliation.188  
                                                          
188 In fact the DPP’s stance on Taiwan independence already moved toward moderation and the center before the 2000 
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Chen’s inaugural address on May 20 2000 was the first sign of his “middle-of-the-road” 
approach and expression of “goodwill”. Chen Shui-bian emphasized the same “ancestral, 
cultural, and historical background” across the Taiwan Strait and was willing to discuss 
“the question of a future ‘one China’.” Although apparently he did not embrace the 
PRC’s version of “one China principle”, Chen did not rule out the possibility of future 
unification. More importantly, his famous “Four Nos and One Without” reassured all 
parties concerned: Beijing, Washington, and the Taiwanese public: “as long as the CCP 
regime has no intention to use military force against Taiwan, I pledge that during my 
term in office, I will not declare independence, I will not change the national title, I will 
not push forth the inclusion of the so-called ‘state-to-state’ description in the 
Constitution, and I will not promote a referendum to change the status quo in regard to 
the question of independence or unification, furthermore, there is no question of 
abolishing the Guidelines for National Unification and the National Unification Council.”  
Furthermore, Chen indicated on June 5 that Taiwan was willing to deal with the question 
of a future “one China” based on all agreements, consensus or conclusions reached 
through dialogue and contacts between the two sides in the past. At the end of June, Chen 
went a step further to signal that he was willing to accept “the 1992 consensus” if it 
meant “one China, respective interpretations” instead of the PRC’s rigid “one China 
principle”.189 (Bush, 2005, p. 63) Allegedly Chen also contemplated resuscitate the 
moribund NUC but after MAC Chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen opposed Chen established a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
presidential election, especially with the adoption of a party resolution in May 1999. For a review of the evolution of 
the DPP’s positions on Taiwan independence, see Rigger, 2001, chapter 7.  
189 Reportedly after then MAC chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen showed strong opposition, later on the Presidential Office 
then denied it.  
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President’s Advisory Group on Cross-Strait Relations headed by Academia Sinica 
President Lee Yuan-tesh and composed of members from different political camps in 
order to integrate different views and forge consensuses. In December 2000 the advisory 
group proposed to respond to Beijing’s demand for recognition of the “one-China 
principle” with the ROC constitution.190  
In short, Chen did not only retreat significantly from the DPP’s traditional radicalism of 
formal Taiwan independence, he also stood explicitly apart from his KMT predecessor, 
Lee Teng-hui’s provocative “special state to state theory”. A few months later, Chen’s 
statements once again caught people’s attention with his 2001 New Year messages. He 
suggested the two sides to build trust, “staring from the integration of cross-strait 
economic, trade, and cultural affairs and the jointly searching for a new framework of 
lasting peace and political integration”, “thereby working together to explore the space of 
unlimited possibilities in the utmost interests of the people on the two sides of the Strait.” 
The term “political integration”, although still short of unification, did incite a flurry of 
imagination about Chen’s vision of the framework of a future “one China”.191 As late as 
                                                          
190 The group proposed “three acknowledgements” and “four recommendations”. In addition to the adherence to the 
ROC constitution, they also include: the current state of cross-strait affairs is a result of historical development and 
neither side represents or belongs to the other; any change to the current cross-strait situation should be approved by the 
people through democratic procedures; as the two sides of the strait use a similar language and are closely situated, 
their people should share long-term and mutual benefits; establish a new mechanism or adjust the existing one to 
continue to integrate different views on national development and cross-strait relations; appeal to the PRC to respect 
the ROC’s international dignity and living space and to give up on the use of force; declare to the world that the ROC 
and its people stick to beliefs in peace, democracy and prosperity, etc. (President’s Advisory Group on Cross-Strait 
Relations December 6, 2000) 
191 There were different interpretations of Chen’s “political integration” statements. Harvey Sicherman, President of the 
Foreign Policy Research Institute, believed that Chen “appeared to commit himself as clearly as any of his predecessors 
to the goal of ‘one China’ in the sense of an integrated political future.” Chen Kuei-miao, a pro-unification New Party 
official, also suggested that “the political integration concept outlines an intermediate stage in the eventual unification 
process with mainland China.” But Frank Hsieh, chairman of the DPP, only considered it as another “goodwill gesture” 
and denied that “integration” was equal to “unification”. Byron S. J. Weng characterized the integration concept as 
“independence with the possibility of unification [and] unification with room for independence.” See Hickey and Li, 
2001.  
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May 2002 Chen, when giving a speech at the very frontline of Kinmen, still reiterated the 
possibility of political integration and the necessity of establishing the three links.(Chen, 
2002) 
The Chen administration also went beyond words by authorizing the so-called “three 
mini-links” between the two offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu and the Chinese 
mainland in January 2001. Given that direct transportation, trade and postal linkages 
(“the three links”) across the strait were still prohibited by Taiwan at that time, the 
initiation of the “mini-three links” was perceived as “the most significant move made by 
the DPP government since winning power” in terms of cross-strait affairs. (Gao, 2001) In 
November 2001, the Chen government adopted a more liberal economic policy vis-à-vis 
mainland China, replacing the more restrictive “no haste, be patient” policy under Lee 
Teng-hui with “aggressive opening, effective management.” Most notably, the new 
policy scrapped a $50 million limit on individual investments in China and automatically 
approved projects of less than $20 million. (Landler, 2001)   
Other smaller conciliatory measures aiming at closer cross-strait relations included 
Taiwan’s support for Beijing’s bid for PNTR with Washington and to enter the WTO and 
campaign to host the 2008 Olympic games. Taipei also permitted reporters from the PRC 
to be stationed in Taiwan and promised to ease restrictions on mainland travelers and on 
trade and investment in the mainland by Taiwanese businessmen and to realize the “three 
links” sometime in the future. (Hickey and Li, 2002) Taken together, although Chen’s 
mainland policy in the first two years of his presidency was not comparable to that of the 
early 1990s, it was a noticeable retreat from the late Lee Teng-hui years and by no means 
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a separatist agenda, although the moderation and conciliation proved to be transient and 
would soon give away to more radical stances.  
So why the moderation?  There was neither perceptible favorable power shift nor 
enhanced domestic mobilizational capacity, yet Chen displayed a low-sovereignty 
assertiveness approach vis-à-vis mainland China. Instead of being driven by external and 
internal constraints, Chen’s initial approach seemed to stem in large part from his 
eagerness to open dialogue with Beijing and personal ambition of becoming “Taiwan’s 
Nixon”.192 (Liu, 2010, p. 23) This reflects the inevitable lacuna of the kind of macro-
theory that focuses on external and internal constraints but leaves out individual-level 
factors. Indeed individual-level political leadership is sometimes crucial to our 
understanding of human history, and although external and internal constraints may 
incentivize political leaders to act in certain ways, sheer human voluntarism may simply 
decide to act otherwise. But the occurrence of one deviation from theoretical predictions 
should not falsify the theory; a real and big challenge for the theory would be that the 
deviation is sustained over an extended period of time. This was clearly not the case: 
soon in August 2002 Chen Shui-bian reversed course and chose instead a hard-line 
approach with high sovereignty assertiveness. Put differently, structural constraints 
trumped individual leadership. 
                                                          
192 “Taiwan’s Nixon” means that Chen Shui-bian, from a political party which has openly advocated Taiwan 
independence, might nevertheless open dialogue with Beijing and even set foot on the mainland’s soil, just as President 
Nixon did in his historic 1972 trip to China despite his strong anti-communist credentials.  
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6.2. The grand rapprochement under Ma Ying-jeou 
Having campaigned for moderation and pragmatism in terms of cross-strait relations, 
among other things, Ma called for a “win-win” situation during his inaugural address. He 
reiterated the principle of “no unification, no independence, and no use of force” and 
promised to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait “under the framework of the 
ROC Constitution”.  Ma also called for the resumption of cross-strait negotiations based 
on the “1992 Consensus”—one China, respective interpretations. Moreover, he proposed 
a “truce” in both the cross-strait and international arenas. Analysts in Beijing saw the 
speech “full of goodwill” and tended to believe that “one China” existed in Ma’s 
mainland policy. (Central News Agency, May 20, 2008) 
Ma’s statements and characterization of cross-strait relations afterwards suggested that he 
stuck quite closely to the notion of one China. On August 26 2008, when interviewed by 
Mexican Daily and asked on the idea of “two Chinas”, Ma said that “we (Taiwan and 
China) have a special relationship, but not that between two countries,” a sharp contrast 
to either Lee or Chen’s previous formulations. (The China Post, September 4, 2008) 
Later the Presidential Office Spokesman defended Ma’s statement and went a step further 
by defining the relationship between Taiwan and China as one between two regions: the 
“Taiwan region” and “mainland region.” (The Taipei Times, September 5, 2008) In 
October Ma said that under the ROC Constitution, the ROC “definitely is an independent 
sovereign state, and mainland China is also part of the territory of the ROC.” (The Taipei 
Times, October 8, 2008)  
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With the political hurdles overcome, resumption of dialogues came about quickly. On 
June 11 2008, the SEF and the ARATS, the two semi-official bodies established in the 
early 1990s by both sides, met again in Beijing after a hiatus of nine years. Eight rounds 
of SEF-ARATS summit meetings have been held so far, and a series of agreements had 
been signed on a wide range of issues, including trade, transportation, tourism, travel, 
finance and investment, crime control, and food safety. The November 2008 meeting was 
particularly significant in two aspects. First, Chen Yunlin, head of the ARATS, flew to 
Taipei to meet with Chiang Pin-kun, head of the SEF. The visit by Chen made him “the 
highest-ranking official to set foot on Taiwan proper in six decades.” (Taiwan Journal 
Online, November 7, 2008) Second, the meeting signed several agreements regarding 
direct shipping links, expansion of air links from weekend to daily nonstop charter 
flights, and direct postal services, thus setting into full realization of the “three links” 
between the mainland and island, again after six decades. (Central New Agency, 
December 15, 2008) Moreover, a cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement (ECFA) was signed in 2010 during the fifth round of talks between the SEF 
and ARATS. In the realm of security, ideas of a “peace agreement” between the two 
sides have been floated for a while, although no substantive moves have been taken so 
far.193 So why has the Ma Ying-jeou government been able to sustain its low-profile 
approach on sovereignty, especially given the seemingly widening gap of military 
capabilities across the strait? 
                                                          
193 For an analysis of the feasibility of a “peace agreement” in light of the current developments across the Taiwan 
Strait, see (Saunders and Kastner, 2009) 
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Indeed the military dimension seems to be the exception to the overall increasingly 
warmer cross-strait relationship with the military balance continuing to shift to Beijing’s 
favor and many of the PLA’s aspirational capabilities developed and put into service. As 
the ROC’s 2011 National Defense Report stated, 
“With regard to the PRC’s policy towards Taiwan, although evaluations of 
the security situation show that cross-strait relations are gradually 
improving, the PRC still emphasizes that ‘Taiwan Independence’ separatist 
forces are a threat to its territorial sovereignty and security, and has 
objected to the continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Up to date the PRC 
has not showed military good will towards Taiwan, nor has it adjusted its 
concept of intimidation and unification.” (Ministry of National Defense of 
the ROC, 2011) 
The Taiwanese defense sectors took the establishment of new missile bridges in 
Guangdong, Fujian and Jiangxi areas, deployment of advanced fighters in airbases within 
600 nautical miles from Taiwan, continued upgrading of amphibious landing capabilities, 
etc. to be evidence that the PLA’s modernization still has a significant Taiwan focus. 
(Ministry of National Defense of the ROC, 2009) pp. 31-32 Moreover, the two sides have 
yet established substantial Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). There are a few 
declaratory and transparency measures in place such as publication of defense reports and 
announcements of plans for major military exercises, but communication (such as 
hotlines), regulatory (such as a cold of conduct over the strait), or limitation measures 
(such as limitations on the deployment of certain forces) have largely been absent.194 
(Ministry of National Defense of the ROC 2009, pp. 33-34)  
                                                          
194 For analyses of the feasibility and implications of establishing cross-strait CBMs, see Bonnie S. Glaser, Kwei-bo 
Huang, and Steven M. Goldstein’s pieces in Cliff, Saunders, and Harold, 2011. 
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However, this does not mean nothing has changed. First of all, rhetorically Beijing has 
attempted to make reassuring rather than threatening statements about the cross-strait 
military situation. (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2011, p. 
282) If one contrasts China’s 2010 defense white paper on Taiwan and its 2004 version, 
the difference is striking. As regards the Taiwan scenario, the 2010 white paper states, 
“The Chinese government has formulated and implemented principles and 
policies for advancing peaceful development of cross-strait relations in the 
new situation, promoted and maintained peace and stability in the area. 
Significant and positive progress has been achieved in cross-strait relations.” 
(Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, 2011) 
The rhetoric in the 2004 white paper is much more threatening,  
“The situation in the relations between two sides of the Taiwan Strait is 
grim… The separatist activities of the ‘Taiwan independence’ forces have 
increasingly become the biggest immediate threat to China’s sovereignty 
and territorial integrity as well as peace and stability on both sides of the 
Taiwan Strait and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.” (Information Office 
of the State Council of the PRC, 2004)  
Secondly, the PLA’s other missions start to compete for attention and resources as the 
cross-strait rapprochement continues. In 2005 Hu Jintao proposed in abstract terms the 
PLA’s “historic mission in the new phase of the new century”: maintain the CCP’s status 
as the ruling party; provide a security guarantee to safeguard China’s continued 
development; help safeguard China’s expanding national interests; and play a role in 
fostering world peace. (Xinhua News Agency, September 27, 2005) In particular, two 
recent developments seem to foreshadow some adjustments of the relative importance of 
the Taiwan scenario for the Chinese military. The first development is China’s intensified 
maritime disputes in the East and South China Sea with its neighbors, which would 
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require at least some limited power projection capabilities if China wants to defend its 
maritime claims and even seize and control disputed islands. (Glosny 2009, 109-125, p. 
122)  
The second development is the rise of the PLA’s non-combat military operations such as 
disaster relief and rescue, counterterrorism, peacekeeping, evacuation of overseas 
Chinese citizens, anti-piracy, etc. (Fravel, 2011) With China’s now far-flung economic 
interests still expanding, it is expected that the PLA’s non-combat missions will only 
increase. Although these new developments do not necessarily mean that Beijing will 
ease its military pressures upon Taiwan or shift the PLA’s focus further away from the 
Taiwan scenario, it does mean that military as well as civilian hardliners on Taiwan will 
have to try harder to justify expending limited resources in an arguably improved 
situation. 
If the military dimension casts a shadow over the long-term sustainability of Ma’s 
conciliatory approach on sovereignty, the restoration of U.S.-Taiwan relations and the 
latter’s expanded international space in recent years have tempered the impetus to 
sovereignty assertions. The inauguration of Ma Ying-jeou offered high hope to both 
capitals to rescue the U.S.-Taiwan relationship from the nadir during most of the Chen 
Shui-bian years. Despite the Bush administration’s quietly turning down Ma’s hope that 
he could visit Washington before the inauguration, (Romberg, 2008a) Washington-Taipei 
ties were off to a good start. Senior officials from the White House, State Department, 
and the U.S. Pacific Command one after another commended Ma’s approach of handling 
mainland affairs and shrugged off rumors that Washington was concerned about closer 
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cross-strait relations.(Romberg, 2008b, p. 17) The U.S. support of Ma’s policies 
continued after Bush left office and Obama sworn in. On March 18, 2009, then AIT 
Chairman Raymond Burghardt emphatically and unambiguously conveyed the U.S. 
endorsement of Ma’s policies at a press conference in Taipei, which is worth citing at 
length: 
I’d like to emphasize that the Obama administration, like the Bush 
administration before it, has a very positive view of the progress that has 
been made since last May in restoring dialogue across the Taiwan Strait 
and in the many steps toward improved cross-Strait relations that have been 
taken… Our relationship with President Ma and with his administration has 
been excellent… We will continue to encourage constructive cross-Strait 
engagement. At the same time our commitments under the Taiwan Relations 
Act will remain unchanged. We believe, as President Ma does as well, that 
Taiwan must negotiate from a position of confidence.(Burghardt, 2009)  
Throughout the course of Ma’s first term, its relations with Washington had been mostly 
cordial except in a few areas such as its policy flip-flop of the importation of U.S. beef, 
on which the unprincipled domestic wrangling is still ongoing. The state of U.S.-Taiwan 
relationship led Ma Ying-jeou to proclaim that it is the “healthiest” in 30 years. (Chan, 
2012) Moreover, toward the second half of 2011 there were a series of moves taken by 
the U.S. government that were interpreted by the DPP and many others as tacit tactics to 
shore up Ma Ying-jeou’s domestic support for the upcoming presidential election in 
January 2012. First came multiple high-level visits of U.S. officials to Taipei, including 
assistant secretary of commerce, assistant secretary of the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, deputy assistant trade representative, administrator of the U.S. 
Agency for International Development, and finally Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel 
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Poneman, who became the highest-ranking government official to visit Taiwan in over a 
decade. (Romberg, 2012)  
Then in December 2011 the AIT announced that Taiwan was being nominated for 
inclusion in the United States Visa Waiver Program (VMP). Although the AIT 
emphasized that the decision was due to Taiwan having met the U.S. statutory 
requirements for membership of the VWP and had nothing to do with the election, the 
timing was delicate enough to warrant some speculations. (Yeh, 2011b) Finally, right 
before the election Douglas Paal, former AIT director, commented in Taiwan that that the 
“1992 consensus” was a “creative formulation” to enable Taipei and Beijing to negotiate 
issues pragmatically and that the DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen’s policies 
could threaten the stability of the region. The AIT quickly pointed out that Paal by no 
means represented the U.S. government and distanced itself from him by calling off a 
scheduled meeting, but still the suspicion of U.S. non-neutrality in the election was 
reinforced. (Shih and Wang, 2012) No matter whether these moves were intended to have 
an impact on Taiwan’s election or not, they demonstrated that the Ma Ying-jeou 
government relations with the U.S. and mutual trust were in good shape. 
Skeptics might argue that the U.S. support has actually been waning in light of the U.S. 
government stalling in selling arms such as F-16 C/Ds to Taiwan and the plethora of 
“abandon Taiwan” thesis from some quarters of the U.S. academics and former officials.  
Both objections, however, do not bear close scrutiny.  
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After the Ma administration came into office, Taiwan received three arms sales packages 
from the U.S. and despite critics’ accusations of the U.S. government’s inadequate efforts 
to supply Taiwan with necessary defensive arms in a timely manner, the three packages 
are actually large in historical perspective and have reassured the Taiwanese government 
of the U.S. continued adherence to its longstanding policy on arms sales to Taiwan. On 
October 3, 2008, the Bush administration notified the Congress of a long-anticipated 
arms sales package worth of $6.4 billion to Taiwan, including most notably 330 PAC-3 
missile defense missiles and 30 Apache attack helicopters. (Kan, 2011b) The Ma 
government responded with euphoria, “we feel that [the Oct. 3] announcement by the 
U.S. administration marks an end to the turmoil in Taiwan-U.S. relations of the past eight 
years and also represents the beginning of a new era in peace and security, as well as 
mutual trust between Taiwan and the United States.” (McNeil, 2008) 
The Obama administration has sold Taiwan defense articles and services totaling more 
than $12 billion in less than two years. The first package came in January 2010 and 
among others included 114 PAC-3 missile defense missiles and 60 Black Hawk utility 
helicopters. Most of the items were actually pending from the 2001 big basket and 
represented no breakthroughs, but it elicited unusually harsh reactions from Beijing, 
including another rupture of military-to-military relations and proposed sanctions against 
U.S. firms involved in the production of those arms. (Wolf and Blanchard, 2010) Then in 
September 2011, the Obama administration announced its decision to upgrade Taiwan’s 
inventory of F-16 A/Bs at a possible cost of $5.3 billion. Given that Taiwan has requested 
buying 66 newer F-16 C/Ds since 2006 and the upgrading decision again circumvented 
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the F-16 C/D issue, Taiwan’s friends in the Congress and the defense industry criticized 
the Obama administration for buckling under China’s pressure.  
The U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, for example, while acknowledging the upgrading 
will “help Taiwan address diminishing manufacturing sources and obsolescence issues, 
improve reliability and maintainability, improve survivability, and update aircraft 
capabilities to remain abreast of current mission requirements,” alleged that the balking at 
the F-16 C/D issue will “represent a capitulation of America’s obligation to provide 
Taiwan with defensive arms based solely on Taiwan’s needs.” (Hammond-Chambers, 
2011) Nevertheless, government officials and supporters of the upgrading decision 
pointed out correctly that retrofitting Taiwan’s existing F-16 A/Bs with radar, weapons 
and structural upgrades was a faster and cheaper way to strengthen Taiwan’s air power 
without doing serious damage to the fragile U.S.-China relationship.195 Former AIT head 
Richard Bush believed the decision also demonstrated the U.S. continuing commitment 
to Taiwan’s defense. (Bush, 2011) The Taiwanese government, though still pressing for 
the F-16 C/D sale, echoed the U.S. government’s argument that the retrofitting would 
advance its air power significantly and was a reflection of the U.S. commitment. (Yeh, 
2011a)  
In the past few years quite a few U.S. academics and former officials called for a 
fundamental adjustment of its Taiwan policy in light of the cross-strait rapprochement 
                                                          
195 A National Journal’s survey of defense and foreign policy experts found that two-thirds of its “National Security 
Insiders” agreed with the Obama administration’s upgrading decision. (Sorcher, 2011) Additionally, according to the 
Taipei Times, a classified Pentagon report actually believed that F-16 C/Ds were not suitable for Taiwan’s defense on 
the grounds that “the planes and runways from which they would operate could not survive an initial missile attack 
from China.” Rather the Pentagon recommended short takeoff and vertical landing fighters for Taiwan. (Lowther, 2011)  
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and changing strategic landscape in East Asia. Different variants of these arguments 
suggested substantial scaling back the U.S. support to Taiwan at a minimum or even an 
outright abandonment of Taiwan, i.e., repealing the TRA.196 For example, Bruce Gilley 
argued in Foreign Affairs that the U.S. should facilitate the “Finlandization” of Taiwan. 
The term “Finlandization” means Finland’s post-WWII arrangement with the Soviet 
Union under which Helsinki agreed not to join hands with other countries to challenge 
Soviet interests in exchange for the Kremlins’ promise to respect Finnish domestic 
autonomy and democracy.  
In the cross-strait context, Taipei should distance itself from being a U.S. strategic ally 
and refrain from undermining the CCP’s rule in China, while Beijing would reduce its 
military threats and grant more international space and economic benefits to Taipei. The 
U.S., for its part, should consult with Beijing about its contacts with Taipei, exclude 
Taiwan from its battle plans, and most significantly, cut back its arms sales to Taipei. 
(Gilley, 2010) In another prominent piece, Charles Glaser was more explicit in tying an 
abandonment of Taiwan with the importance of U.S.-China relations by saying that 
“backing away from its commitments with Taiwan” would “remove the most obvious and 
contentious flash point between the United States and China and smooth the way for 
better relations between them in the decades to come.” (Glaser, 2011, p. 87) 
The “abandon Taiwan” chorus is not without serious critics. Nancy Tucker and Bonnie 
Glaser criticized the abandonment idea head on by arguing that the benefits of such a 
move are elusive and risks are high. (Tucker and Glaser, 2011) Specifically they pointed 
                                                          
196 In addition to the two pieces cited below, see also Owens, 2009; Miller Center of Public Affairs, 2011. 
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out that abandoning or reducing support for Taiwan will unlikely secure China’s 
cooperation on issues over maritime rights, nuclear proliferation, cyber security, etc., as 
China’s positions are determined by its own national interests and are “not taken as 
favors to Washington.” (Tucker and Glaser, 2011, p. 25) Instead, an abandonment of 
Taiwan and the almost certain consequence of Taiwan being incorporated into mainland 
China in some form will hurt the U.S. economic interests in an autonomous Taiwan and 
the U.S. stature as the beacon of democracy, and perhaps more significantly, put the U.S. 
credibility at risk in the eyes of its friends and allies in Asia. (Tucker and Glaser, 2011) 
Moreover, Richard Bush noted that Taiwan is a strategic asset rather than a liability to the 
U.S. because it is “a litmus test of what kind of great power China will become,” i.e., 
how China will approach the Taiwan Strait issue sends a message about whether China’s 
rise will be peaceful and constructive or not. (Bush, 2012) Beyond these strategic 
concerns over ditching Taiwan, Shelley Rigger added that moral reasons should also 
prevent the U.S. from ending its security assistance to Taiwan hastily given the “decades 
of friendship, cooperation, common purpose, and shared sacrifice.” (Rigger, 2011, p. 4) 
If Taipei does not take enough comfort from these criticisms of abandoning Taiwan from 
prominent experts on U.S.-China-Taiwan relations given their non-official status, senior 
officials from the Obama administration have certainly driven home that an abandonment 
of Taiwan is far from being a serious option for Washington. Jeffrey Bader, former senior 
director for Asian affairs in the NSC, commented in Taipei in March 2012 that the idea of 
abandoning Taiwan is like something from a “kids’ playground” rather than something 
learned at “school,” and it is simply “unthinkable.” Moreover, Bader emphasized, “there 
212 
 
is a pretty strong consensus” in Washington “about the importance of Taiwan—
democracy, stability, and the peaceful resolution [of cross-strait differences],” and that 
his view was shared by his colleagues in the NSC and the State Department. (Shih, 2012) 
Bader’s colleague, Kurt Campbell,  who was Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs, more systematically elucidated “why Taiwan matters” in the strategic 
context of the U.S. “rebalancing” toward Asia when he testified before the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee in October 2011. Campbell stressed that an important part of the U.S. 
Asian strategy is “maintaining a robust and multidimensional unofficial relationship with 
Taiwan,” and “consistent with this interest is the United States’ strong and enduring 
commitment to the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.” 
Moreover, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship advances many of the U.S. economic and 
security interests in the region and the management of the relationship will have a great 
impact on the way partners view the U.S. across the Asia-Pacific region. Campbell also 
“categorically” rejected the assertion that the U.S. effort to build a “positive, cooperative, 
and comprehensive” relationship with Beijing would come at the expense with relations 
with Taiwan. (Campbell, 2011)  In short, although the “abandon Taiwan” thesis has 
inevitably caught plenty of media attention, it has not come close to be the mainstream 
view and has not influenced the Obama administration’s Taiwan policy in any perceptible 
way. Although the Taiwanese government and Taiwan’s friends in the Congress, defense 
industry and think tanks would still fault the Obama administration for not offering 
enough support, the truth is that the U.S.-Taiwan relations have been in a far better state 
characterized by considerable mutual trust.  
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Moreover, Taiwan’s international space has been expanded, if only to a limited extent. 
The limited expansion of Taiwan’s international space is reflected in several aspects. 
First of all, it managed to preserve the number of its formal diplomatic allies at 23 with a 
tacit understanding of “diplomatic truce” with Beijing. Given the downward trend of the 
number of Taipei’s diplomatic allies and Beijing’s rising economic and political clout, 
this is actually a more remarkable achievement than it appears to be. Beijing has so far 
been tacitly observed the “truce” and reportedly turned down at least three of Taipei’s 
allies’ requests to switch sides. 
Moreover, Taiwan has participated in the UN-affiliated World Health Assembly (WHA) 
under the name “Chinese Taipei” as an official observer for the past three years. In 
particular, its presence in the WHA in May 2009 marked the first time to participate in a 
meeting or activity of U.N. specialized agencies since 1971, when the ROC’s seat in the 
U.N. was taken over by the PRC. It was also the first time for Taiwan to take part in the 
WHA after 12 unsuccessful attempts to join the body since 1997. (Low, 2009) It also 
meant that China relaxed its longstanding position that Taiwan was not eligible to join the 
U.N, its affiliated bodies or any other international organizations composed of sovereign 
states. However, the opposition DPP mounted strong criticisms against the seemingly 
welcome development for Taipei. The DPP pointed out that the participation in the WHA 
was no more than a malicious favor from Beijing and that the negotiation process was not 
transparent enough to ensure that no secret deals were conducted between the KMT and 
the CCP. Most importantly, the DPP alleged, Taiwan’s status in its participation in the 
WHA could be relegated to that of the NGOs or an “associate member” subordinate to 
214 
 
Beijing’s sponsorship.197 (deLisle, 2009) The Ma Ying-jeou government defended the 
participation as a major breakthrough in terms of Taiwan’s international space without 
compromising its dignity or sovereignty. In light of Taiwan’s domestic political 
atmosphere, the wrangling over WHA may never end, but one would be hard-pressed not 
to admit that the participation is an overall positive development for Taipei, albeit with 
limits.  
Another development in terms of Taiwan’s participation in international organizations is 
that former Vice President and honorary chairman of the KMT Lien Chan became the 
highest-level Taiwanese official to attend the APEC from 2008 to 2011. (Chan, 
2011)This is in sharp contrast to the 2001 APEC summit in Shanghai, when Chen Shui-
bian was unable to send another former Vice President Li Yuan-zu as his envoy and 
decided to withdraw from the meeting altogether. Taipei also substantially expanded its 
membership in visa waiver programs around the world by increasing the number from 53 
to 124. In the economic sphere, Taipei acceded to the Government Procurement 
Agreement under the WTO and it has continued to vigorously pursue free trade 
agreements (FTAs) with other countries: It signed an investment protection accord with 
Japan in September 2011, is negotiating an FTA with Singapore, and is conducting 
feasibility studies for possible FTAs with India and the Philippines. 
In his second inaugural address on May 20, 2012, President Ma boasted of the diplomatic 
achievements during his first term by pointing out the Taiwan-U.S. relationship being the 
                                                          
197 In May 2011, the release of an internal memo of the WHO which referred Taiwan as a province of China 
exacerbated these concerns and prompted the Ma Ying-jeou government to protest against the WHO and Beijing. (Mo, 
2011) 
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most solid “security and economic partnership” of the past 30 years, the Taiwan-Japan 
“special partnership” being the “friendliest” in 40 years, the European Union and the 
European Parliament’s support on many occasions, and breakthroughs in international 
organizations. (Ma, 2012) Ma attributed these achievements to the practice of “viable 
diplomacy”. In August 2008 Ma elaborated on the concept and strategy of his viable 
diplomacy when he delivered a speech to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Viable diplomacy is in line with the spirit of the “pragmatic diplomacy” 
previously promoted by the government, both being based on the principle 
of pragmatism… Further, we realize that the difficulties we’ve previously 
encountered in foreign relations did not result from our promotion of any 
policy opposed by the world, or from any rhetoric or behavior despised by 
the international community. Rather, they were entirely the consequence of 
the many years of competition and struggle, confrontation and conflict, 
between Taiwan and mainland China in the arena of foreign affairs… The 
basic idea of our resultant policy… is to find a viable path for the 
development of the ROC’s foreign relations. The concrete approach for 
doing so is for Taiwan and mainland China, building on positive 
development in cross-strait relations, to come up with a modus of 
interaction in the international community that is conducive to co-existence 
and co-prosperity. (Ma, 2008)   
The logic of viable diplomacy is quite straightforward: since the diplomatic competition 
and confrontation between Taipei and Beijing is the root of the former’s diplomatic 
predicament, cross-strait rapprochement should be conducive to Taipei’s foreign 
relations; on the other hand, a continuation of Taipei’s deteriorating diplomatic standing 
will create a backlash against the positive development of cross-strait relations. Similar to 
the attacks on Taiwan’s participation in the WHA, the DPP also criticized the practice of 
viable diplomacy on the grounds that it was too dependent on Beijing’s good will and 
whatever tangible results achieved through viable diplomacy were at the expense of 
Taiwan’s sovereignty. (Yan, 2010) Some of the DPP’s concerns are not illegitimate, but 
216 
 
the fact remains that whatever diplomatic strategy Taiwan adopts, Beijing could always 
be an insurmountable obstacle. If more international visibility and participation is the 
goal of Taiwan’s diplomatic endeavors, then viable diplomacy may be the only “viable” 
option indeed.  
On balance, the three dimensions of power shift across the Taiwan Strait have exhibited 
somewhat different trajectories after 2008 with the military balance being the exception 
to the overall relaxed atmosphere. But limited expansion of Taiwan’s international space 
and improved U.S.-Taiwan relationship has ameliorated the deteriorating military balance 
for Taipei. In addition, the Ma Ying-jeou administration has faced some resource 
constrains. The global financial crisis and the havoc wrecked by the 2009 Typhoon 
Morakot in southern Taiwan probably explained why the government failed to 
consistently raise its defense budget to the promised three percent of Taiwan’s GDP. On 
the other hand, President Ma has had a relatively freer hand in resource mobilization due 
to weak political constraints. He won the 2008 presidential victory with an unprecedented 
wide margin—58% vs. 42% of the DPP candidate, which came on the heels of the 
KMT’s sweeping victory in the legislative election by grabbing 81 out of the total 113 
seats. With the assumption by Ma of the KMT chairmanship in 2009, it is fair to say that 
Ma’s political stature has been unrivaled for a while and he can more easily pursue his 
preferred policies to ensure Taiwan’s survival and security.     
To summarize the Ma Ying-jeou era, improved U.S.-Taiwan relations, expanded 
international space and weak political constraints are sustaining the conciliatory approach 
of low sovereignty assertiveness, but shifting military balance and resource constraints 
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cast a shadow on the long-term prospect of the still fragile cross-strait rapprochement. On 
January 14, 2012, Taiwan had its fifth fully democratic presidential election and a 
concurrent legislative election, and Ma successfully won his second term and the KMT 
was able to pull off a majority in the legislature.198 Albeit President Ma and the KMT 
both received reduced mandate in light of the much narrower margins of victory, in all 
likelihood the current rapprochement will continue provided that no dramatic changes 
take place in the realm of power balance or domestic constraints.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
198 For a lucid analysis of the election, see (deLisle, 2012) 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion  
7.1 Key arguments revisited 
Security and sovereignty have been inexorably interwoven for Taiwan, a fact that is 
easily underappreciated because few, if any, political entities in the world can be put in 
the same category.  The security-sovereignty nexus derives from both an international 
setting—the unassailable status of the norm of sovereignty—and a domestic setting—
Taiwan’s ambiguous sovereign status. Under this broader context, Taiwan’s aspiration 
for sovereignty—the Taiwan independence policy—will become stronger if the security 
environment becomes more perilous as a result of adverse power shift and alternative 
means of security-seeking are not readily available due to domestic constraints. On the 
other hand, Taiwan’s pursuit of sovereignty will subside if the external or internal 
constraints become more benign and its survival and security is not at stake. 
I have tested the hypotheses by examining the rise and fall of the Taiwan independence 
policy from 1988 to 2012. From the late 1980s to early 1990s, Taiwan faced a very 
benign security environment as a result of its qualitative edge in military balance, 
enhanced ties with the United States and fruitful pragmatic diplomacy. Moreover, 
domestic resources were abundant due to sustained economic boom and growing 
government revenue. Although President Lee Teng-hui’s power was contested from the 
KMT conservatives, the political division did not undermine his ability of resource 
mobilization for national security purposes because the conservatives were generally 
supportive of strengthening Taiwan’s military capability and diplomatic status. Under 
these auspicious circumstances, sovereignty assertiveness was low. However, the 1995-
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96 Taiwan Strait crisis was a turning point, after which mainland China intensified both 
its Taiwan scenario-focused military modernization and diplomatic strangulation. Also 
ominously for Taiwan, the Clinton administration’s efforts to restore and build better 
relations with China were accompanied by some concurrent policy change towards 
Taiwan, mostly notably the announcement of the three noes. These unfavorable 
developments were to some extent ameliorated by weak domestic constraints on resource 
mobilization: resources were still sufficient and Lee’s political power was strengthened 
after the 1996 presidential election and 1997 constitutional amendment. As a 
consequence, sovereignty assertiveness rose to a limited extent in the late 1990s. 
During the Chen Shui-bian years, the security situation was most precarious for Taiwan: 
the PLA coupled its traditional numerical advantage with qualitative advancement to 
present Chinese leaders with more credible means to conduct a variety of coercive 
campaigns against Taiwan and to deter, delay and disrupt possible U.S. intervention; 
political relations with Washington was severely damaged and mutual distrust pervaded 
bilateral relations; and Taipei’s international space shrank noticeably in terms of both 
formal and substantive relations. The precarious security situation was compounded by 
strong resource and political constraints: sluggish economic growth, swollen government 
budget deficit, increasing spending on social welfare programs, and an executive-
legislative impasse throughout Chen’s whole terms. These external and internal 
constraints prompted the Taiwanese government to be the most assertive on sovereignty 
from 2002 to 2007.  
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The new security environment confronted by the Ma Ying-jeou administration is 
characterized by a mixture of negative and positive developments: on the one hand, 
military balance is still tilting in favor of mainland China even though Chinese leaders 
and the PLA rhetorically toned down military threats; on the other hand, mutual trust has 
been restored and improvements of bilateral relations have been made between Taipei 
and Washington and Taipei’s international space has been expanded to some extent. In 
terms of domestic constraints, although the global financial crisis and the 2009 Typhoon 
Morakot limited available resources for the government, Ma’s unprecedented political 
power ensured that he has faced fewer political constraints to mobilize these resources to 
ensure survival and security. 
Chen Shui-bian’s early moderation on sovereignty cannot be fully explained by my 
theory. As noted earlier, Chen’s personal political leadership was instrumental in taking a 
series of somewhat surprising initiatives characterized by low sovereignty assertiveness. 
More generally, I readily admit that I am not offering a mono-causal argument here and 
many other factors are also important in understanding the rise and fall of the Taiwan 
independence policy, such as electoral politics, shifting identity, party ideology, etc. But I 
do argue that the proposed theory focusing on power shift and domestic constraints 
provides the greatest theoretical purchase on Taiwan’s sovereignty assertiveness in a 
deductively consistent way. Moreover, it is also plausible that these other factors are 
themselves secondary and their effects can at least be partially explained by elements of 
power shift. For example, the PLA’s growing military threats might explain why being 
assertive on sovereignty is sometimes electorally beneficial; likewise, Taiwan’s 
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deteriorating diplomatic standing seems to be quite closely associated with Taiwanese 
shifting identity.  
7.2. Theoretical and policy implications  
Given the distinctiveness of Taiwan, it is arguably harder for the findings to travel very 
far. Still there are some theoretical implications. First, international relations literature 
has abundant work on balance of power and balancing strategies, but Taiwan’s 
sovereignty assertions have indicated that balancing, under certain circumstances, can 
take a political face. In addition to hard and soft balancing, the study of Taiwan’s 
behaviors suggest that there is “political balancing”, too.199 Political balancing is no 
different from other balancing strategies in terms of its fundamental goal of maintaining 
survival and security; and it is also similar to other balancing strategies in terms of 
possible counterproductive consequences if it engages the adversary in an action-reaction 
spiraling dynamic. Moreover, different balancing strategies are interactive: when more 
orthodox means are not readily available or beyond reach due to external or internal 
constraints, political leaders are more incentivized to turn to unorthodox ones.  
Second, the findings also demonstrate that international norms do matter in political 
leaders’ strategic calculations. This is especially true if a norm is as undisputed and 
universally enshrined as sovereignty and its associated rules. The operation of 
international norms is not as visible as military buildup, economic sanctions or 
diplomatic maneuvering, but the fact that all three sides—Beijing, Washington and 
Taipei—have taken pains to frame Taiwan’s sovereignty issue in its own favor can only 
                                                          
199 For classical works on balance of power, see Gulick, 1955; Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1987. For the new developments of 
the concept, see Paul, Wirtz, and Fortmann, 2004. For soft balancing, see Pape, 2005; Paul, 2005; Brooks, 2005. 
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be explained by its normative significance. On the other hand, however, the significance 
of norms should not be overstated. Political leaders tend to rely more heavily on 
international norms when there are few alternative and arguably more effective means to 
ensure national security. 
The findings also have policy implications. First of all, there is an external origin of the 
Taiwan independence policy. The conventional understanding of the Taiwan 
independence policy is that it is a result of internal developments on the island of Taiwan: 
shifting identity, domestic politics, political leaders’ ideological predilection, etc. These 
domestic “roots” of Taiwan independence certainly matter, but the findings here suggest 
that its external origin is at least equally, if not more, important. The changing security 
environment as a consequence of changing military threat, U.S. support and diplomatic 
standing has had a strong bearing on how much incentive Taiwanese leaders had to resort 
to sovereignty assertions to maintain survival and security. An improved security 
environment and a relatively secure Taiwan will be less obsessed with its sovereign status.  
A related implication is that some of Beijing’s measures at containing Taiwan 
independence and promoting unification could paradoxically have the opposite effects. 
Beijing tends to believe that if outdone militarily, economically and diplomatically and 
left with no other alternatives, Taipei could only choose to accept unification under “one 
country, two systems”. It is possible. But it may well be the contrary. Instead of 
conceding in the face of Beijing’s formidable coercive power, waning U.S. support and 
deteriorating diplomatic standing, Taipei may decide not to capitulate but to assert its 
separate and independent sovereignty as one last hope. 
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Secondly, partisan and individual preferences on Taiwan’s sovereignty issue may matter 
less than the external and internal constraints facing Taiwan’s leaders when it comes to 
actual policy. The division over Taiwan’s relations with mainland China between the 
KMT-led blue camp and the DPP-led green camp is well known and their constant 
wrangling seems to suggest that their differences are irreconcilable. Beijing has acted out 
of this belief and preferred to deal with the more Beijing-friendly KMT government and 
avoided the DPP whose party charter still retains the Taiwan independence clause. In 
terms of individual leaders, Beijing also tends to make judgments about their “true color” 
first and then decide whether to deal with this particular Taiwanese leader or not. For 
example, when Beijing concluded that Lee Teng-hui was a diehard separatist after Lee’s 
interview with a Japanese journalist in 1994 and his Cornell trip in 1995, the deep 
suspicion had never escaped its interaction with Taiwan during the rest of Lee’s 
presidency.  
Likewise, when Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election in 2000, Beijing’s attitude 
was “listening to his words, and watching his deeds”, i.e. determining Chen’s political 
inclination first before giving credit to him. And when Chen’s “one-country-on-each-side” 
statement dropped a bombshell in August 2002, Beijing again concluded that he was not 
trustworthy at all and never had a real dialogue with him. What Beijing did not seem to 
realize, however, was that those “words and deeds” were as much a product of external 
and internal constraints in which Beijing played an important part as they were a 
manifestation of ideological preferences. Indeed in the past twenty years or so, different 
political parties and political leaders on Taiwan have adopted similar policies and the 
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same political parties and political leaders have adopted different policies during different 
time periods, testifying the often overvalued importance of partisan preferences and the 
overlooked significance of strategic constraints.  
Thirdly, the sustainability of the current cross-strait rapprochement hinges upon how 
Taiwan assesses the evolving security environment. If the security environment becomes 
more benign, Taiwan will more likely continue the low-profile approach on sovereignty 
and its engagement with the mainland; if, on the other hand, the security environment 
deteriorates, Taiwan’s sovereignty assertiveness may once again rise and cross-strait 
rapprochement will break down as a consequence. In an address to the Washington think 
tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on May 12, 2011, President 
Ma Ying-jeou elucidated the “three lines of defense for the ROC’s national security”: 
institutionalizing the cross-strait rapprochement, enhancing Taiwan’s contributions to 
international development and aligning defense with diplomacy. (Ma, 2011) Implicit in 
his remarks was that the three lines are a “bundle”, i.e. the rapprochement of cross-strait 
relations cannot be sustained without Taiwan’s increasing international participation and 
a strong defense.  
In terms of policy specifics, Beijing’s interests will actually be well served by easing 
military pressures upon and granting more international space for Taiwan because these 
moves reduce Taiwan’s incentive to push on the sovereignty issue and sustain the cross-
strait rapprochement. Mainland China has the perennial concern that easing military 
pressures will undermine its coercive power against Taiwan, but after decades of the PLA 
military modernization, big and small crises, and the enactment of the Anti-Secession 
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Law, both Beijing’s deterrent capability and credibility have been well established and 
some goodwill gestures will unlikely change that. As a first step Beijing could consider 
redeploying or withdrawing some of the SRBMs and LACMs targeting against Taiwan. 
For both countervalue and counterforce purposes, the number of deployed missiles is 
already excessive, and a partial redeployment or withdrawal will only sway the island’s 
threat perception without sacrificing the PLA’s coercive power.200 The same can be said 
about Taiwan’s international space. Beijing is concerned that expanding Taiwan 
international space now could be taken advantage of either by the DPP or by other 
potential “separatists” later. But the cross-strait gap of diplomatic standing is so huge and 
Taiwan is so isolated that a few more IGO memberships for Taiwan will unlikely create 
the slippery slope that Beijing is anxious about. And Taiwan independence will only 
become less appealing when there are other ways of surviving in the precarious world.  
 7.3. Future research 
One line of future research could extend the timeline to Taiwan’s authoritarian era. 
Although this project is on the Taiwan independence policy, which was a nonissue before 
Taiwan’s democratic transition, its framework focusing on external and internal 
constraints could be useful in explaining Taiwan’s survival strategies during its 
authoritarian era. A brief historical overview reveals how Taiwan adapted its strategies to 
the more and more constraining environment. Immediately after the communist victory 
on the mainland in 1949 and before the end of 1958, the KMT government on Taiwan 
                                                          
200 A RAND study concluded that between 90 and 240 sufficiently accurate, submunition-equipped SRBMs would be 
sufficient to shut down Taiwan’s fighter force in a few minutes by attacking runways and parking ramps. (Shlapak, 
2009). In history Beijing has indicated its flexibility in the missile development once. In October 2002, former PRC 
President Jiang Zemin reportedly proposed to President Bush that China could reduce the missiles opposite Taiwan, but 
on the condition that the U.S. reduces its arms sales to Taiwan. (Brown, 2003) 
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adopted an aggressive strategy of military counter-attack, when the US support was 
particularly strong after the outbreak of the Korean War and the East-West confrontation 
was intense. Subsequently between 1958 and 1971, its strategy shifted from military 
counter-attack to political counter-attack. From the 1960s, the West-East relationship 
came into a period of détente and the US support of Taiwan became less whole-hearted, 
the ROC thus had to modify its initial aggressive and offensive strategy and turned to a 
strategy of political counter-attack. The modified strategy suggested “a long-term plan of 
‘political influence’ in winning over the hearts and minds of enemies rather than one of 
drastic military confrontation”. (Hsieh, 1985, p. 289) After the diplomatic debacle in the 
1970s, the ROC’s new strategy was “economics- and trade-first diplomacy”, which 
emphasized Taiwan’s international economic, trade and other unofficial contracts rather 
than on the traditional diplomacy of political and/or official interactions. The ROC 
government hoped to “enmesh other countries in a network of trade, economic and 
technological relations with Taiwan so that it would be against, or even be harmful to, 
their interests for the PRC to take over Taiwan.” (Hsieh, 1985, p. 292) 
Another line of future research could move beyond Taiwan and study more generally 
“weapons of the weak” in international politics. In order to preserve survival and security 
interests, weaker actors in international politics have to be more innovative and creative 
than the stronger ones and they have to utilize their more limited resources more fully. In 
the case of Taiwan, the sovereignty norm has been presented from time to time to make 
the case that Taiwan should not be attacked or coerced when its military, diplomatic and 
economic means are woefully insufficient to make itself secure. Historically, guerrilla 
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warfare, terrorism, and nuclear weapons can all be characterized as weapons of the weak 
in one way or another. A recent study found that “coercive engineered migration” can 
also be used strategically as a weapon of the weak to extract concession from foreign 
targets. (Greenhill, 2010) Since the unusual circumstances and limited resources are often 
unique to the weak actors and their behaviors are sometimes seen either as 
incomprehensible or irrational, this is an area worthy of further study. 
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APPENDIX 
Timeline  
The early Lee Teng-hui Era (1988-1995) 
 1988/01/13, Lee Teng-hui assumed presidency upon Chiang Ching-kuo’s death; 
 1988/07, Lee Teng-hui was elected party chairman at the KMT’s 13th National Congress; 
 
 1989/5-1989/6, Tiananmen Square Protest and Crisis; 
 
 1990/05/20, Lee Teng-hui was inaugurated as the 8th president of the ROC, and set three 
conditions for the PRC for unification: democratization, renouncement of the use of force, 
exercising diplomatic restraint;  
 1990/10/07, the NUC was established; 
 
 1991, Taiwan became the biggest holder of foreign exchange reserves; 
 1991/02/23, the NUG was passed by the NUC; 
 1991/05/01, Lee Teng-hui abolished the “temporary provisions” during the “period of 
national mobilization for the suppression of communist rebellion”; 
 1991/11, Taipei joined the APEC together with Beijing and Hongkong; 
 1991/12/21, the 2nd National Assembly election; 
 1991/12/25, The Soviet Union was formally dissolved and the Cold War was over; 
 
 1992/08/01, the NUC passed “the Meaning of ‘One China’”, the core of which was “one 
China, different interpretations”; 
 1992/09/02, President Bush announced the sale of 150 F-16s to Taiwan; 
 1992/09, Taipei was granted GATT observer status; 
 1992/12, U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills became the first cabinet-level official to visit 
Taiwan since 1979; 
 1992/12/19, the 2nd Legislative Yuan election; 
 1992/12/22, France notified China that it decided to sell 60 Mirage 2000s to Taiwan; 
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 1993/2, Lee Teng-hui firmly consolidated power by having Lien Chan replace Hao Pei-tsun 
as the premier; 
 1993/4/27-1993/4/29, summit meeting of the SEF and ARATS between Koo Chen-fu and 
Wang Daohan in Singapore; 
 
 1994/9, the Clinton administration’s Taiwan Policy Review was released; 
 
 1995/01/30, PRC President Jiang Zemin proposed “eight points” regarding the Taiwan issue; 
 1995/04, Lee Teng-hui responded to Jiang’s “eight points” with his “six points”; 
The late Lee Teng-hui Era (1995-1999) 
 1995/06/7-1995/06/12, Lee Teng-hui visited the United States; 
 1995/07-1996/03, the third Taiwan Strait Crisis; 
 
 1996/03/23, Lee Teng-hui won the ROC’s first genuinely democratic presidential election;  
 1996/04/17, the U.S. and Japan announced the Joint Declaration on Security; 
 1996/12, Lee Teng-hui convened the National Development Conference to discuss further 
constitutional reform; 
 
 1997/07, the National Assembly approved the fourth constitutional amendment; 
 1997/09/23, the U.S. and Japan announced the revised Guidelines for Defense Cooperation; 
 1997/10/27-1997/11/03, PRC President Jiang Zemin visited the United States; 
 1997/12, “Monterey talks” was initiated; 
 1997/12, South Africa broke diplomatic relations with the ROC; 
 
 1998/02, Kenneth Lieberthal proposed a 50-year “interim arrangement” between Taipei and 
Beijing; 
 1998/06/30, U.S. President Clinton announced the “Three No’s” in Shanghai; 
 1998/10, the second Koo-Wang meeting was held in Beijing; 
 1998/12, the KMT acquired a solid majority in the Legislative Yuan election; 
 
 1999/03/24, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth proposed “interim agreements” 
between Taipei and Beijing; 
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 1999/07, Lee Teng-hui announced the “special state-to-state theory”; 
The Chen Shui-bian Era (2000-2008) 
 2000/05/20, Chen Shui-bian was inaugurated as the 10th president of the ROC, and he 
announced the “four noes and one without”; 
 2000/06/05, Chen Shui-bian indicated that he was willing to deal with the question of a future 
“one China”; 
 2000/10, the Chen Shui-bian government ordered the shutdown of the fourth nuclear plant; 
 2000/10/06, Premier Tang Fei resigned over the fourth nuclear plant controversy; 
 2000/12/31, Chen Shui-bian’s New Year messages mentioned “political integration” across 
the strait; 
 
 2001/01/01, the three mini-links were realized; 
 2001/04/24, President Bush approved a big arms sales package to Taiwan; 
 2001/04/25, President Bush said the U.S. will do “whatever it took” to defend Taiwan; 
 2001/11, “aggressive opening, effective management” replaced “no haste, be patient”; 
 2001/12/01, the 5th Legislative Yuan election; the DPP became the biggest party in the LY 
but was not able to acquire a majority for the green camp; 
 
 2002, China ordered two additional Sovremenny-class destroyers  from Russia; 
 2002/01/01, Taiwan jointed the WTO; 
 2002/03, the ROC Defense Minister Tang Yao-ming attended the U.S.-Taiwan Defense 
Summit in Florida; 
 2002/05/09, Chen Shui-bian’s talk on the Dadan island; 
 
 2002/08/03, Chen Shui-bian’s “one country on each side” statement; 
 
 2003/09/28, Chen Shui-bian said at the DPP’s 17th founding anniversary that a new 
constitution should be completed by 2006; 
 2003/10, Chen Shui-bian made a high-profile transit stop at New York; 
 2003/12, Chen Shui-bian announced the plan to hold a defensive referendum alongside the 
presidential election next year; 
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 2003/12/09, President Bush rebuked Taiwan’s planned referendum when meeting with the 
PRC Premier Wen Jiabao; 
 
 2004/03/20, Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election with a razor-thin margin for a 
second term; 
 2004/04/21, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly testified before the House 
International Relations Committee on the Taiwan issue; 
 2004/06, the Chen Shui-bian government decided to request a special budget for the arms 
deal; 
 2004/10, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said during an Asian trip that “Taiwan is not 
independent; it does not enjoy sovereignty as a nation”; 
 2004/12/10, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage described Taiwan as probably 
the biggest “landmine” in U.S.-China relations; 
 2004/12/11, the 6th LY election; the blue camp still held a thin majority; 
 2005/02/19, the joint statement of U.S.-Japan 2+2 meeting included peaceful resolution of the 
Taiwan issue as one of the “common strategic objectives”; 
 
 2005/02/24, Chen Shui-bian met with PFP Chairman James Soong  and issued a ten-point 
joint statement; 
 2005/03/14, the PRC’s National People’s Congress passed the Anti-Secession Law; 
 2005/04/26-2005/05/03, KMT Chairman Lien Chan visited mainland China; 
 2005/05/05-2005/05/13, PFP Chairman James Soong visited mainland China; 
 
 2006/02/27, Chen Shui-bian abolished the NUC and NUG; 
 2006/05/20, Taiwan’s first National Security Report was released; 
 2006/08-2006/10, mass protest asking Chen Shui-bian to resign; 
 
 2007/5, Chen Shui-bian proposed to hold a referendum on applying to the U.N. under the 
name “Taiwan”;  
 2007/09/11, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Christensen delivered a 
blistering speech at the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council; 
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The Ma Ying-jeou Era (2008-2012) 
 2008/03/22, the KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou won the 12th presidential election; 
 2008/05/20, Ma Ying-jeou proposed in his inaugural address “no unification, no 
independence, no use of force”; 
 2008/08/26, Ma Ying-jeou said during an interview that the cross-strait relationship is a 
“special relationship, but not that between two countries”; 
 2008/06/11, the SEF and ARATS resumed meeting after a hiatus of nine years; 
 2008/10/03, the outgoing Bush administration notified the Congress of an arms sales package 
worthy of $6.4 billion to Taiwan; 
 2008/11, at the second Chiang-Chen meeting, the three links were realized; 
 2008/11, former Vice President Lien Chan attended the APEC in Japan; 
 
 2009/05, Taiwan participated in the World Health Assembly for the first time since 1971; 
 2009/10, Ma Ying-jeou assumed the KMT chairmanship; 
 
 2010/01/29, the Obama administration notified the Congress of an arms sales package worthy 
of $6 billion to Taiwan; 
 2010/06/29, the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) was signed; 
 
 2011/09/21, the Obama administration notified the Congress of an arms sales package worthy 
of $5.8 billion to Taiwan, including upgrading of Taiwan’s 145 F-16 A/Bs; 
 2011/09/22, Taiwan signed an investment protection pact with Japan;  
 2011/10/04, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell testified before the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee on “Why Taiwan Matters”;  
 2011/12/12, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman visited Taiwan; 
 2011/12/22, Taiwan was nominated for inclusion in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP); 
 
 2012/01/12, former AIT director Douglas Paal said in Taipei that the 1992 Consensus was a 
“necessary compromise” and expressed concern for the DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-
wen;  
 2012/01/14, Ma Ying-jeou won the 13th presidential election. 
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